Buckrey v. Comm'r
This text of 2017 T.C. Memo. 138 (Buckrey v. Comm'r) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Appropriate orders will be issued.
Ps were the sole owners of a corporation (C). C partially redeemed Ps' shares for its liquid noncash assets and then sold all its operating assets, which generated a large tax liability. Ps entered into a Midco transaction with (M), whereby C transferred its cash to M and a subsidiary of M (S) purchased Ps' shares of C. R was unable to collect C's large tax liability from M or S and decided to hold Ps liable as transferees of C. R sent Ps notices of liability, arguing that the entire series of transactions lacked economic substance. Ps assert that they are not liable under Minnesota fraudulent-transfer law, the governing state law.
*139
HOLMES,
The parties filed a lengthy (1,402 pages to be exact) stipulation of facts to accompany their cross-motions for summary judgment. We draw our discussion of the background facts from this comprehensive stipulation and its many exhibits, and rely solely on the facts as agreed.
Buckrey, Nyberg, and Pribyl (the shareholders), and a man named John Hays incorporated BHNP Acquisition Company in Minnesota in 1994. They did so to buy the business assets of a company that manufactured gears and broaches2*141 and had the uninspired*139 name of Gear & Broach, Inc. After the acquisition, BHNP changed its name back to Gear & Broach, Inc. None of the shareholders had a four-year college degree, but they knew their business. The shareholders operated the company successfully for ten years, and revenues grew from $1 million to $20 million by 2003. Hays enjoyed this success too but was bought out in 2003. He remained as a consultant.
After a decade spent forging this success, the shareholders decided to see if they could sell. Buckrey went to a seminar on how to sell a business hosted by the Geneva Companies, Inc. The shareholders together retained Geneva and its representative Ted Polk to search for buyers. The mission was a success, and the company sold its gear-manufacturing assets to FastenTech, Inc., through a newly formed subsidiary of FastenTech called Gear & Broach (DE), Inc. (a Delaware corporation). The shareholders hired Arthur Dickinson and Yuri Berndt from a Minneapolis law firm as well as Mark Harrington from a local accounting firm to help them. They closed the sale in March 2004.
*142 Before the closing Polk contacted Dickinson about the shareholders' selling their stock to MidCoast Investments, Inc. Dickinson*140 and Berndt told the shareholders about this opportunity, and the attorneys received a letter from MidCoast later that month. In it was a promise to pay a premium for the stock and a claim that MidCoast was in the "asset recovery" business, which could somehow make the company a profitable acquisition. Dickinson and Berndt reviewed the terms of this letter with an eye to its tax consequences to their clients. Buckrey became the contact for the shareholders, and Dickinson sent him a copy of MidCoast's letter to review.
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Appropriate orders will be issued.
Ps were the sole owners of a corporation (C). C partially redeemed Ps' shares for its liquid noncash assets and then sold all its operating assets, which generated a large tax liability. Ps entered into a Midco transaction with (M), whereby C transferred its cash to M and a subsidiary of M (S) purchased Ps' shares of C. R was unable to collect C's large tax liability from M or S and decided to hold Ps liable as transferees of C. R sent Ps notices of liability, arguing that the entire series of transactions lacked economic substance. Ps assert that they are not liable under Minnesota fraudulent-transfer law, the governing state law.
*139
HOLMES,
The parties filed a lengthy (1,402 pages to be exact) stipulation of facts to accompany their cross-motions for summary judgment. We draw our discussion of the background facts from this comprehensive stipulation and its many exhibits, and rely solely on the facts as agreed.
Buckrey, Nyberg, and Pribyl (the shareholders), and a man named John Hays incorporated BHNP Acquisition Company in Minnesota in 1994. They did so to buy the business assets of a company that manufactured gears and broaches2*141 and had the uninspired*139 name of Gear & Broach, Inc. After the acquisition, BHNP changed its name back to Gear & Broach, Inc. None of the shareholders had a four-year college degree, but they knew their business. The shareholders operated the company successfully for ten years, and revenues grew from $1 million to $20 million by 2003. Hays enjoyed this success too but was bought out in 2003. He remained as a consultant.
After a decade spent forging this success, the shareholders decided to see if they could sell. Buckrey went to a seminar on how to sell a business hosted by the Geneva Companies, Inc. The shareholders together retained Geneva and its representative Ted Polk to search for buyers. The mission was a success, and the company sold its gear-manufacturing assets to FastenTech, Inc., through a newly formed subsidiary of FastenTech called Gear & Broach (DE), Inc. (a Delaware corporation). The shareholders hired Arthur Dickinson and Yuri Berndt from a Minneapolis law firm as well as Mark Harrington from a local accounting firm to help them. They closed the sale in March 2004.
