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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 B.S.W., CASE NO. 3:26-cv-05284-DGE 11 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE 12 v. SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION UNDER SEAL (DKT. NO. 3) AND 13 JOHN DOE et al., MOTION TO PROCEED PSEUDONYMOUSLY (DKT. NO. 14 Defendants. 4) 15
16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to file under seal pursuant to 17 Local Civil Rule 7(g) and motion to proceed pseudonymously pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 18 Procedure 10(a). (Dkt. Nos. 3, 4.) For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the motions. 19 I BACKGROUND 20 On March 22, 2026, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and under the pseudonym “B.S.W.,” 21 sued Defendants “John Doe” d/b/a LocateFamily.com and ReliableSite.net LLC to “stop the 22 ongoing publication of fabricated personal information bearing his name” on LocateFamily.com. 23 (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges LocateFamily.com is “a commercially operated, advertising- 24 1 supported website that publishes a database of over 1.4 billion personal records” including 2 names, addresses, telephone numbers, and financial information. (Id. at 4.) According to 3 Plaintiff, LocateFamily.com published Plaintiff’s information and identified him as residing at a 4 “fabricated” address, which Plaintiff contends he has never resided at. (Id. at 5–6.) Plaintiff
5 alleges that when he requested the website remove the inaccurate information, his information 6 was republished on a new platform, which was “effectively a retaliation mechanism designed to 7 discourage removal requests.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff brings five causes of action for trademark 8 infringement, identity theft, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. (Id. at 13–17.) 9 Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed under pseudonym and to seal a declaration which 10 identifies his name.1 (Dkt. Nos. 3, 4.) Plaintiff argues that because his name is embedded in the 11 “infringing content at issue[,]” public disclosure of the name “would be immediately indexed by 12 search engines and would amplify the very harm Plaintiff seeks to stop.” (Dkt. No. 4 at 2.) 13 II DISCUSSION 14 The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s motion to proceed pseudonymously, and then Plaintiff’s
15 motion to seal. 16 A. Motion to Proceed Pseudonymously 17 Plaintiff seeks to proceed under the pseudonym “B.S.W.” (Dkt. No. 4.) The default rule 18 in civil litigation, embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) is that “[t]he title of the 19 complaint must name all the parties.” Nonetheless, in the Ninth Circuit, “we allow parties to use 20 pseudonyms in the ‘unusual case’ when nondisclosure of the party's identity ‘is necessary . . . to 21
22 1 In the sealed declaration, Plaintiff provided his United States Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Application Record, which showed his trademark application was “Dismissed or 23 Invalidated” because he failed to timely file a Statement of Use after the Notice of Allowance was issued. (Dkt. No. 8 at 12.) 24 1 protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment.’” Does I thru 2 XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067–1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United 3 States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981)). The decision to grant or deny permission 4 to proceed anonymously is committed to the district court’s discretion. See Advanced Textile
5 Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068. In utilizing that discretion, district courts must consider five factors: 6 (1) the severity of the threatened harm; (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears; 7 (3) the anonymous party’s vulnerability to retaliation; (4) prejudice to the opposing party; and 8 (5) the public interest. See id. Severity of the threatened harm and reasonableness of Plaintiff’s 9 fears are the most important factors and may be analyzed together. See Doe v. Kamehameha 10 Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est., 596 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kamehameha). 11 Plaintiff alleges he was a previous victim of an “identity impersonation scheme” and 12 Defendants “compound[]” that harm by publishing false information about Plaintiff on their 13 website. (Dkt. No. 4 at 2.) He further contends that filing this action under his true name would 14 create “an additional, permanent public record associating Plaintiff’s name with this litigation,
15 compounding the search-engine harm that Plaintiff seeks to remedy.” (Dkt. No. 4 at 3.) The 16 Court is unclear what “search-engine harm” Plaintiff is referring to. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s 17 conclusory statements do not provide an adequate justification for allowing him to proceed under 18 a pseudonym; as Plaintiff fails to describe how he will be harmed if his legal name is publicly 19 disclosed.2 20 The Ninth Circuit has described three types of cases that are appropriate for fictitious 21 pleading: (1) where identification creates the risk of physical retaliation, Advanced Textile, 214 22
