Buffalo Loan, Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Medina Gas & Electric Light Co.

12 A.D. 199
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJuly 1, 1896
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 12 A.D. 199 (Buffalo Loan, Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Medina Gas & Electric Light Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Buffalo Loan, Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Medina Gas & Electric Light Co., 12 A.D. 199 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1896).

Opinion

Green, J.

1. Contention is made hy appellants’ counsel that the mortgage in suit never having been personally delivered by Mr. Robertson, the president, and the bonds not having been negotiated by him, they never became binding obligations upon the mortgagor company;. that the bonds never had' a valid inception until they were negotiated in. the manner provided by the resolution authorizing their execution ;■ that the resolution required as condition precedent to the creation of any liability, that the president should negotiate the bonds upon the best possible terms; that the president must have ■been named for a purpose, i. e., the protection of the corporation, so that the future, as well as the present stockholders, should derive some consideration or benefit therefrom; that the president was, therefore, prevented from negotiating the bonds “ upon the best terms possible,” or upon any terms, and the bonds were never put into circulation through the agency of the corporation, but were practically stolen by the secretary, Stranahan, who received the manual possession thereof from the trust company after it had certi.fied the same; that Stranahan was not authorized to negotiate the bonds' at all, but Robertson alone was authorized.

This contention is clearly untenable. Stranahan- was practically the owner of the entire capital stock of the- company, and, if we ■are to believe the testimony of Curry, the superintendent, the other two directors took no active part in the management or control of its business affairs. , The strong inference from his testimony and . from the circumstances of the case is, that- they were “ figureheads. ” and nominal stockholders and directors, subject to the control of their creator, and the mere creatures of his will. Evidently it was a matter immaterial to them whether they should negotiate the bonds, 'of the -virtual owner of them and of the corporation-itself should do so; they knew, or must have known,- that Stranahan negotiated the bonds, and their acquiescence is evidenced by long lapse of time and circumstances presented. If they did not •actually know that Stranahan had the-mortgage, recorded and had ■ -disposed of the bonds, they did not cáre; it was none of their par[205]*205ticular business, for they had but very little interest to protect. Stranahan and Curry managed the whole business. Robertson and Dayton could not presume to interfere and object to the acts of the owner of the company. During all these years Dayton and Robertson remained silent. Silence may give consent, and long acquiescence must, under such circumstances, be sufficient evidence of authority. This action has afforded them the opportunity to come forward and testify as to what they do not know in respect' to the. matters in controversy, but it appears that the defendants have not thought it advisable to produce any of the directors as witnesses to establish tffeir defense. Surely, when the trust company brought, the foreclosure suit in December, 1889, at the request of Stranahan and for the purpose, it would seem, of cutting off Alport’s judgment, these nominal dh'ectors must have known of the institution of that suit, and consequently the disposition of the bonds which-three years before they had authorized to be issued and negotiated. Let it be assumed that it was incumbent upon the trust company to make inquiry of the other directors as to whether they would permit Stranahan to negotiate the bonds, or insist that the act ■ be performed by the president, what would have been the answer? In view of all the circumstances and condition of things now disclosed, and, particularly the peculiar relationship existing between the subordinate directors and their superior, could it reasonably be inferred or presumed that the holders of the two shares of stock 'would refuse to authorize the owner of 298 shares to negotiate the bonds ?

■ The general doctrine is, that the purchaser of a negotiable instrument, who purchases under circumstances which throw upon him the duty of making inquiry as to its validity, assumes no greater , risk by his failure to inquire than the burden of proving that the facts which he could have discovered, had he inquired, would have protected him. (Wilson v. Met. Elev. Ry. Co., 120 N. Y. 145.)

“ Therefore, if the plaintiff, when charged with the duty of making inquiry, had actually done so, whatever its officers prosecuting the investigation would naturally have discovered, according to any permissible inference from the evidence, it can now invoke to establish the implied authority of Mr. Stone. What could the jury have found in this regard within the rules governing their powers* [206]*206if the case had been submitted to them for decision % (Hanover Bank v. American Dock, etc., Co., 148 N. Y. 612, 622; 75 Hun, 55, and see Cheever v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 150 N. Y. 59.)

The conclusion is fully warranted by the evidence that Stranahan was lawfully in possession of the bonds, and with ample authority to dispose of them. The suggestion made, that the president was designated in the resolution as the officer to negotiate the bonds, so that the company ” might be protected from the loss to be expected and anticipated if they should be intrusted to Stranahan, is, in the light of the evidence presented, very suggestive, but nothing inore. Whether or not the compliment is justly deserved we are unable to say ; nor is there much weight in the suggestion that the secretary practically stole the bonds of which he was the virtual owner.

2. It is argued with some show of reason that Stranahan never negotiated nor pledged the bonds for or on behalf of the company, but rather on his individual behalf and credit, and for his own individual purposes; that the moneys were advanced to and received by him, not while acting for the company, but while acting in his individual capacity, and for the accomplishment of his own private objects; and .it .is insisted that this contention is strengthened by the circumstance that there is no evidence that any of these moneys so received, iwere ever used for, or applied to, the purpose of defraying the existing indebtedness of the company, or for its other lawful purposes,” or that the company ever received any advantage or benefit therefrom; but it is claimed that the. evidence indicates the ■ contrary.

The referee truly says that the trust company acted in a dual capacity; as trustee for the bondholders, it had certain duties to perform, and as a banking corporation, it had the right to loan money upon securities, and it made no practical difference whether it was named as trustee in the security, except so far as it was chargeable with notice of any diversion of such securities. If the plaintiff had never parted with these bonds, could it maintain this action in its own behalf as a bona fide purchaser or pledgee of the bonds % The referee says not; and the reasons given for his conclusions are, that when the bonds and the mortgage were presented to the plaintiff, it was apparent that they had never been negotiated by the president, as required by the resolution recited in the mortgage; that the [207]

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Bluebook (online)
12 A.D. 199, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/buffalo-loan-trust-safe-deposit-co-v-medina-gas-electric-light-co-nyappdiv-1896.