Bucheit v. Hines
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Opinion
2026 IL App (1st) 250170-U No. 1-25-0170 Order filed March 31, 2026 Second Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ CHRISTINE BUCHEIT, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 24 OP 79403 ) TERRY HINES, ) Honorable ) Marina E. Ammendola, Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McBride and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Affirmed. Appellant has failed to provide a sufficient record such that error can be determined.
¶2 Respondent Terry Hines appeals pro se from the trial court’s entry of a plenary order of
protection against him and in favor of petitioner Christine Bucheit. On appeal, Hines claims that
the trial court failed to acknowledge his evidence and his objections to petitioner’s evidence and No. 1-25-0170
declined to address that petitioner served him with a summons at his place of employment in order
to embarrass him. We affirm.
¶3 The record on appeal does not contain a report of proceedings. The following facts are
gleaned from the common law record that includes, relevant here, the petitions for an emergency
order of protection and a plenary order of protection, Hines’s motion to dismiss, and the trial
court’s orders. We relate only those facts relevant to the issues on appeal.
¶4 On September 27, 2024, petitioner filed a pro se petition seeking an emergency order of
protection and a plenary order of protection against Hines, with whom she previously had a dating
relationship. Petitioner filed a second pro se petition on September 28, 2024, alleging, in pertinent
part, that on September 27, 2024, Hines “threat[ed] to sue” her for the value of certain gifts and
sent her at least 12 “intimidating and aggressive” text messages.
¶5 On September 28, 2024, the trial court issued an emergency order of protection against
Hines.
¶6 Hines subsequently filed a pro se motion to dismiss alleging, relevant here, that petitioner
had him served with a summons at his business address to “hurt” his employment. Hines
acknowledged that he “lashed out” but asserted that he apologized “more than once.”
¶7 On November 13, 2024, the trial court denied Hines’s motion to dismiss. The court’s order
reflects that (1) petitioner and Hines appeared pro se, (2) Hines tendered 20 pages of exhibits to
petitioner, and (3) the parties were to exchange exhibits by December 30, 2024.
¶8 On January 30, 2025, petitioner and Hines appeared pro se before the trial court. Following
a hearing, the trial court entered an eight-month plenary order of protection against Hines and in
favor of petitioner.
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¶9 On January 31, 2025, Hines filed a pro se notice of appeal.
¶ 10 On appeal, Hines claims the trial court disregarded his evidence and his objections to
petitioner’s “questionable” evidence. He argues that, though the trial court reviewed his evidence,
it did not enter the evidence into the record or include the evidence in the record on appeal. Hines
further argues that petitioner had him served with a summons at work to embarrass him and that
the trial court stated that it lacked “jurisdictional reach” to address “malicious” service.
¶ 11 As a preliminary matter, our review of Hines’s appeal is hindered by his failure to fully
comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which governs the form and
content of appellate briefs. While Hines used preprinted forms, his briefs narrate the case from his
point of view and lack citations to the record on appeal, cohesive legal arguments, and reasoned
bases for those arguments in violation of Rule 341(h). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6), (7) (eff. Oct. 1,
2020). “Arguments that do not comply with Rule 341(h)(7) do not merit consideration on appeal
and may be rejected by this court for that reason alone.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders, 2015
IL App (1st) 141272, ¶ 43.
¶ 12 Hines did attach documents to his opening brief, but they are not included in the record on
appeal and thus cannot be considered. See Koshinski v. Trame, 2017 IL App (5th) 150398, ¶ 9
(attachments to briefs that are not included in record are not properly before reviewing court and
cannot be used to supplement record); People v. Mehlberg, 249 Ill. App. 3d 499, 532 (1993) (“A
reviewing court must determine the issues before it on appeal solely on the basis of the record
made in the trial court.”).
¶ 13 To the extent that Hines’s briefs fail to comply with Rule 341(h)(7), it would be within our
discretion to dismiss this appeal on that basis. Zale v. Moraine Valley Community College, 2019
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IL App (1st) 190197, ¶ 32. We decline to do so, however, as it is clear that Hines wishes to
challenge the trial court’s entry of the plenary order of protection. That said, we are unable to reach
the merits of this appeal due to deficiencies in the record.
¶ 14 On appeal, the appellant, in this case Hines, has the burden to provide a complete record
for review to support his claims of error. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391 (1984). If no such
record is provided, “it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity
with law and had a sufficient factual basis.” Id. at 392. This is because, in order to determine
whether an error occurred, a reviewing court must have a record before it to review. Id.; see also
Walsh v. Sklar, 2025 IL App (1st) 231830, ¶ 104 (“Where the issue on appeal relates to the conduct
of a hearing or proceeding, this issue is not subject to review absent a report or record of
proceedings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶ 15 Here, Hines challenges the trial court’s entry of a plenary order of protection. But the record
on appeal does not contain any reports of proceedings, including from the January 30, 2025 hearing
at which the trial court entered judgment in favor of petitioner. Nor does the record contain an
acceptable substitute such as a bystander’s report or agreed statement of facts. See Ill. S. Ct. R.
323(a), (c), (d) (eff. July 1, 2017). Without a transcript or an acceptable substitute, we are unable
to determine what evidence, exhibits, and testimony were admitted or excluded at the January 30,
2025, hearing, and have no knowledge of what arguments were presented to the trial court or the
court’s reasoning in ruling as it did. The record is thus insufficient for our review of Hines’s claims
of error.
¶ 16 When the record is insufficient for our review of an appellant’s contentions, we must
presume that the trial court acted in conformity with the law and ruled properly after considering
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the evidence before it. Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 156-57 (2005). In the
absence of a report of proceedings or other record of the hearing, we have no basis for disturbing
the trial court’s judgment. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92.
¶ 17 The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 18 Affirmed.
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