2 The Court notes the incongruity of Plaintiff asserting trademark infringement claims against 23 Defendants yet requesting anonymity over the very name that is the subject of the trademark application and a matter of public record. 24 1 F.3d at 1068; (2) where anonymity is needed to protect highly personal information, such as 2 medical reports or a person’s sexual orientation, id. (citing Doe v. United Services Life Ins. Co., 3 123 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)); (3) and where anonymity protects a party from criminal 4 prosecution, id. (citing Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir.1981)). Plaintiff’s alleged harm
5 does not fit within this framework; there are no special or unusual circumstances that justify 6 protection of his identity in a matter alleging infringement of a trademark application. 7 Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to proceed under a pseudonym is DENIED without 8 prejudice. 9 B. Motion to File Under Seal 10 In conjunction with his motion to proceed pseudonymously, Plaintiff moved to seal his 11 declaration, which includes his legal name. (Dkt. No. 3.) “Historically, courts have recognized a 12 general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and 13 documents.” See Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) 14 (internal quotations omitted). Although “access to judicial records is not absolute,” there is a
15 “strong presumption in favor of access.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “The presumption of 16 access is based on the need for federal courts, although independent—indeed, particularly 17 because they are independent—to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have 18 confidence in the administration of justice.” Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 809 19 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, “‘[a] party seeking 20 to seal a judicial record then bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption by meeting 21 the “compelling reasons” standard.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). Under the 22 compelling reasons standard, “a court may seal records only when it finds ‘a compelling reason 23 and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.”
24 1 Center for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1096–1097 (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179).
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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 B.S.W., CASE NO. 3:26-cv-05284-DGE 11 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE 12 v. SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION UNDER SEAL (DKT. NO. 3) AND 13 JOHN DOE et al., MOTION TO PROCEED PSEUDONYMOUSLY (DKT. NO. 14 Defendants. 4) 15
16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to file under seal pursuant to 17 Local Civil Rule 7(g) and motion to proceed pseudonymously pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 18 Procedure 10(a). (Dkt. Nos. 3, 4.) For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the motions. 19 I BACKGROUND 20 On March 22, 2026, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and under the pseudonym “B.S.W.,” 21 sued Defendants “John Doe” d/b/a LocateFamily.com and ReliableSite.net LLC to “stop the 22 ongoing publication of fabricated personal information bearing his name” on LocateFamily.com. 23 (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges LocateFamily.com is “a commercially operated, advertising- 24 1 supported website that publishes a database of over 1.4 billion personal records” including 2 names, addresses, telephone numbers, and financial information. (Id. at 4.) According to 3 Plaintiff, LocateFamily.com published Plaintiff’s information and identified him as residing at a 4 “fabricated” address, which Plaintiff contends he has never resided at. (Id. at 5–6.) Plaintiff
5 alleges that when he requested the website remove the inaccurate information, his information 6 was republished on a new platform, which was “effectively a retaliation mechanism designed to 7 discourage removal requests.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff brings five causes of action for trademark 8 infringement, identity theft, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. (Id. at 13–17.) 9 Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed under pseudonym and to seal a declaration which 10 identifies his name.1 (Dkt. Nos. 3, 4.) Plaintiff argues that because his name is embedded in the 11 “infringing content at issue[,]” public disclosure of the name “would be immediately indexed by 12 search engines and would amplify the very harm Plaintiff seeks to stop.” (Dkt. No. 4 at 2.) 13 II DISCUSSION 14 The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s motion to proceed pseudonymously, and then Plaintiff’s
15 motion to seal. 16 A. Motion to Proceed Pseudonymously 17 Plaintiff seeks to proceed under the pseudonym “B.S.W.” (Dkt. No. 4.) The default rule 18 in civil litigation, embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) is that “[t]he title of the 19 complaint must name all the parties.” Nonetheless, in the Ninth Circuit, “we allow parties to use 20 pseudonyms in the ‘unusual case’ when nondisclosure of the party's identity ‘is necessary . . . to 21
22 1 In the sealed declaration, Plaintiff provided his United States Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Application Record, which showed his trademark application was “Dismissed or 23 Invalidated” because he failed to timely file a Statement of Use after the Notice of Allowance was issued. (Dkt. No. 8 at 12.) 24 1 protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment.’” Does I thru 2 XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067–1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United 3 States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981)). The decision to grant or deny permission 4 to proceed anonymously is committed to the district court’s discretion. See Advanced Textile
