Buckholz v. Kelso Housing Authority

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: April 30, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05170
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT TACOMA 6 JACQUELINE BUCKHOLZ, Case No. 3:25-cv-05170-TLF 7 Plaintiff, v. ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 8 FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION KELSO HOUSING AUTHORITY, (DKT. 10) 9 Defendant. 10

11 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Jacqueline Keri Buckholz’s 12 motion for preliminary injunction. Dkt. 10. The briefs have been submitted and the Court 13 heard oral argument. Dkts. 14 (Defendant’s Response); Dkt. 21 (Plaintiff’s Reply); Dkt. 14 25. For the reasons below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction 15 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 65. 16 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 17 On February 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Kelso 18 Housing Authority asserting claims for violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 19 3601 et seq. (“FHA”); the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60.222; 20 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and the Due Process Clause under the 21 Fourteenth Amendment. Dkt. 11. 22 23

24 1 Plaintiff focuses on her claims under the FHA and Due Process Clause for purposes of this motion. 1 Plaintiff states she is an individual with significant mental disabilities and has 2 lived in her home in Kelso for 21 years helped by a housing voucher from Defendant, a 3 local public housing agency. Dkt. 11, Declaration of Jacqueline Buckholz, ¶¶2-32. Until 4 August 2024, Defendant subsidized about 70 percent of Plaintiff’s rent; Plaintiff paid the

5 remaining amount from her disability benefits under the Social Security Income (“SSI”) 6 Program. Id. 7 On June 20, 2024, Plaintiff received a letter dated June 13, 2024, that Defendant 8 would be terminating her housing assistance on July 31, 2024, for “fail[ing] to comply 9 with the request to inspect the unit for Housing Quality Standards ….” Id. at ¶4. See 10 also Dkt. 11 at Exhibit 1. Defendant states Plaintiff was provided a few opportunities to 11 comply with the Housing Quality Standards. See Dkt. 15, Declaration of Shelly Watkins, 12 at Exhibits B, C, D, E, F. 13 The June 20, 2024, letter further stated, “If you wish to appeal this decision, you 14 have the right to an informal hearing. The request must be submitted to this agency by

15 2:00p.m. within 10 business days of this letter. If your request is not received within the 16 time period indicated above, you will waive your right to hearing and our decision to 17 terminate your assistance will become final.” Id. 18 Plaintiff states she did not understand what steps she was required to take to 19 request an informal hearing upon reading the letter. Id. As a result, Plaintiff called the 20 Kelso Housing Authority 34 times in an attempt to better understand the letter and 21 request an informal hearing. Dkt. 11 at ¶5. 22

23 2 Plaintiff provides a detailed background of the inception of the Housing Choice Voucher Program established by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 in her motion for preliminary 24 injunction. Dkt. 10. 1 Limayri Disla, an employee working for Defendant, states that Plaintiff came into 2 the office and asked Ms. Disla how to figure out the deadline to file an appeal. Ms. Disla 3 helped Plaintiff count the number of days Plaintiff had to respond to the letter and 4 determined Plaintiff had until June 28, 2024, to appeal. Dkt. 16, Declaration of Limayri

5 Disla. In her declaration, Ms. Disla did not identify the date on which Plaintiff came into 6 the office. Plaintiff, in her declaration supporting her reply brief, states she did not meet 7 with Ms. Disla before July 2, 2024. Dkt. 23, Declaration of Jacqueline Buckholz, ¶3. 8 Plaintiff submitted a written request for an informal hearing using a form from 9 Defendant’s office on July 2, 2024. Id. ¶8. See also Dkt. 11 at Exhibit 2. On July 18, 10 2024, Defendant informed Plaintiff in a letter that Plaintiff’s request for a hearing was 11 untimely and should have been provided to Defendant no later than Friday, June 28, 12 2024. See Dkt. 11 at Exhibit 3. Defendant’s office is closed on weekends and federal 13 holidays, and is closed to the public on Fridays. The letter added that “a request for an 14 informal hearing must be made in writing and delivered to the Housing Authority either

