Bunch v. Potts

21 S.W. 437, 57 Ark. 257, 1893 Ark. LEXIS 75
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedFebruary 4, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 21 S.W. 437 (Bunch v. Potts) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bunch v. Potts, 21 S.W. 437, 57 Ark. 257, 1893 Ark. LEXIS 75 (Ark. 1893).

Opinion

MansEieed, J.

The claim of the plaintiff, Bunch, was for damages alleged to have been sustained through the failure of the defendants, Potts Bros., to ship the potatoes within the time contemplated by the contract. The promise of the defendants was to ship as soon as the weather would permit them to do so without exposing the potatoes to the danger of freezing ; and it is not entirely clear from the record that the trial court has found that there was any avoidable delay in making the shipment. But construing the conclusions of fact stated in the bill of exceptions to embrace a finding that there was such delay, only nominal damages were recoverable for it if no actual damage was suffered; and the failure to recover damages merely nominal can not entitle the plaintiff to a reversal of the judgment. Buckner v. Railway, 53 Ark. 18; Glasscock v. Rosengrant, 55 Ark. 376.

i. Emu- a* to nominal damages,

% Damage for breach of contract of

3. Right of vendee to weigh before payment.

In the absence of any special damage, the general damage a vendee is entitled to recover for the non-delivery of goods is the difference between the contract price and the market value of the goods at the time and place of delivery, with interest. Under this rule, if the market value of the potatoes was not above the contract price on the day they would have reached Little Rock, if shipped at the proper time, the plaintiff sustained no loss for which he can maintain an action. 2 Sedg. Dam. secs. 733, 734. But if they were worth more than the stipulated price on the day they should have been delivered, there was no evidence that warranted the court in finding' that their value had diminished in the short time that intervened before the day on which the defendant offered to deliver them; and the law will not allow the plaintiff to recover for a loss he could have avoided by accepting them. 2 Sedg. Dam. sec. 741. It is said, however, that he was justified in refusing the potatoes by the fact that he was not permitted to unload them before paying the amount of the invoice ; and also by the additional fact that it was afterwards-ascertained that a shortag'e existed in the quantity charg'ed for. But he had no right under the contract to have the cars unloaded before making payment ; and the fourth finding' of the court is against the contention that any shortage existed.

4. Special damage caused by delay in ship-

The only attempt to prove a special damag'e was made by Bunch’s own testimony. He stated that he had contracts with parties in Little Rock, where he was engaged in business, for the re-sale of thepotatoes, and that he lost in profits’ from 25 to 50 cents per barrel in consequence of the non-delivery of the potatoes before it was too late to sell them, as he had expected to be able to do, for use as seed. The indefinite nature of this statement as to the plaintiff’s loss per barrel indicates that he had no contracts to re-sell the potatoes at any fixed price. And his conditional offer to receive them at the contract price after they reached Lfittle Rock, without objection as to the time they were tendered, was a circumstance tending to show that he was not injured by the defendant’s’default in not forwarding them at an earlier day. Weed v. Dyer, 53 Ark. 160; Benj. on Sales, sec. 900. A fact of like tendency is found in his letter of February 19th, the tenor of which manifests the intention to receive the potatoes if shipped without further delay. It is an inference, too, that may be fairly drawn from other facts of which there is evidence, that the plaintiff might have obtained a substitute for the goods in time to have fulfilled his sub-contracts, and at a price that would not have reduced his profits. If he could have done so by a reasonable effort, and that course was necessary to his protection, it was his duty to pursue it. Benj. Sales, sec. 877; 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th ed.) secs. 201, 205; 2 do. secs. 740, 741. Warren v. Stoddart, 105 U. S. 224. Moreover, it is not shown that, at the time the principal contract was entered into, the defendants had notice of the sub-contracts; and without such notice the special damage claimed could not be-recovered. 1 Sedg. Dam. secs. 156, 158, 161, 202; 2 do. sec. 740; St. Louis, etc. Railway v. Mudford, 48 Ark. 509.

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Related

Continental Grain Co. v. Simpson Feed Co.
102 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Arkansas, 1951)
Kilgore Lumber Co. v. Thomas
128 S.W. 62 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1910)
State v. Rosenberger
111 S.W. 509 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1908)
Rose v. Christinet
92 S.W. 866 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1906)

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Bluebook (online)
21 S.W. 437, 57 Ark. 257, 1893 Ark. LEXIS 75, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bunch-v-potts-ark-1893.