*142 Before the closing Polk contacted Dickinson about the shareholders' selling their stock to MidCoast Investments, Inc. Dickinson*140 and Berndt told the shareholders about this opportunity, and the attorneys received a letter from MidCoast later that month. In it was a promise to pay a premium for the stock and a claim that MidCoast was in the "asset recovery" business, which could somehow make the company a profitable acquisition. Dickinson and Berndt reviewed the terms of this letter with an eye to its tax consequences to their clients. Buckrey became the contact for the shareholders, and Dickinson sent him a copy of MidCoast's letter to review. After some revisions the shareholders countersigned a letter of intent in March 2004.
Berndt sent MidCoast a list of due-diligence requests that included: • Independent references regarding MidCoast's financial capabilities, including banking and credit references; • a list of references of attorneys or accountants who had previously worked with MidCoast and who had evaluated a transaction similar to this one; • a list of the principals, officers, and directors of MidCoast Investments, Inc., and its parent companies; • evidence as to the source of the funds to be used in the purchase; and • names of affiliated operating companies related to MidCoast.
MidCoast itself retained Thomas Doyle of another Minneapolis law firm to assist in the acquisition. MidCoast's subsidiary, MidCoast Acquisitions Corp., formed another subsidiary, BNP, LLC, to acquire the stock from the shareholders. MidCoast Acquisitions was BNP, LLC's sole member. At the request of MidCoast the shareholders changed the name of their company to BNP of Minnesota, Inc. (though we'll call it just BNP from now on). MidCoast was only interested in acquiring a company that held nothing but cash and tax liabilities, so the shareholders had to redeem a portion of their stock, which they did on May 19, 2004. This redemption caused BNP to distribute all its remaining noncash assets accounts receivable from the three owners, tax refunds, prepaid insurance refunds, and future cash from FastenTech from the earlier asset sale--to the shareholders*142 in redemption of approximately 36% of their total shares.
BNP now had only cash and a tax liability--specifically, approximately $3.7 million in cash and a tax liability of approximately $1.5 million from the asset *144 sale. The magic could begin. On the same day as the redemption, the shareholders and a representative of MidCoast entered into a share-purchase agreement in which BNP, LLC, promised to pay nearly $2.7 million for the shareholders' remaining BNP stock. This price was a more than $500,000 premium over what the shareholders would have received in a simple liquidation of BNP.3
The purchase agreement was executed by BNP, LLC; BNP; and the shareholders. MidCoast Credit Corp.--yet another MidCoast affiliate--was also a party, and it guaranteed that the purchase price would be paid. The agreement said that BNP, LLC, would buy the shares by wiring the purchase price according to the instructions set out in a separate closing agreement. The agreement also said that BNP would deliver all its cash to BNP, LLC. By its terms, all of the events at closing would be deemed to occur simultaneously. This is what would happen: *145 • First, BNP would transfer its funds to a general escrow account,*143 opened by agreement among BNP, another firm named Morehead Capital, LLC,4 and Associated Bank Minnesota. • Second, once MidCoast's counsel received confirmation that BNP made this transfer, funds in the amount of the purchase price would be wired to the same account. (The memo was silent as to who exactly would be wiring these funds.) • Third, once the escrow account held both amounts, the escrow agent would transfer the cash that came from BNP to BNP, LLC's lender's counsel. This "lender" was defined to be MidCoast Investments, Inc. • Fourth, the escrow agent would wire some of the remaining money (i.e., the purchase price) to a couple other escrow accounts. These were known as the "holdback escrow account" and the "tail escrow account." • Finally, once all this was done (which, in reality, could be accomplished in minutes), the balance of the money was to be wired to the shareholders.
The escrow agent was Associated Bank Minnesota, and all three escrow accounts were held there. The parties signed three separate escrow agreements to create the three escrow accounts. The general escrow account was the main account used to facilitate the transaction. The tail escrow account held $30,000 to*144 *146 cover any insurance premiums on policies for BNP's discontinued operations. As of the date of the audit, the $30,000 was still in this account. The holdback escrow account was created as insurance for MidCoast. The agreement required that $350,000 of the purchase price be placed into this holdback escrow account in case BNP (which at this point would be owned by BNP, LLC) was required to pay FastenTech a working-capital adjustment under the terms of the earlier asset sale. The escrow agreement stated that any working-capital adjustments would be reimbursed up to the $350,000, and if there was anything left, the remainder would go to the shareholders. (The shareholders later got the full $350,000 after FastenTech said that it needed no adjustments.)
Each escrow agreement laid out the responsibilities of Associated Bank. The Bank's responsibilities were quite simple: It had to hold the money that it received from BNP and MidCoast and send it on according to the precise instructions we've already described.
The transfers were all uneventful. BNP wired its entire cash reserve of more than $3.7 million to the escrow account. Once the money was there, MidCoast Investments, Inc., wired the*145 purchase price of a bit more than $2.7 million to the same escrow account. These funds came from MidCoast Investments' SunTrust Bank operating account. On the following day the escrow *147 agent wired the $3.7 million received from BNP to the same MidCoast Investments operating account with SunTrust Bank. The escrow agent also wired $30,000 to the tail escrow account, $350,000 to the holdback escrow account, and the remainder to the shareholders.
