Bryson Moore v. Diego Machado, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: December 9, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-04281
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 JL 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Bryson Moore, No. CV-25-04281-PHX-JAT (DMF) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Diego Machado, et al., 13 Defendants.

15 On July 8, 2025, Plaintiff Bryson Moore, who is confined in the Arizona State 16 Prison Complex-Tucson (ASPC-Tucson), filed through counsel, a Complaint in Pima 17 County Superior Court against the State of Arizona and Diego Machado. (Doc. 1-1 at 15- 18 23.) On August 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (Id. at 28-36.) On 19 August 26, 2025, the State answered the First Amended Complaint. (Id. at 39-49.) 20 Subsequently, the case was transferred to the Maricopa County Superior Court. (Id. at 52- 21 53.) On November 14, 2025, Defendant Machado filed a Notice of Removal and removed 22 the case to this Court. (Doc. 1.) On November 21, 2025, Defendant Machado filed a 23 Motion for Extension of Time to file an answer to the First Amended Complaint, which 24 the Court granted that same day. (Docs. 4, 5.) 25 The Court will dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim without prejudice and remand 26 the state-law claims to the Maricopa County Superior Court. 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 I. Removal 2 A state court defendant may remove to federal court any civil action brought in the 3 state court over which the federal district courts would have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1441(a). In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that 5 Defendant Machado violated his Eighth Amendment rights. This Court’s jurisdiction 6 extends to such claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a federal court has original jurisdiction “of 7 all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”). 8 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 9 Although Plaintiff is represented by counsel, the Court is required to screen 10 complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer 11 or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss 12 a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or 13 malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief 14 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 15 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 16 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 17 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 18 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 19 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 20 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 21 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 22 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 23 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 24 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 25 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 26 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 27 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 28 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 1 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 2 III. First Amended Complaint 3 In his three-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues the State of Arizona and 4 Correctional Officer II Diego Machado. (Doc. 1-1 at 29.) Plaintiff asserts an Eighth 5 Amendment failure-to-protect claim against Defendant Machado, a negligence/gross 6 negligence claim against Machado, and a vicarious liability claim against the State. (Id. at 7 31-36.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, pre- and post-judgment 8 interest, and his attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. at 36.) 9 Plaintiff alleges the following: 10 Plaintiff is a prisoner in the Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and 11 Reentry (ADCRR). On October 24, 2024, Plaintiff was housed alone in a cell within a 12 close custody unit at ASPC–Tucson, Cimarron Unit. (Id. ¶ 10.) ADCRR regulations 13 prohibit a close custody prisoner from entering another close custody prisoner’s cell and 14 prohibit officers from unlocking cell doors for the purpose of granting close custody 15 prisoners access to other close custody prisoners’ cells. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) 16 At approximately 8:00 p.m., while Plaintiff was asleep in his cell, Defendant 17 Machado unlocked the door to Plaintiff’s cell and allowed two prisoners to enter the cell, 18 although those prisoners were not assigned to live in that cell. (Id. ¶ 13.) The two prisoners 19 had told Machado that they wanted to roll cigarettes with Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 14.) By allowing 20 those prisoners to enter Plaintiff’s cell, Defendant Machado “violated” his training and 21 ADCRR rules, regulations, policies, procedures, and orders. (Id. ¶ 13.) 22 Once inside his cell, the two unidentified prisoners assaulted Plaintiff, fracturing his 23 jaw and causing him to suffer extensive and visible facial trauma and “serious medical 24 needs.” (Id. ¶ 16.) The prisoners then left Plaintiff’s cell, and Plaintiff crawled into the 25 hallway, reported the incident to Defendant Machado, and requested medical help. (Id. 26 ¶ 17.) Defendant Machado told Plaintiff, “give me a minute.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Defendant 27 Machado’s work shift ended, and he left the ADCRR premises without providing or 28 seeking medical attention for Plaintiff, without activating an incident command system 1 (“ICS”),1 and without notifying his colleagues, supervisor(s), or ADCRR medical 2 personnel about Plaintiff’s injuries. (Id. ¶ 22.) 3 Plaintiff was left untreated for approximately 90 minutes until a corrections officer 4 on the next shift “discovered Plaintiff’s peril” and activated an ICS. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff 5 was transported to St. Mary’s Hospital, and then to St. Joseph’s Hospital, where he was 6 diagnosed with a left mandibular condyle fracture and a right mandibular angle fracture. 