5 Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068. In utilizing that discretion, district courts must consider five factors: 6 (1) the severity of the threatened harm; (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears; 7 (3) the anonymous party’s vulnerability to retaliation; (4) prejudice to the opposing party; and 8 (5) the public interest. See id. Severity of the threatened harm and reasonableness of Plaintiff’s 9 fears are the most important factors and may be analyzed together. See Doe v. Kamehameha 10 Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est., 596 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kamehameha). 11 Plaintiff alleges he was a previous victim of an “identity impersonation scheme” and 12 Defendants “compound[]” that harm by publishing false information about Plaintiff on their 13 website. (Dkt. No. 4 at 2.) He further contends that filing this action under his true name would 14 create “an additional, permanent public record associating Plaintiff’s name with this litigation,
15 compounding the search-engine harm that Plaintiff seeks to remedy.” (Dkt. No. 4 at 3.) The 16 Court is unclear what “search-engine harm” Plaintiff is referring to. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s 17 conclusory statements do not provide an adequate justification for allowing him to proceed under 18 a pseudonym; as Plaintiff fails to describe how he will be harmed if his legal name is publicly 19 disclosed.2 20 The Ninth Circuit has described three types of cases that are appropriate for fictitious 21 pleading: (1) where identification creates the risk of physical retaliation, Advanced Textile, 214 22
2 The Court notes the incongruity of Plaintiff asserting trademark infringement claims against 23 Defendants yet requesting anonymity over the very name that is the subject of the trademark application and a matter of public record. 24 1 F.3d at 1068; (2) where anonymity is needed to protect highly personal information, such as 2 medical reports or a person’s sexual orientation, id. (citing Doe v. United Services Life Ins. Co., 3 123 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)); (3) and where anonymity protects a party from criminal 4 prosecution, id. (citing Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir.1981)). Plaintiff’s alleged harm
5 does not fit within this framework; there are no special or unusual circumstances that justify 6 protection of his identity in a matter alleging infringement of a trademark application. 7 Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to proceed under a pseudonym is DENIED without 8 prejudice. 9 B. Motion to File Under Seal 10 In conjunction with his motion to proceed pseudonymously, Plaintiff moved to seal his 11 declaration, which includes his legal name. (Dkt. No. 3.) “Historically, courts have recognized a 12 general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and 13 documents.” See Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) 14 (internal quotations omitted). Although “access to judicial records is not absolute,” there is a
15 “strong presumption in favor of access.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “The presumption of 16 access is based on the need for federal courts, although independent—indeed, particularly 17 because they are independent—to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have 18 confidence in the administration of justice.” Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 809 19 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, “‘[a] party seeking 20 to seal a judicial record then bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption by meeting 21 the “compelling reasons” standard.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). Under the 22 compelling reasons standard, “a court may seal records only when it finds ‘a compelling reason 23 and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.”
24 1 Center for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1096–1097 (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). “What 2 constitutes ‘compelling reason’ is ‘best left to the sound discretion of the trial court.’” Center for 3 Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commnc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 4 (1978)).
5 The compelling reason standard applies here, because Plaintiff moves to seal his 6 declaration in support of the complaint, which is more than tangentially related to the merits of 7 the case. Given the Court’s determination that Plaintiff may not proceed pseudonymously, 8 Plaintiff has not shown compelling reasons to seal his name and identifying information. 9 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to seal is DENIED. 10 III CONCLUSION 11 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed pseudonymously (Dkt. No. 4) and motion to 12 seal (Dkt. No. 3) are DENIED. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint no later than April 24, 13 2026 that identifies the parties, including Plaintiff’s full name. If an amended complaint that 14 complies with this Order is not filed by such date, the matter will be dismissed without prejudice.
15 The Clerk is directed to calendar this event. 16 Dated this 13th day of April, 2026. 17 A 18 David G. Estudillo 19 United States District Judge
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