The purchase agreement contained a few other noteworthy terms. BNP, LLC, warranted it would maintain the legal existence of BNP for three years and promised to "conduct[] operations" during that time. The agreement also stated that BNP, LLC, would file BNP's "state and federal income tax returns for [BNP's] fiscal year ended August 31, 2004 and [pay] the federal and state income taxes,
The shareholders then made their exit, but the story was far from over. MidCoast Acquisitions executed*146 an agreement to sell its interest in BNP, LLC (which now owned BNP), to Morehead Capital, LLC, on the same day it received the $3.7 million in its operating account. The sum of $3.7 million was withdrawn from MidCoast Investments' SunTrust Bank operating account on this date. After this sale BNP, LLC, had BNP participate in some sort of binary-or digital-option *148 transactions and interest-rate swaps in June 2004. The purpose of these swaps presumably was to generate losses in a Son-of-BOSS fashion.5 In June 2004 Morehead sold BNP, LLC, to Sequoia Capital, LLC. A little over a week later Sequoia contributed its interest in BNP, LLC, to yet another entity. No party disputes that the transactions occurring after the shareholders' sale of BNP to MidCoast were part of a scheme to generate illegitimate losses. To this very limited extent, the scheme worked and when BNP did file a 2004 tax return, it offset the income from the FastenTech purchase with them.
Midco/Intermediary transactions aim at one goal--to allow buyers and sellers of corporations to eat their cake and have it too. In a normal scenario (such as that faced by the shareholders here),*147 the owners of a corporation that want to sell their company would prefer to do so by a stock sale. By structuring it this way, shareholders would likely have a capital gain, and any built-in gains in the *149 corporation's assets would be the problem of the new owners, who don't get a step-up in basis in those assets by buying stock. But both parties to such a deal know the rules, which means that the stock price should reflect those built-in gains and future tax bill. Still, in our fallen world of nonzero-transaction costs and less-than-perfect information, a future tax bill of uncertain size means that stock sales are usually preferred by sellers of firms, and asset purchases by their buyers. That was certainly true of the shareholders here. By agreeing to an asset sale, they were left with a corporation that was a shell full of cash. The corporation had large gains from the sale of its assets, and it would have to pay taxes on those gains. The shareholders would get whatever's left over in liquidation of their shares, and they would likely have to pay tax on the gain from the sale of their stock too.
Midco transactions generally occur in one of two ways, and both result in effectively*148 the same outcome. The first structure is explained in
The other variant of the transaction reverses the sequence and begins with an asset sale*149 followed by a stock sale.7 The sellers sell the assets in the company and are left with a pile of cash, a corporate shell, and a large corporate-tax liability. At this point, the Midco offers the shareholders a premium on their shares that they wouldn't otherwise get. After the sale of the stock, the Midco now owns the corporate shell, its cash, and its tax liability. In some form or fashion, the Midco withdraws the cash from the corporation and disappears, leaving a large unpaid tax bill. Just as in the first scenario, the Midco is usually *151 newly formed (often in a tax-haven jurisdiction) and is both judgment-proof and hard to find.8
The big loser in all of this is the IRS. It does not take this loss well, and has for years gone after the other parties involved to try to collect what can be a substantial tax bill.
The IRS audited BNPs 2004 tax return and issued a notice of deficiency, which it mailed to the company's address in February 2008. The IRS then issued 30-day letters9 to each of the three shareholders only four days later. These letters were the first step by the Commissioner to collect BNP's*150 tax liability from them. In his letter the Commissioner proposed a transferee-liability assessment of more *152 than $1.1 million plus interest and penalties against each shareholder. He did so under the authority of
*153 The parties filed a first stipulation of facts in June 2014. Both then moved for summary judgment, and we held a hearing on the cross-motions in June 2015. We allowed the parties to file supplemental memoranda of law in support of their motions after this hearing, and both took advantage of this opportunity. Today we rule on these motions.
We may grant*151 summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Rules making some transfers voidable are necessary for advanced credit markets. Without them, pawn shops and loan sharks would be the only credit sources because a debtor who kept possession of his assets could give them to family or friends, and make himself judgment-proof. Fraudulent-transfer laws have developed over the centuries to protect creditors and credit markets.12
*155 Many states have adopted a uniform law--in Minnesota called the Minnesota Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (MUFTA)--to solve this problem. The MUFTA defines those transfers deemed to be fraudulent and gives remedies to creditors. The Act defines "creditor" to mean "a person who has a claim."*152
The IRS can collect on fraudulent transfers under
A transferee liable under
We must be constantly aware in this context that the Code places the IRS on a par with other unsecured creditors, and does not give it greater rights.
*159 We have repeatedly rejected this argument.
We'll start with state law.
Minnesota adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, and later amended and retitled it as the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act.
Fraudulent transfers generally fall into three categories: • A transfer is • A transfer is • A transfer is fraudulent to present *161 • was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; • intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they*157 became due.
