Buchannan v. Cole

57 Mo. App. 11, 1894 Mo. App. LEXIS 137
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 5, 1894
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 57 Mo. App. 11 (Buchannan v. Cole) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Buchannan v. Cole, 57 Mo. App. 11, 1894 Mo. App. LEXIS 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 1894).

Opinion

Biggs, J.

— The defendant Cole constructed for his. codefendant, the Davie Mining and Development Company, what is denominated a “gravity plant,” which is used for hoisting and separating lead and zinc ores. The plant consists of an engine, boiler, crusher, reels, jigs, rougher and finisher, shafting, pulleys, tanks, rods, etc., all inclosed by a building which was planned and constructed for that particular purpose. The plant was constructed on mining lots numbered 116, 117, 121 and 125, belonging to the Kentucky Mining Company. Cole employed the plaintiff to erect the building, for which he agreed to pay $350. The plaintiff did the work according to contract, and, Cole having failed to pay him therefor, he filed a mechanic’s lien on the building and machinery, and the land to the extent of one acre. The present action is against Cole for the debt and to enforce the lien against the property. The defendant bank held a chattel mortgage on some of the machinery, and for this reason it was made a party. The separate answer of Cole and the Davie Mining and Developing Company were general denials. The bank in its answer averred that it had advanced money to Cole in making the improvements, and that, about two months after the completion of the work, it took a chattel mortgage from him on the machinery to secure that indebtedness. It seems that Cole, who was the general manager of the Davie Mining and Devel[13]*13opment Company, had made the improvements under an agreement with the'company that he would run the mine and plant on his own account until he was fully .reimbursed for his outlays. The answer also set forth that the plant was erected on leasehold property belonging to the Kentucky Mining Company, that the lessors had the right to remove the building and machinery, and that, by reason of this, all of said property was personalty and not subject to a mechanic’s lien.

The cause was submitted to the court sitting as a jury. There is no conflict whatever in the testimony. It tends to show that plaintiff did the work in the manner and for the price alleged; that Cole failed to pay him therefor; that the plaintiff had filed his lien paper within the time prescribed by law, and that he had given the Davie Mining and Development Company due notice of his claim. The evidence also disclosed the nature of the machinery and its relation to the building, and also the title or interest of the Davie Mining and Development Company in the mining claims on which the improvements were made. At the conclusion of the evidence the plaintiff asked the court to instruct specially that the machinery became fixtures and, as such, subject to the plaintiff’s lien; and he also asked the court to instruct generally that under the uncontradicted evidence all of the issues should be found for him. The court refused the instructions. Judgment was rendered against Cole, but the court found against the plaintiff as to the lien. The plaintiff has appealed.

In support of the judgment it is urged that the Davie Mining and Development Company had a mere license to dig for mineral, -which, it is urged, is not sufficient to sustain a mechanic’s lien. The facts are these: The Kentucky Mining Company is the owner of quite a large tract of mining land, which it has sub[14]*14divided into mining lots. The company worked the property under a system of leasing, requiring from its tenants or miners a stated royalty on all mineral taken out. Instead of executing formal leases or contracts, the company adopted rules, in which were stated the terms and conditions of lettings, and the only thing required of the miner was to sign a register kept in the office of the company. When this was done, the miner had the exclusive right to dig for mineral on the lot or lots designated so long as he should comply with the terms and conditions of his contract.

Paragraph 4 of the rules provides as follows: “No sub-leasing or renting of lots will be allowed. No transfer of lease, lots or mining claims, or rights, will be recognized by the company, unless the parties acquiring such lots, leases, claims, or - rights, have received permission from the said Kentucky Mining Company to Tnine such lot or claim, and no person or persons will be recognized by the company unless their names are on the register.” The rules also provide that, if any of the terms or conditions of the contract are violated, all rights under the contract will be subject to forfeiture, and the company may enter and take possession without notice. In May, 1892, S. C. Johnson & Co. registered on the lots in controversy, and developed the property to some extent. Prior to the construction of the “plant” by Cole, S. C. Johnson & Co. sold and transferred their interest in the contract to “the Davie Mining and Development Company.” The latter failed to register on the lots, but the superintendent of the Kentucky Mining Company testified that his company recognized and approved the transfer, and that, at the time the “plant” was erected by Cole, the Davie Mining and Development Company held the exclusive mining rights to the lots.

The fact that the Davie Mining and Development [15]*15Company had not formally registered on the lots prior to the erection of the plant, we do not regard of any consequence. The Kentucky Mining Company con-, sented to the transfer, and the subsequent signing of the register was'a matter of form, and related back to the date of the transfer.

The contract between the Kentucky Mining Company and the Davie Mining and Development Company does not amount to an absolute sale and transfer of all mineral in the specified lots, for the reason that the right of resale is withheld. Hobart v. Murray, 54 Mo. App. 249. Nor is it a mere license to dig and prospect for mineral, which would not be exclusive and would be revocable at the pleasure of the Kentucky Mining Company. Doe v. Wood, 2 B. & Ald. 736. It partakes more of the nature of a leasehold, and we will so treat it, although this.is subject to the technical objection that, as a contract of letting, it has no determinate period. Therefore, if the plaintiff was . entitled to the enforcement of his lien on other grounds, the judgment of the court as to the building and the leasehold was wrong. R. S. 1889, see. 6708. Whether the purchaser under the execution enforcing the lien would acquire any rights under the leasehold as against the owner of the land, we need not discuss. He would, at least, obtain the right to remove the buildings.

Was the machinery so connected with the building that it became a part thereof, and subject to the mechanic’s lien? R. S. Eddy, the superintendent of the Springfield Foundry and Machine Company, furnished the machinery for the plant. He testified as follows: “The building was constructed some time in January or February, and was made expressly for the machinery, as was the machinery for the building, and together they constituted what is called a gravity plant. A gravity plant is one in which the mineral flows grad[16]*16ually from one machine to another. The building and machinery are one — one is part of the other. The main building is eighty by seventeen or eighteen, and the wing, where the boiler is set, about twenty by thirty-two feet, and is placed over the shaft. The structure is higher at one end than at the other, higher than necessary, simply to carry oil the water from the roof, sloping from about twenty-two feet, twelve feet in height. This is done to accommodate the crusher and other high machinery placed there, which could not be placed under a lower roof than that.

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Bluebook (online)
57 Mo. App. 11, 1894 Mo. App. LEXIS 137, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/buchannan-v-cole-moctapp-1894.