7 (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff underwent open reduction and internal fixation jaw surgery with his 8 jaw being wired shut and metal jaw locks being placed. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff endured 9 significant post-operative complications, was “forced to endure a full liquid diet,” and 10 sustained weight loss, persistent pain, infection, and a retained fixation screw for which he 11 had to undergo another surgical procedure to remove the screw. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Plaintiff 12 also experienced profound emotional distress, including fear of repeated attacks and 13 psychological trauma associated with his restricted speech and swallowing ability resulting 14 from having his jaw wired shut. (Id. ¶ 28.) 15 ADCRR initiated an investigation of the assault. (Id. ¶ 29.) During his investigative 16 interview, Defendant Machado admitted that his actions had been “improper.” (Id. ¶ 30.) 17 Defendant Machado failed to provide the investigator with a rationale for his failure to 18 render aid to Plaintiff, and he ultimately told the investigator, “I fucked up.” (Id.) 19 Plaintiff alleges that his untreated injuries were likely to, and in fact did, result in 20 further significant injury and the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. (Id. ¶ 19.) 21 Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Machado had received training and instruction about close 22 custody prisoners being housed alone and about not letting prisoners into cells they were 23 not assigned to, but Machado “purposefully, deliberately, willfully, recklessly and cruelly 24 failed follow his training and instead provided access for other inmates into Plaintiff’s 25 cell.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Machado had received training and 26 instruction about activating ADCRR’s incident command system (“ICS”) for inmate

27 1 An ICS is an Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry 28 process “to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate incidents and emergencies.” See Department Order (DO) 706 at 1 [https://perma.cc/B8LH-UEJT]. 1 medical emergencies, but he “purposefully, deliberately, willfully, recklessly and cruelly 2 failed and refused to activate the ICS or otherwise provide or summon medical assistance 3 for Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 21.) 4 In Count One, Plaintiff asserts a negligence/gross negligence claim against 5 Defendant Machado. In Count Two, Plaintiff asserts an Eighth Amendment claim against 6 Machado. Plaintiff alleges that Machado was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety 7 and well-being by: unlocking Plaintiff’s cell door while he was asleep in a closed custody 8 unit where Plaintiff was housed alone and inmates were not permitted to enter one 9 another’s cells; failing to protect Plaintiff from a known risk of allowing and facilitating 10 other inmates’ entry into his cell; ignoring the likelihood that Plaintiff faced a substantial 11 risk of suffering serious harm as a result of other inmates being in his cell; ignoring the 12 likelihood that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of suffering serious harm by not being 13 provided timely medical care; failing to render or summon medical aid for Plaintiff; and 14 leaving the ADCRR premises without first arranging for Plaintiff to receive medical care. 15 (Id. ¶ 40.) 16 In Count Three, Plaintiff asserts a vicarious liability claim against the State of 17 Arizona. 18 IV. Failure to State a Federal Claim 19 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 20 (2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities and 21 (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 22 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 23 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury 24 as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link 25 between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371- 26 72, 377 (1976). 27 A. Failure to Protect 28 The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to 1 guarantee the safety of prisoners because being assaulted in prison “is simply not part of 2 the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Farmer v. 3 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–34 (1994); Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 4 2009). To state a failure-to-protect claim, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the deprivation 5 was, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the official was, subjectively, deliberately 6 indifferent to the prisoner’s safety or acted with “a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” 7 Farmer, 511 US at 834; Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal 8 citation omitted). 9 Under the objective prong, “[w]hat is necessary to show sufficient harm for the 10 purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause depends on the claim at issue.” 11 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). For a failure-to-protect claim, the prisoner 12 must show that he was placed in conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious harm. 13 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). 14 Under the subjective prong, the requisite state of mind is “deliberate indifference.” 15 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence 16 or lack of ordinary due care for the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 835. “Neither negligence nor 17 gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of 18 Corrs., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002). A plaintiff must allege facts to 19 support that the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to prisoner safety. 20 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To satisfy the knowledge component, “the official must both be 21 aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 22 harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. Although deliberate indifference 23 “does not require that the [prison] official believe to a moral certainty that one inmate 24 intends to attack another at a given place at a time certain before that officer is obligated to 25 take steps to prevent such an assault,” it does require that the official “have more than a 26 mere suspicion that the attack will occur.” Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 27 1986) (citation omitted). 28 In addition, a plaintiff alleging deliberate indifference must “demonstrate that the 1 defendants’ actions were both an actual and proximate cause of [his] injuries.” Lemire v. 2 Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013). “The requisite 3 causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct personal participation 4 in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor 5 knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” 6 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). 7 Plaintiff’s allegations do not support that Defendant Machado was aware of and 8 disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff before Machado allowed the two 9 prisoners to enter Plaintiff’s cell. The allegation that the prisoners told Machado that they 10 wanted to roll cigarettes with Plaintiff suggests that Machado had no reason to believe 11 those particular prisoners posed any threat to Plaintiff, and generalized safety concerns 12 with respect to all close custody prisoners cannot support Machado’s personal liability for 13 failing to protect Plaintiff from assault. Even if Machado was negligent or grossly 14 negligent, that is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. And even if Machado 15 violated ADCRR policy, that does not amount to a constitutional violation. See Cousins v. 16 Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (departmental regulations do not establish a 17 federal constitutional violation) (emphasis in original). 18 B. Failure to Obtain Medical Care 19 Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a 20 violation of the Eighth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show 21 (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result 22 in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the 23 defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th 24 Cir. 2006). 25 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 26 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both 27 know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be aware 28 of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 1 exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate 2 indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond 3 to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 4 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a prison official 5 intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the way prison 6 doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 7 (1976); Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 8 As noted, deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of 9 ordinary due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence 10 nor gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 11 1105; see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims 12 of “indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical malpractice” do not support a claim under 13 § 1983). A mere delay in medical care, without more, is insufficient to state a claim against 14 prison officials for deliberate indifference. See Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison 15 Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The 16 action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 17 U.S. at 105. 18 With respect to the allegation that Defendant Machado failed to obtain medical 19 assistance for Plaintiff, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that his injuries were so 20 obvious to Machado that failing to immediately call for medical assistance was anything 21 more than negligent or grossly negligent. Plaintiff also alleges that the delay in treatment 22 resulted in further injury to him, but he does not describe how the delay further injured 23 him, or facts to support that Machado knew or should have known that such further injury 24 was likely. Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support that his injuries would not have 25 been as severe if he had been treated immediately. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that when 26 he reported the assault to Defendant Machado, Machado initially told Plaintiff to “give 27 [him] a minute,” but Plaintiff alleges no other facts concerning anything Machado did or 28 1 said after that but before his shift ended. As presented, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth 2 Amendment claim against Machado for failure to obtain medical assistance. 3 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim in the 4 First Amended Complaint. 5 V. Remand of State Law Claims 6 The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law 7 claims because he has failed to state a federal claim. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 8 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related 9 state-law claims once it has ‘dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” 10 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3))); Gini v. L.V. Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 11 (9th Cir. 1994) (when federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the court generally 12 should decline jurisdiction over state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice). 13 The Court will therefore remand Counts One and Three to the state court. 14 IT IS ORDERED: 15 (1) Count Two is dismissed without prejudice. 16 (2) Counts One and Three are remanded to the Maricopa County Superior 17 Court. 18 (3) The Clerk of Court must mail a certified copy of this Order to:

19 Joseph W. Malka 20 Clerk of the Superior Court 21 Maricopa County, Arizona Superior Court 201 West Jefferson 22 Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2205

23 24 . . . . 25 . . . . 26 . . . . 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 (4) The Clerk of Court must close this federal case. 2 Dated this 5th day of December, 2025. 3 4 ' ° 6 □ James A. C rg Senior United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28