The Commissioner wants to hold the shareholders liable for all of the taxes that were due from BNP on the sale of the assets to FastenTech, plus penalties and interest. He argues that the partial stock redemption and the subsequent stock sale should be considered a single transaction that was effectively just a liquidation of the shareholders' BNP stock. The Commissioner believes that even if we can't use federal substance-over-form principles to do this, Minnesota also provides for these principles of equity to view the transaction in its substance.
The Commissioner also offers (albeit very briefly) two alternative fraudulent-transfer theories. The first is that the shareholders are liable as transferees of a transferee of BNP. The Commissioner argues that the transfer by BNP of its remaining cash to MidCoast "was fraudulent making [the IRS] a creditor of MidCoast." Once the IRS is deemed a creditor of MidCoast, the *162 transfer of cash from MidCoast to the shareholders "was also fraudulent and thus [the IRS], being a creditor of MidCoast, became a creditor of [the shareholders]." The second is that the shareholders are liable as people for whose*158 benefit the fraudulent transfer was made, even if they never actually received anything from BNP. The Commissioner argues that "MidCoast Investments would not have transferred cash to [the shareholders] without receiving [BNP's] cash. [The Shareholders] received an actual benefit from the transfer to MidCoast Investments by receiving a premium stock purchase price * * *."
The Commissioner also makes another state-law argument. He contends that the shareholders are liable under the Minnesota Business Corporations Act (MBCA)--in their capacity as directors for making illegal distributions; and for having received transfers from BNP as part of its dissolution before BNP paid off its creditors.
The shareholders contend that they never received a distribution from BNP, at least a distribution that was governed by MUFTA. They also assert that BNP wasn't rendered insolvent as a result of any of the transfers because the money originally left in the BNP shell remained with it throughout the process. In answer to the Commissioner's alternative arguments, the shareholders say they can't be transferees of a transferee because this theory requires two separate fraudulent *163 transfers. The second transfer,*159 from MidCoast to the shareholders, wasn't fraudulent because MidCoast was still solvent. The shareholders also believe the Commissioner's reading of the "for the benefit of" provision of MUFTA is too broad and that there is no undisputed evidence that MidCoast wouldn't have transferred the purchase price to the shareholders but for BNP's transfer of cash to the MidCoast operating account.
The shareholders respond to the Commissioner's MBCA liability arguments by pointing out that they can be liable as directors only if they made "illegal distributions." And, even if any alleged distributions were illegal, the directors can be liable only to the corporation, its shareholders, or a corporate receiver. They also argue that no dissolution ever took place, so that theory of liability won't work either.
We address these issues in the following order: • Can the transactions be combined under Minnesota law? • Did the shareholders receive a transfer from BNP (other than the partial stock redemption) through commingling in the erroneous accounts? • Were the shareholders transferees of a transferee of MidCoast? • Were the transfers from BNP made for the shareholders' benefit? *164 • Did the shareholders*160 have actual fraudulent intent? • Do the provisions of the MBCA make the shareholders liable?
The Commissioner first argues that we should combine the partial redemption of shares with the later stock sale and treat the whole deal as a liquidation of BNP. He relies on general equitable principles of substance over form and urges us to focus on the fact that the redemption occurred only two days before the stock sale and with full knowledge that it would happen. The shareholders don't dispute the timing, but rely heavily on the Commissioner's stipulation that BNP was still solvent after the redemption and before the stock sale to avoid any combination of the redemption and sale.
The Commissioner starts by pointing us to Minnesota tax law, and there are Minnesota cases that apply substance-over-form principles to recharacterize a transaction. In
These cases do apply a substance-over-form analysis. But they are Minnesota
*166 These cases might be useful in determining how a Minnesota court would rule in this the absence of other authority--but that's not what we have here: The Minnesota Supreme Court recently decided [T]he focus of [MUFTA] is on individual transfers, rather than a pattern of transactions that are part of a greater scheme. MUFTA's emphasis on individual transactions finds support in the definition of the word transfer, which refers to every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with
Once we look at the stock redemption and the later stock sale as distinct transactions, the strength of the shareholders' position becomes clearer. Let's look at the redemption first. Minnesota law expressly defines a corporation's redemption of stock as a form of corporate distribution. "A distribution may be in the form of a * * * redemption".
Even if it seems strange that Minnesota precludes outside creditors from challenging the propriety of a corporate distribution, we can't and won't ignore the *170 plain language of the statute. We are not alone. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota granted partial summary judgment in a case because the party's claims were based on MUFTA but the transfers were distributions governed by MBCA.
*171 The Commissioner does argue that the stock sale by itself, quite apart from the redemption, was a liquidation, but that still wouldn't free it from the MBCA's restrictions.20 Following the plain language of the statute and the reasoning of these courts, we hold that neither the stock redemption nor the stock sale and redemption together is governed by MUFTA. We cannot read the MBCA to let a hypothetical unsecured creditor challenge the redemption under MUFTA*166 at all. The Commissioner has no greater rights than such a creditor. Even if the redemption was illegal at the time it occurred, the MBCA doesn't give standing to challenge an illegal distribution to the Commissioner or any other unsecured general creditor.