15 in person or by first class mail.” Id. 16 Later, Plaintiff left messages for Defendant regarding the termination of her 17 participation from Defendant’s voucher program. Defendant wrote Plaintiff another letter 18 in response to those messages on July 29, 2024, explaining the voucher was 19 terminated for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Housing Quality Standards 20 requirements, and Plaintiff would not receive an informal hearing to appeal the decision 21 because her request for a hearing was untimely. Id. at Exhibit 4. 22 On August 2, 2024, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Defendant explaining her request 23 was submitted within 10 business days because she received the letter on June 20,

24 1 2024, and did not believe Fridays were considered “business days,” and she suffers 2 from mental health issues, including anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder, which 3 significantly impact her day-to-day life. Id. at Exhibit 5. Plaintiff requested “some 4 understanding and support” from Defendant. Id.

5 After being unable to pay her entire rent in August and September, Plaintiff’s 6 landlord filed an eviction proceeding against her. Dkt. 17, Declaration of Nicole 7 Tideman, Exhibit A. Plaintiff’s court-appointed counsel in her eviction proceeding 8 managed to help Plaintiff find short-term rental assistance in lieu of the voucher. Dkt. 11 9 at ¶12. 10 On October 8, 2024, her counsel with Northwest Justice Project wrote a letter to 11 Defendant on her behalf requesting a reasonable accommodation — they requested the 12 Defendant grant an informal hearing for Plaintiff to get the voucher back, or in the 13 alternative, extend her tenancy until she is able to secure new housing, or a at a 14 minimum, to extend tenancy until January 6, 2025. Id. at Exhibit 6. Defendant

15 responded to this letter on October 16, 2024, stating that it had “accommodated Ms. 16 Buckholz on multiple occasions over the years,” including after she received her 17 termination notice and a Kelso Housing Authority staff member explained “business 18 days” to Plaintiff. Id. at Exhibit 7. 19 At oral argument, the parties agreed that Plaintiff will no longer have access to 20 rent assistance starting in May 2025 and will be at risk of eviction. 21 22 23

24 1 DISCUSSION 2 Injunctions are “to be used sparingly, and only in a clear and plain case.” Rizzo v. 3 Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Irwin v. Dixon, 50 U.S. 10, 33 (1850)); see 4 also Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974). “A preliminary injunction is an

5 extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 6 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Instead, injunctive relief “may only be awarded upon a clear 7 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22. 8 To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must demonstrate that: (1) they are 9 likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they will likely suffer irreparable harm absent 10 preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction is in 11 the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The moving party must make a showing on 12 all four factors to obtain a preliminary injunction. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. 13 Clinic v. Becerra, 901 F.3d 1166, 1167 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing to Alliance for the Wild 14 Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)).

15 Alternatively, under Ninth Circuit precedent, “a plaintiff may also obtain a 16 preliminary injunction by showing ‘serious questions go[] to the merits’ of its claims and 17 a balance of the hardships that tip “sharply” towards the plaintiff, so long as it makes a 18 showing on the other two factors.” A Woman’s Friend Res. Clinic, 901 F.3d at 1167 19 (quoting Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135). But, a plaintiff may not obtain 20 an injunction merely because an irreparable injury is possible, the plaintiff must show 21 that the irreparable injury is likely absent preliminary relief. Am. Trucking Association, 22 Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). 23

24 1 (1) Likelihood of Success 2 “The first factor under Winter is the most important—likely success on the 3 merits.” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). Under the Ninth 4 Circuit sliding scale approach, the moving party must demonstrate, at minimum, “a fair

5 chance of success on the merits, or questions serious enough to require litigation.” 6 Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Guzman v. Shewry, 7 552 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2009)). 8 Here, there is a fair chance of success on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims for 9 disability discrimination in violation of the FHA and the Due Process Clause. 10 A. Fair Housing Act

