Building Owners & Managers Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

470 A.2d 1092, 79 Pa. Commw. 598, 1984 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1141
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 18, 1984
DocketAppeals, Nos. 1424 C.D. 1982 and 1455 C.D. 1982
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 470 A.2d 1092 (Building Owners & Managers Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Building Owners & Managers Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 470 A.2d 1092, 79 Pa. Commw. 598, 1984 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1141 (Pa. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinion

Opinion by

President Judge Crumlish, Jr.,

We have consolidated for argument and disposition the appeals of Building Owners and Managers Association and Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans[601]*601portation Autority (SEPTA) from an order of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.1 We affirm.

On July 29, 1981, .the Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO) filed Supplement No. 28 to its Tariff Electric-Pa. P.U.C. No. 25 with a proposed effective date of September 27, 1981. This supplement was designed to produce an annual base rate increase of approximately $344.5 million. By order dated September 16, 1981, the Commission initiated a formal rate investigation and allowed the Supplement to be suspended by operation of law for seven months under Section 1308 of the Public Utility Code, 66 Pa. C. S. §1308.

Hearings were held before an Administrative Law Judge who, on April 8, 1982, issued a Recommended Decision. The Commission entered its Final Opinion and Order on May 21, 1982, which adopted .the ALJ’s Recommended Decision on the rate structure matters at issue in the appeals sub judice.

No. 1445 G.D. 1982

¡SEPTA presents two arguments on appeal. It contends first that it is entitled to a separate mass transportation rate which is designed to return to PECO a rate of return equal to its system rate of return. SEPTA also contends that it is entitled to the extension of conjunctive billing to its Reading Commuter Lines.

In support of its argument for a separate mass transportation rate, SEPTA points to its unique service characteristics.2 The Commission, in adopting [602]*602the ALJ’s decision, rejected SEPTA’-s claim for a sepárate- rate. The ALJ noted that SEPTA attempted to show itts uniqueness without examining other High Tension (HT) customers. The ALJ further noted that the mere fact .SEPTA may contribute a rate of return greater than the system average does not mean it deserves a special rate. We agree.3 We rejected a similar argument in United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 195, 390 A.2d 849 (1978). There, U.S. Steel requested a separate rate, presenting two substantial factors demonstrating its uniqueness : (1) its average gas usage was more than eighty-seven times higher and thirty times higher than the average usage of the two rate classes with which it was to be combined, and (2) it received gas service directly from the gas transmission pipeline. What we stated in U.S. Steel is equally applicable to the case before us. A large volume of use does not entitle a customer to a preferred rate. ■ Questions concerning the reasonableness of rates and the difference between rates are factual questions for the Commission, whose findings must be upheld if supported by competent evidence. U.S. Steel at 211, 290 A.2d at 857. Moreover, the mere fact that SEPTA may contribute a rate of return greater than the class average does not mean that it deserves a special rate. See, e.g., Park Towne v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 61 Pa. [603]*603Commonwealth Ct. 285, 291, 433 A.2d 610, 614 (1981). Testimony before the ALJ showed that Rate HT is designed to accommodate a wide range of demand' and usage characteristics, and that all HT customers benefit from this diversity. Accordingly, we are satisfied that there is competent evidence to support .the Commission’s finding.

SEPTA also argues that it is entitled to conjunctive billing of its Wayne Junction Substation. This claim arises from its acquisition in 1979 of Reading Commuter Lines which is supplied by the Wayne Junction Substation. All twenty-nine of SEPTA’s other feeder points are billed conjunctively.

'Section 2.2 of PECO’s tariff states the general rule of conjunctive billing:

Single Point Delivery: Unless otherwise stipulated therein, the rates in this Tariff for each class of service are based upon its supply through a single delivery and metering point for the total requirements at each separate premises of contracting Customer. Separate supply for the same Customer at other points of consumption shall be separately metered and billed.

An exception found in the Rate HT Tariff provides:

Where a load of an industrial Customer located on single or continuous premises becomes greater than the capacity of the standard circuit or circuits established by the Company to supply the Customer, an additional separate delivery point may be established for such premises upon the written request of the customer and billing continued as if the service were being delivered and metered at a single point, provided such multi-point delivery is not disadvantageous to the Company.

[604]*604The ALJ’s opinion as adopted by the Commission noted that the purpose of the limited conjunctive billing exception is to handle service growth by an individual customer, not service acquisitions. The ALJ reasoned that there is no reason why SEPTA should receive the benefit of reduced demand charges when all of the costs of dual services and meter reading are present. We agree. On its face, the billing exception in the tariff requires both that a customer’s load exceeds the capacity of the existing circuits and that the contiguous, billing would not be disadvantageous to the utility. The ALJ properly found that SEPTA met neither of these requirements as specified in PECO’s tariff.

No. 1424 C.D. 1982

The Association alleges unlawful discrimination in PECO’s rate structure, arguing that its members4 have been assigned a far greater revenue responsibility than is justified. Specifically, it alleges that there is intradiscrimination within the Eate HT class, that the Commission erred in retaining the 80% demand rachet, and that there is insufficient evidence to support the adoption of the revenue-neutral time-of-use energy surcharge and credit rates. The Association bases its complaint on Section 1304 of the Public Utility Code, 66 Pa. C. S. §1304, which provides in pertinent part:

No public utility shall, as to rates, mate dr grant any unreasonable preference or advantage to any person, corporation, or municipal corporation, or subject any person, corporation, or municipal corporation to any unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. No public util[605]*605ity shall establish or maintain any unreasonable difference as to rates, either as between localities or as between classes of service. . . . This section does not prohibit the establishment of reasonable zone or group systems, or classifications of rates ....

Before addressing the individual arguments of the Association, we reiterate that mere variation in rates among classes of customers does not violate the Public Utility Code. The requirement is merely that rates of one class of .service shall not be unreasonably prejudicial and* disadvantageous to a patron in any other class of service. Thus, for a rate to be found unlawfully preferential, there must be both an advantage to one and a resulting injury to another. Manufacturer’s Association of Erie v.

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470 A.2d 1092, 79 Pa. Commw. 598, 1984 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1141, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/building-owners-managers-assn-v-pennsylvania-public-utility-commission-pacommwct-1984.