The Commissioner next tries to set up several later arguments with a contention about the effect of the shareholders' escrow agreement with the other parties to the overall deal. He wants very much to show that the money left behind in BNP after the redemption somehow found its way to the shareholders. And a first step in his reasoning is to argue about the effects of the commingling of funds to the shareholders and from BNP in that account. He argues that once BNP and MidCoast both transferred their respective obligations to the escrow account, the fungibility of money amounted to a commingling of funds and the cash that flowed to the shareholders must have come from BNP. The shareholders disagree, and they cite the "earmarking" doctrine. This is a rule of bankruptcy law that states there is not a voidable preference when a debtor makes a transfer to an old creditor with money*167 received from a new creditor.
*173 The Commissioner himself also cites cases from outside the world of fraudulent transfers. His are cases about money laundering that discuss the fungibility of money, and courts have reasoned in such cases that it would be impossible for the government to have to prove which dollars in a commingled account were dirty and which were clean. That's not the situation here either. In these cases, the withdrawals matched exactly the deposits from the two parties, and the escrow agent was contractually obligated to ensure that certain sums of money that came from one party reached the other. In other words, when the escrow agent received money from BNP, "it held the [funds] only for the purpose of fulfilling an instruction to make the funds available to*168 someone else."
*174 The shareholders specifically cite
The Commissioner next argues that even if the shareholders never received a direct transfer from BNP, there were two*169 fraudulent transfers here. BNP's transfer to MidCoast, and then MidCoast's transfer to the shareholders. He argues that--even if we have to look at all these transactions transfer by transfer--both of these transfers were fraudulent and thus keep unbroken a chain of recovery at least for the amount of the stock sale. The First Circuit examined this theory at length in
To hold the trust liable, that court said, one first has to determine if the IRS was a creditor of the LLCs.
To sum up, the IRS was a creditor of the LLC and new corporations because they received fraudulent transfers from the old corporations. The IRS's claim *177 against the LLC and new corporations was based on its claim against these old corporations, i.e.,*172 their unpaid taxes. The IRS could then recover against a transferee of the LLC and new corporations for its claim against them if those later transfers were also fraudulent. It didn't matter that the "initial" transfer actually occurred later in time because UFTA allows recovery for future creditors.21
Of particular note to us is that in
*178 This might mean that it doesn't matter whether Midco used its own money to pay the shareholders for their BNP stock.
But it also means that we are left here with questions that can't be answered on summary judgment. This series of transfers differs from the ones in
The first transfer we analyze is the transfer from BNP to MidCoast. Despite the transfer of cash directly to MidCoast, the proper party to consider the transferee is BNP, LLC. The share purchase agreement states that BNP will transfer all of its cash to BNP, LLC, or as BNP, LLC, directs. The closing agreement and the escrow agreements instruct the escrow agent to release the funds to MidCoast's counsel or as she directs. MidCoast's counsel, Ann L. Smith, directed the escrow agent to wire the funds to MidCoast, not BNP, LLC. This arrangement raises interesting questions of which party is the initial transferee.
Even though the funds never went to a BNP, LLC, account, it had the right to receive those funds under the agreement. When bankruptcy courts analyze the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent-transfer provisions, they apply a "dominion and *179 control" test.
Once we've determined that BNP, LLC, is the transferee, we need to determine if the transfer was fraudulent. The answer is yes. BNP received nothing in return for the transfer of all its cash and it was rendered insolvent by the transfer. Just as in
The second transfer--from MidCoast to the shareholders--gives some trouble. It was MidCoast, not BNP, LLC, that paid the purchase*175 price to the shareholders. This might suggest there was no transfer from a debtor of the IRS (here, BNP or BNP, LLC) to the shareholders. But we addressed this same issue in
We don't know at this stage what happened in these cases. There are some indications that the same arrangement was used here as in
On this argument, then, there can be no decision on summary judgment.
Next up is the Commissioner's fallback position that at least a portion of the deal's proceeds--namely, the amount of cash the shareholders received that was greater than they would have received as net proceeds of a fully taxed liquidation is a fraudulent transfer.
*182 MUFTA does allow recovery against a third party to a fraudulent transfer, even if he was not a transferee, if the transaction occurred for his benefit.
*183 The shareholders counter with two arguments. They claim
The shareholders also argue that
We may have some help from precedent. We think Judge Easterbrook's opinion in
Judge Easterbrook observed that "someone who receives
We must deny summary judgment on this theory.
The Commissioner also argues, in addition to his constructive-fraud claims, that the shareholders entered this transaction with actual fraudulent intent. MUFTA provides a nonexhaustive list of eleven factors (also known as "badges") that can help support an inference of actual fraud, given that direct evidence is very hard to come by.*180 These eleven factors are • the transfer or obligation was to an insider; • the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer; • the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; • before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; • the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; • the debtor absconded; • the debtor removed or concealed assets; • the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; *186 • the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; • the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and • the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
The shareholders claim that the record is completely without any evidence to prove they acted with actual fraudulent intent. The Commissioner asserts that a number of the badges are present. These include: • BNP didn't receive reasonably equivalent*181 value for its transfer; • the series of transactions rendered BNP insolvent; • the series of distributions were to insiders;26 • the series of transactions were of substantially all of BNP's assets; and • the series of transactions occurred shortly after BNP had incurred a substantial liability.