11 “To make out a claim of discrimination based on failure to reasonably 12 accommodate, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) [plaintiff] suffers from a handicap as 13 defined by the FHAA; (2) defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the 14 plaintiff's handicap; (3) accommodation of the handicap ‘may be necessary’ to afford 15 plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) defendants refused 16 to make such accommodation3.” Giebeler v. M & B Associates, 343 F.3d 1143, 1147 17 (9th Cir.2003) (citing United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 18 1374, 1380 (9th Cir.1997)) 19 “[O]nly ‘reasonable’ accommodations are required by the FHAA.” Giebeler, 343 20 F.3d at 1148 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)). “Ordinarily, an accommodation is 21 reasonable under the FHAA ‘when it imposes no fundamental alteration in the nature of 22 23 3 Although the statutory language uses the term “handicap”, the Court will use the term “disability” in the 24 rest of this opinion. 1 the program or undue financial or administrative burdens.’ ” Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1157 2 (quoting Howard v. City of Beavercreek, 276 F.3d 802, 806 (6th Cir.2002)). “To prove 3 that an accommodation is necessary, ‘[p]laintiffs must show that, but for the 4 accommodation, they likely will be denied an equal opportunity to enjoy the housing of

5 their choice.’ ” Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1155 (citing Smith & Lee Associates, Inc. v. City of 6 Taylor, Mich., 102 F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir.1996)). 7 Plaintiff submits a declaration stating she receives SSI disability benefits, and 8 has “significant mental disabilities that amount to my anxiety causing me to panic easily, 9 not being able to concentrate, feeling scattered and becoming depressed.” Dkt. 11 at 10 ¶11. In her letter dated August 2, 2024, to Defendant, she also specified that she suffers 11 from anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder. Dkt. 11 at Exhibit 5. 12 The record includes various correspondence from Defendant – in each letter, 13 Defendant denies Plaintiff’s request for an informal hearing. See Dkt. 11 at Exhibit 3 14 (“As a result of your late response, your request for an informal hearing will not be

15 granted.”); Exhibit 4 (“Your request was not received until several days following the due 16 date, therefore, your participation in the HCV program will end effective 7/31/2024.”); 17 Exhibit 7 (“KHA will not be changing its decision.”). 18 Plaintiff has made a prima facie case that she suffers from a disability as defined 19 by the FHA because she suffers from a mental impairment which substantially limits her 20 ability to concentrate and understand the notifications and letters sent from Defendant. 21 The Court finds that the record, as revealed by the letters exchanged between the 22 parties, provides prima facie evidence that Defendant knew or reasonably should have 23

24 1 known of Plaintiff’s disability and refused to accommodate Plaintiff. See, e.g., Dkt. 11 at 2 Exhibit 5. 3 Plaintiff has also made a prima facie showing that she requested a reasonable 4 and necessary accommodation. See Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1155 (“Imposition of

5 burdensome policies ... can interfere with disabled persons' right to use and enjoyment 6 of their dwellings, thus necessitating accommodation.”) (citing Shapiro v. Cadman 7 Towers, 51 F.3d 328, 335–36 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that a landlord's failure to grant a 8 disabled tenant an exception to ‘first come-first served’ waiting list for tenant parking 9 substantially affected tenant's use and enjoyment of her dwelling.)). 10 The Court finds that Plaintiff has shown serious questions going to the merits. 11 Plaintiff has also shown a fair chance of prevailing on her claim that her Housing 12 Choice Voucher was terminated in violation of the Due Process Clause's protections 13 requiring notice of the alleged violations that form the basis of a proposed termination 14 and procedures that are reasonably calculated to not erroneously deprive her of a

15 protected interest. 16 For Defendant to be liable under a Due Process Clause claim, Plaintiff must 17 show that the unconstitutional violation occurred because of a policy, practice, or 18 custom of the Defendant. When analyzing due process procedures, the Court must first 19 look to whether a constitutionally protected interest is at stake. Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. 20 Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). If such an interest exists, the Court must then 21 look to whether the state’s procedures are constitutionally sufficient to deprive the 22 person of their interest. Id. These three factors are weighed to determine whether a set 23 of procedures is adequate:

