MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
TANNENWALD, Chief Judge: On May 27, 1980, we filed our original opinion (74 T.C. 441) in this case in which we disposed of certain severed issues. The sole issue left for decision is the value of 16 1 machines and a group of 1,101 fully depreciated items sold by Buffalo Tool on March 21, 1973.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The findings of fact set forth in our original opinion are incorporated by reference and are made findings of fact herein. The value on March 21, 1973, of each item in dispute is as follows:
| Item Description | Value |
| 70-H6-T G&L Horizontal Boring Mill | $ 105,000 |
| 70-H5-T G&L Horizontal Boring Mill | 85,000 |
| 4JE G&L Horizontal Boring Mill |
| #400-40-65 | 65,000 |
| 4JE G&L Horizontal Boring Mill |
| #400-50-65 | 65,000 |
| Verson 800 Ton Press-18030 | 130,000 |
| Verson 800 Ton Press-18031 | 130,000 |
| P&W2-E Jig Bore | 10,000 |
| 22-K Blanchard Vertical Surface |
| Grinder 11936 | 16,500 |
| 20-K Blanchard Vertical Surface |
| Grinder 11935 | 15,000 |
| S-15 K&T Vertical Mill | 18,000 |
| Carlton Radial Drill | 18,000 |
| G&L Numerite Tape Drill | 5,900 |
| Porter Cable Belt Grinder | 233 |
| Model 72 Layout Machine and Table | 7,600 |
| Model 48-A Layout Machine | 3,800 |
| G&L Horizontal Rotary Table | 5,000 |
| 1,101 not itemized items | 53,000 |
OPINION
The sole issue presented is the purely factual question of valuation. See Buffalo Tool and Die Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441 (1980). The parties jointly request us to value 16 of the items sold by Buffalo Tool to the Syndicate, with respondent also asking us to value 1,101 fully depreciated items. Although we believe the parties could have agreed upon equally "precise" values of each of these items, we herein fulfill our responsibilities.
In our prior opinion, we held that the valuation methods proposed by each party would not necessarily be determinative for reasons explained therein. Although we bought neither party's argument "lock, stock and barrel," we did not determine that the time how much weight, if any, would be accorded their allocations.
We see no purpose to be served by our indulging in a detailed exposition of the manner in which we arrived at the value of each item set forth in our findings of fact. We think it sufficient to note that we have done the best that we could with a record that reflects a variety of infirmities, particularly infirmities in the testimony of the three witnesses who were offered as being knowledgeable as to the values which the Court is required to determine in the context of the factual situation presented herein. We have, of course, also been guided by the views articulated in our prior opinion. In this connection, we note that we need not wrestle with petitioners' renewed attempt to shift the burden of proof to respondent. Although we continue to adhere to our view that the burden of proof remains with petitioners, 2 (see 74 T.C. at 446,Rule 142(a), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure), we have reached our conclusions on the basis of the entire record before us and without regard to the location of the burden of proof.
Initially, we dispose of an evidentiary problem presented by the testimony of Joseph O'Connell, Jr., a member of the purchasing Syndicate, and his contemporaneous notes of the amounts for which the Syndicate expected to resell the items (Exhibit G). Petitioners oppose the admission into evidence of Exhibit G on the ground that the notes constitute hearsay. See Rule 802, Fed. R. Evid.3
Exhibit G is a four-page list of the major machines of Buffalo Tool on which O'Connell marked the price he and/or his associates expected to obtain on the resale of each piece of machinery. He testified that he made all of the pencil and blue ink markings on the document. To be sure, the notes on Exhibit G were compiled over a period of time, they reflect in part the opinions of several members of the Syndicate conveyed to O'Connell, i.e., a consensus value, and they constitute the views of only one party to the transaction. But, we think the testimony of O'Connell may well have been sufficient to take Exhibit G, including the notes, out of the hearsay category and make it admissible despite the foregoing infirmities. 4 In any event, we are satisfied that the exhibit is "more probative * * * than any other evidence," which respondent could have procured through reasonable efforts (see our comments, 74 T.C. at 451, regarding the difficulty of respondent's task) and otherwise meets the requirements of section 803 (24), Fed. R. Evid.5 See Karme v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1163, 1181 (1980), on appeal (9th Cir. May 5, 1980). Cf. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 397 (5th Cir. 1961).
We have already indicated that O'Connell's testimony (including Exhibit G and his notes therein) is admissible and we are satisfied that it has probative value. As to Hosta's testimony in support of petitioners' allocation, it is obvious that it has the infirmity of having been colored by the attractiveness of juggling to reduce the amount of depreciation recapture to a minimum. See 74 T.C. at 447-448.Similarly, the testimony of petitioners' expert witness (Schauer) was less than convincing. Although Schauer was undoubtedly familiar with most of the machinery in question, his valuation method was, for the most part, unenlightening and unpersuasive. It is clear that he was not as familiar with the used machinery market as was O'Connell and the method by which he used new machinery prices for 1973 and subsequent years was at best uncertain.
The long and the short of the matter is that, under the circumstances herein where we have already indicated our doubts as to respondent's methods of valuation, see 74 T.C. at 450-451, we find ourselves unable to base our decision entirely on the total failure of petitioners to carry their burden of proof. By the same token, we are unwilling to conclude that respondent's values should be accepted in toto. Accordingly, despite our desire in cases such as this to reach a decision which adopts one party's position as against that of the other, see 74 T.C. at 452, we have been unable to adopt this approach in its entirety.
We cannot refrain from making one final observation. The Court made strenuous efforts to persuade the parties to settle this case both before and after our prior opinion. A settlement was clearly the appropriate vehicle for disposition of this case in the latter period. But applying the most charitable description of the attitude of counsel for the parties, we can only assume that the talismanic quality of their respective perceptions precluded them from pursuing such a path. We wish that we were as blessed as they obviously consider themselves to be, although we cannot help but note that it took petitioners' counsel 69 pages and respondent's counsel 60 pages of supplemental briefing to articulate their perceptions. When one considers the time, effort, and expense to petitioners and respondent, to say nothing of the Court, it may not be inappropriate to ask "was it all really worth it"?
Decision will be entered under Rule 155.