We agree with the Commissioner that there is no genuine dispute that some of the factors are present here. These include BNP's being rendered insolvent and BNP's not receiving reasonably equivalent value in exchange for its cash. And the presence of many factors can create a presumption of actual fraud.
Switching gears, the Commissioner also asserts liability under MBCA. His first problem is that, as the shareholders observe, any liability under
The MBCA might also make the shareholders liable as receiving undue distributions from a dissolution. This requires a little more discussion. The Commissioner correctly states that
The Commissioner relies on
The state-law transferee-liability question is only one of two questions that needs to be answered to find for the Commissioner. The shareholders argue in their motion that they win as a matter of law because there's no theory of recovery under Minnesota law. They do not challenge their status as transferees under
There are material facts in dispute that prevent us from ruling on whether the shareholders are liable under the transferee-of-a-transferee or for-the-benefit of theories because it's unclear at the moment which entity actually paid for the stock and which entity actually received the stock. There are also material*185 facts in dispute concerning the shareholders' actual intent to enter into fraudulent transfers. To the extent that we hold that Minnesota law prevents us from collapsing the transfers and finding that the shareholders received a transfer directly from BNP, we will grant the shareholders' motion. We also will grant the shareholders' motion to the extent we find that the partial stock redemption wasn't a fraudulent transfer. The rest of the shareholders' motion will be denied, and the Commissioner's motion will be denied.
Footnotes
1. The other cases that we consolidated with this one are Richard Nyberg, Transferee, docket No. 16566-09; and Robert Pribyl, Transferee, docket No. 16567-09.↩
2. A broaching machine is a tool that cuts different materials into a desired shape. The broach is the cutting tool that is at the heart of a broaching machine. It has many teeth to cut the material, and each tooth is slightly larger than the one before it. Broaches comes in many different shapes and sizes.↩
3. In a liquidation, the shareholders would walk away with only around $2.2 million, because the asset sale to FastenTech generated a large taxable gain at the corporate level. The shareholders could have waited until this liability matured and had BNP pay it before liquidation, or they could have liquidated immediately and taken the $3.7 million in cash. If they chose the second option, they would be personally liable for the corporate tax on the asset sale, so either way they would end up with only around $2.2 million.↩
4. This appears to be a typo. The closing memorandum refers to the escrow agreements, which were executed separately. The general escrow agreement was between BNP, Associated Bank, and MidCoast Investments, Inc.Morehead was not a party to it but was also not simply a name out of the blue. As we explain below, Morehead was an integral part of the post-stock-sale transactions that MidCoast used to "eliminate" the taxes from the asset sale.↩
5. Son-of-BOSS deals were generally used to artificially inflate someone's basis in a partnership interest by contributing assets with large contingent liabilities (which were ignored in computing basis) and then selling this interest at fair market value for a huge tax (but no economic) loss.
See, e.g., (involving typical Son-of-BOSS transaction);RJT Invs. X v. Commissioner , 491 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 2007) . There are other variations,Kligfeld Holdings v. Commissioner , 128 T.C. 192 (2007)see, e.g., . We've never found a Son-of-BOSS transaction that worked.Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States , 634 F.3d 249↩ (4th Cir. 2011)6.
See, e.g., ;Swords Tr. v. Commissioner , 142 T.C. 317 (2014) ,Diebold Found., Inc. v. Commissioner , 736 F.3d 172, 184-85 (2d Cir. 2013)vacating and remanding sub nom. .Salus Mundi Found. v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2012-61↩7.
See, e.g., .Sawyer Tr. of May 1992 v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2014-59↩8. The principals involved in several Midco transactions did not manage to disappear, but instead were indicted for conspiracy to defraud the government and obstruct the administration of tax law.
See United States v. Veera↩ , No. 2:12-cr-00444-BMS (E.D. Pa. filed June 20, 2012).9. After an IRS examiner concludes an audit and determines there is something off with a return, he sends the taxpayer a 30-day letter to describe his findings. The taxpayer has thirty days to request a conference with the IRS Appeals Office if he disagrees. If the taxpayer does nothing, the IRS will then send him a notice of deficiency.