24 1 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 2 procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including 3 the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 4 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has determined that a 5 housing voucher is a property interest subject to the protections of the Due Process 6 Clause, and even small changes can have a significant impact on public housing 7 tenants. Nozzi v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 806 F.3d 1178, 1191 (9th Cir. 8 2015), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (9th Cir. 2016). 9 Plaintiff argues that the procedures provided to Plaintiff risked erroneous 10 deprivation of her right to procedural safeguards. For example, at the time Defendant 11 announced its intent to terminate Plaintiff’s housing voucher, Plaintiff should have been 12 informed of her right to request an accommodation under Defendant’s own 13 Administrative Plan. The Administrative Plan provides: 14 A PHA’s decision to deny or terminate the assistance of a family that includes a 15 person with disabilities is subject to consideration of reasonable accommodation [24 16 CFR 982.552 (2)(iv)]. 17 When applicants with disabilities are denied assistance, the notice of 18 denial must inform them of the PHA’s informal review process and their right to request an informal review. In addition, the notice must inform 19 applicants with disabilities of their right to request reasonable accommodations to participate in the informal review process. 20 When a participant family’s assistance is terminated, the notice of 21 termination must inform them of the PHA’s informal hearing process and their right to request a hearing and reasonable accommodation. 22 When reviewing reasonable accommodation requests, the PHA must 23 consider whether any mitigating circumstances can be verified to explain and overcome the problem that led to the PHA’s decision to deny or 24 1 terminate assistance. If a reasonable accommodation will allow the family to meet the requirements, the PHA must make the accommodation. 2 Dkt. 12 (Declaration of Magali Cota) at Exhibit 1. Here, Defendant’s notice of 3 termination did not advise Plaintiff of her right to a reasonable accommodation. 4 Turning to the third Mathews inquiry, affording the procedure requested by the 5 Plaintiff would place little burden on the Defendant. Plaintiff requests an informal 6 hearing and the opportunity to present her reasons why the Defendant should continue 7 providing her with a housing voucher, even though her appeal was filed after the 8 deadline given by the Defendant. 9 Thus, Plaintiff shows a “fair chance” of prevailing under the Due Process Clause 10 as well. 11 (2) Irreparable Harm 12 Plaintiff states in her declaration that without this voucher, she will be unable to 13 pay rent in May and will be evicted from her home. Dkt. 11 at ¶16. Plaintiff contends that 14 if she is forced to move from her current home, she faces the possibility of becoming 15 homeless. Further, Plaintiff’s tenant history is likely to be irreparably harmed by the 16 mere filing of an eviction, even if she were to ultimately prevail in that action. 17 A plaintiff must demonstrate they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 18 absence of a preliminary injunction. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The Ninth Circuit has 19 cautioned that “[s]peculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to 20 warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Caribbean Marine Servs. v. Baldrige, 844 21 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir.1988). In general a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must 22 establish that “remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 23 24 1 compensate” for the injury. Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm't Mgmt., 736 F.3d 2 1239, 1249 (9th Cir.2013). 3 In this case, the FHA specifically authorizes the Court to grant “any permanent or 4 temporary injunction” and “temporary restraining order.” See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (“In

5 a civil action under subsection (a) of this section, if the court finds that a discriminatory 6 housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, the court may ... grant as relief, as 7 the court deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary 8 restraining order, or other order (including an order enjoining the defendant from 9 engaging in such practice or ordering such affirmative action as may be appropriate).”). 10 Wrongful eviction is not an injury for which remedies available at law are 11 adequate. If Plaintiff is evicted and an innocent third party rents the property, the Court 12 may not have authority return Plaintiff to her original home. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(d); 13 Smith v. Brown, 2010 WL 3120203, *7 (W.D.Wash.2010) (in the context of an allegedly 14 discriminatory eviction, finding “irreparable harm if the injunction does not issue