Sec. 601.105(d)(1)(iv) , Statement of Procedural Rules;see also ,Estate of Gillespie v. Commissioner , 103 T.C. 395, 395 n.3 (1994)superseded by statute , Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,Pub. L. No. 105-206, sec. 3101(b), 112 Stat. at 728 ,as recognized in ,Fla. Country Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner , 122 T.C. 73 (2004)aff'd ,404 F.3d 1291↩ (11th Cir. 2005) .10. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and all rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.↩
11. Appellate venue of a Tax Court decision is defined by
section 7482 . In the case of a "redetermination of tax liability" for an individual, appeal lies to the circuit in which the taxpayer resided when he filed the petition.Sec. 7482(b)(1)(A) . The Code doesn't address what happens when there are multiple taxpayers and they do not all reside in the same circuit. Caselaw tells us that in such cases taxpayers can appeal our decision to their different circuits or stay together with one appeal in any of the circuits in which one of them resided.See ,Estate of Israel v. Commissioner , 159 F.3d 593, 595-96, 133 U.S. App. D.C. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1998)rev'g and remanding 108 T.C. 208 (1997) .But we have a possible problem here. No one disputes BNP's deficiency, yet the shareholders in these cases did not receive notices of deficiency, they received notices of
liability . It's entirely about whether the shareholders should be held liable for BNP's tax bill. This means there is a question about whether their cases really seek a "redetermination of tax liability."Sec. 7482(b)(1)(A) .We haven't found a case directly addressing appellate venue for transferee-liability cases where the underlying amount of tax isn't in dispute. But the appellate-venue provisions of
section 7482(b)(1)(A) have at least been implicitly applied to other very similar Midco cases before.See ,Slone v. Commissioner , 810 F.3d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 2015)vacating and remanding T.C. Memo. 2012-57 ; (venue proper in both Sixth and Fourth Circuits, but transferring case to Fourth Circuit);Swords Tr. v. Commissioner , 114 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2014-7003 (6th Cir. 2014) ("The IRS filed a timely petition for review in this circuit, where venue is proper.Sawyer Tr. of May 1992 v. Commissioner , 712 F.3d 597, 604 (1st Cir. 2013)See 26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(1) ."),rev'g and remanding T.C. Memo. 2011-298 .But see (holding that appellate venue for CDP cases not challenging the underlying tax liability was only proper in that circuit).Byers v. Commissioner , 740 F.3d 668, 675-76, 408 U.S. App. D.C. 137 (D.C. Cir. 2014)Commentators have proposed multiple theories for appellate venue in transferee-liability cases. One such theory is that "redetermination of tax liability" includes our jurisdiction at the time the Code was amended in 1966, which included both deficiency and transferee cases. Another theory is that the phrase includes only deficiency cases, which would make transferee cases appealable only to the D.C. Circuit.
See James Bamberg, "A Different Point of Venue: The Plainer Meaning ofSection 7482(b)(1) ,"61 Tax Law. 445, 461-62 (2008) . The IRS agrees with the former.See Chief Counsel Notice CC-2015-006, 2015 CCN LEXIS 5 (June 30, 2015) .We note this issue because appellate venue sometimes affects our analysis: Different circuits sometimes apply different legal analyses, and appellate venue dictates which circuit's law, if any, we must apply.
,Golsen v. Commissioner , 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970)aff'd ,445 F.2d 985↩ (10th Cir. 1971) . At this stage of this case, however, we think it is immaterial because the analysis conducted today focuses on Minnesota law, which should be the same in each circuit.12. The first such law in our legal tradition dates to 1571, when Parliament made it illegal to transfer property to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Even back then, fraudulent-transfer laws were connected to tax law--one-half of the property fraudulently conveyed would be forfeited to the Crown.
See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, "Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain,"38 Vand. L. Rev. 829 (1985) .Twyne's case , 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 3 Co. Rep. 80 b (Star Chamber 1601), showed the problem. Pierce, a sheep farmer, owed money to Twyne and another creditor. The other creditor recruited the sheriff to collect his money but, just before the sheriff arrived, Pierce deeded all his sheep to Twyne though he continued to keep and treat them as his own. The other creditor sued, and the Star Chamber found the transfer to be fraudulent. It based its decision on six indicia of fraud--laying the foundation of what we now call "badges" of fraud.See↩ Stephen P. Harbeck, "Twyne's Case Retold: Still Good Law Four Hundred Years Later," 4 Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies 65, 65-69 (2000).13. The parties do not agree that the possible liability of the shareholders for penalties is a claim under MUFTA.↩
14. The Eighth Circuit reasoned in
Stanko that "penalties for negligent or intentional misconduct by the transferor that occurred many months after the transfer, * * * are not, by any stretch of the imagination, existing at the time of the transfer." . Relying on this opinion, we held inStanko , 209 F.3d at 1088Frank Sawyer Trust↩ , another Midco case, that the Commissioner hadn't proved the transfers were made with the intent to defraud future creditors, and therefore, couldn't hold the taxpayers liable for the transferor's penalties.15. The Commissioner even admits that he "is not seeking to apply Minnesota state tax law. Rather [he] is seeking to collect a debt * * * . Accordingly, support for [the Commissioner's] recasting of the transactions between [the shareholders] and MidCoast should be derived from state transferee liability cases, or other creditors' rights laws, not state tax law cases."