15 because the home itself will forever be lost for Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment ... [It] will 16 not exist for Plaintiffs to move back into should they ultimately succeed in their case.”). 17 The Court finds that Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of irreparable injury. 18 (3) Balance of Equities and Public Interest 19 The balance of harms tips sharply in favor of granting the motion for preliminary 20 injunction because when faced with a conflict between financial concerns and 21 preventable human suffering – here, eviction and relocation of an indigent individual 22 with mental health disabilities –the balance of hardship tips in the favor of preventing 23 human suffering. The Defendant’s harm, by contrast, is minimal and they could continue

24 1 to allow for the payment of the voucher. Defendant states granting this preliminary 2 injunction would create a hardship for them because “Defendant has to have funding 3 available in order to be able to provide a voucher.” Dkt. 14 at 6. But Defendant does not 4 provide evidence that they do not have funding available to issue a new voucher or an

5 expectation that a new voucher will not become available. Id. See also Dkt. 15, 6 Declaration of Shelly Watkins, at 3 (“Ms. Buckholz’s voucher has been terminated, and 7 it is contingent on available funding.”) 8 (4) Public Interest 9 Finally, the Court must consider whether the public interest would be furthered by 10 the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See Inst. of Cetacean Rsch. v. Sea Shepherd 11 Conservation Soc., 725 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2013). This factor, too, weighs in favor 12 Plaintiff’s favor. 13 In the FHA, Congress declared that “it is the policy of the United States to 14 provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”

15 42 U.S.C. § 3601. Accordingly, courts have emphatically declared that the public 16 interest is served by effective enforcement of the FHA. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Recht 17 Family Partnership, 51 F. Supp. 3d 989, 992–93 (S.D.Cal. 2014) (upon a showing of 18 likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm, finding that plaintiff met the 19 public interest requirement because “[t]he public interest has been authoritatively 20 declared by Congress in its enactment of the FHA”) (citation omitted); see also U.S. v. 21 Com. of Puerto Rico, 764 F.Supp. 220, 225 (D.Puerto Rico 1991) (emphasizing “the 22 public interest that all citizens have in seeing vigorous enforcement of civil rights 23

24 1 legislation like the Fair Housing Act” in concluding that “the public interest weighs 2 heavily in favor of a preliminary injunction.”). 3 This significant public interest “is an important consideration in the exercise of 4 equitable discretion in the enforcement of statutes.” U.S. v. Odessa Union Warehouse

5 Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir.1987). 6 Therefore, in this case, where the statute authorizes injunctive relief “as the court 7 deems appropriate” to enforce the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c), the public interest is 8 served by the entry of a preliminary injunction. 9 CONCLUSION 10 The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff has met 11 the criteria; Plaintiff has shown serious questions going to the merits, she faces 12 irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, the injunction serves the public 13 interest, and that the balance of hardship tips in her favor. 14 Usually, a bond is a condition precedent to the issuance of a preliminary

15 injunction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). But the Court may waive the bond when a plaintiff 16 cannot afford its cost or when there is little, or no, harm to the party being enjoined. See 17 Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003); Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 18 167 F.3d 1228, 1237 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff, here, is indigent. No bond will be required 19 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). 20 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 21 Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Junction is GRANTED. The Court orders that the 22 Defendant is enjoined from refusing to make Housing Assistance Program payments to 23 Plaintiff’s landlord under the Housing Choice Voucher program, must immediately

24 1 reinstate payment, and make Housing Assistance Payments on an ongoing basis as it 2 did before the present controversy for the pendency of this Order and until the Court 3 vacates this Order. 4 This injunction shall be binding as provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) and shall

5 remain in effect until further order of the Court. 6 Dated this 30th day of April, 2025. 7 A

8 Theresa L. Fricke United States Magistrate Judge 9

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