The Commissioner does argue that these principles apply statutorily to MUFTA. He cites
Minn. Stat. section 513.50 . This section states that unless they've been specifically excluded in the other sections of MUFTA, "the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal and agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement [MUFTA's] provisions."Minn. Stat. Ann. sec. 513.50 (West 2014). The shareholders counter withejusdem generis . This is the canon of statutory construction that says when general words follow more specific ones, the general terms will be limited to things in the same class as the specific ones.See, e.g., . Under this logic, the shareholders argue that substance over form doesn't belong to the same class as the law of merchant, principal and agent, etc. Because we find that we can't recast the transactions for other reasons described below, we needn't decide this question.Argo-Jal Farming Enters., Inc. v. Commissioner , 145 T.C. 145, 154↩ (2015)16. This presumption lets creditors prove certain elements of a fraudulent transfer by showing a debtor was operating a Ponzi scheme. If a creditor can show a debtor's actions were in furtherance of the scheme, it will be presumed that he had actual fraudulent intent,
see , was insolvent at the time he made any transfers in furtherance of the scheme, and did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for them. (The latter two can help show constructive fraud.Donell v. Kowell , 533 F.3d 762, 770 (9th Cir. 2008)See, e.g., .Warfield v. Byron , 436 F.3d 551, 558↩ (5th Cir. 2006))17. In
Butler , which we decided before the Minnesota Supreme Court issuedFinn , we avoided the issue.See .Butler↩ , T.C. Memo 2002-314, 2002 WL 31882859, at *618. One commentator explains that the exception was originally a suggested variation of the Model Business Corporations Act (Model Act). The variation was meant to alleviate any confusion between the Model Act's and the old Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act's insolvency tests for distributions. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was repealed and replaced with the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act in 1987, and this new act had an insolvency test less likely to be confused with the Model Act's test for corporate distributions. Minnesota nevertheless retained the optional provision even after adopting the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act in 1987. John H. Matheson & Philip S. Garon, 18 Minn. Prac., Corporation Law & Practice sec. 6:11, n.1 (3d ed.).↩
19. Minnesota and Washington aren't all by themselves.
See N.M. Stat. Ann. sec. 53-11-44(E) (2004) (similar to Washington);N.D. Cent. Code Ann. sec. 10-19.1-92(3)(c)↩ (2012) (similar to Minnesota).20. This is another reason the Commissioner's substance-over-form argument fails. If we were to apply substance-over-form principles as the Commissioner suggests MUFTA would not apply to a transaction recast as a direct transfer from BNP to the shareholders: The plain language of MBCA supersedes MUFTA in Minnesota when the transfer is a corporate distribution, and a corporate "distribution" includes a "distribution in liquidation."
Minn. Stat. Ann. sec. 302A.011 subdiv. 10↩ (West Supp. 2017). Due to this rather unusual statutory language, even recasting the redemption-plus-sale as a liquidation would not free it from MBCA's broad language.21. We later applied a similar analysis in
. We found transferee-of-a-transferee liability inCullifer v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo 2014-208Cullifer for the same reasons as we did inFrank Sawyer Trust . The transfers occurred in reverse order, just as they did inFrank Sawyer Trust↩ .22. We even noted in
Cullifer that one of the purposes of the escrow arrangement was "to ensure that [the taxpayer] was being purchased using outside funds." . Nonetheless, we held that the taxpayers were liable as transferees of a transferee.Cullifer↩ , at *2723. We note that the shareholders here even seem to admit that BNP, LLC, was the real transferee. They said that after the transfers through the escrow accounts, "BNP, LLC, as the purchaser of [the shareholders'] stock and sole member of the company, obtained control over [BNP's] cash."↩
24. Determining which party is the transferor of the second transfer is important for another reason. For the Commissioner to prove this second transfer was also fraudulent, he must prove that the transferor was "engaged or was about to engage in a business or transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small * * * or intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they became due."
Minn. Stat. Ann. sec. 513.44(a)(2)(i)-(ii)↩ (West 1987). These answers may very well differ depending on whether MidCoast or BNP, LLC, was the record transferor.25. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded
Stuart to consider whether the stock sale in that case should have been recharacterized as a liquidating distribution to the shareholders under Nebraska law.See ,Stuart v. Commissioner , 841 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2016)vacating and remanding 144 T.C. 235 (2015) . That opinion is not a problem here because we apply Minnesota law here. We also do not need to address yet the argument that "transfer for the benefit of" means that the alleged fraudulent transfer must itself benefit the alleged transferee directly instead of in a "but for" causation way. It is possible that this language in the MUFTA means to capture only the benefit someone like guarantor gets when a transfer is made to the obligee of the debt he's guaranteed, and not someone who benefits from a separate transaction that would not have occurred but for the challenged transaction like the sort we discussed inStuart. See .Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. , 838 F.2d at 896↩26. "Insider" under MUFTA includes directors of a debtor corporation, officers of a debtor corporation, and people in control of a debtor corporation.
Minn. Stat. Ann. sec. 513.41(7)(ii)(A)-(C)↩ (West 1987).27. The section also requires there to be a liquidation or dissolution. We concluded above that
Finn precludes us from collapsing transactions to find ade facto↩ liquidation occurred. This also makes the MBCA inapplicable.
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