Bryant v. Arizona, State of

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedJuly 24, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-01702
StatusUnknown

This text of Bryant v. Arizona, State of (Bryant v. Arizona, State of) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bryant v. Arizona, State of, (D. Ariz. 2025).

Opinion

1 KEB 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Kenneth Bryant, No. CV-25-01702-PHX-JAT-CDB 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Arizona, State of, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 I. Procedural History 16 On April 10, 2025, Plaintiff Kenneth Bryant, who is not in custody, filed a 17 Complaint (Doc. 1-1 at 5–8)1 in the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, against 18 the State of Arizona, the City of Phoenix, and the Phoenix Police Department. On May 19 19, 2025, Defendants City of Phoenix and Phoenix Police Department (“Removing 20 Defendants”) filed a Notice of Removal (Doc. 1) and removed the case to this Court. One 21 day later, Removing Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 22 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. 4), which is fully briefed (Doc. 23 6; Doc. 8). On June 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand to State Court (Doc. 7). 24 . . . 25 . . . 26 . . . 27

28 1 The citation refers to the document and page number generated by the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Filing system. 1 II. Removal and Motion to Remand 2 A. The Parties’ Filings 3 In their Notice of Removal, Removing Defendants assert that the Court “has original 4 jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331” because Plaintiff “has asserted claims of 5 violation of his Civil Rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including allegations of 6 malicious prosecution.” (Doc. 1 at 2.) 7 In his Motion to Remand, Plaintiff requests the Court remand the case back to the 8 state court. He asserts that “this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction” because “no 9 federal question is presented” on the face of his Complaint. (Doc. 7 at 2.) Plaintiff states 10 that instead, “the state court has jurisdiction” over this matter “because the Complaint 11 arises under the laws of the Arizona State Constitution as well as other established state 12 law.” (Id. at 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff states that his Complaint “involves a malicious 13 prosecution claim under Arizona law, as outlined in [Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 14 Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 411, 758 P.2d 1313 (1988)] and as applied in [Gonzalez v. City of 15 Phoenix, 203 Ariz. 152, 52 P.3d 184 (2002)].” (Id. at 2.) 16 B. Discussion 17 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and “possess only that power 18 authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 19 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited 20 jurisdiction” and the burden of establishing jurisdiction is on the party asserting 21 jurisdiction. Id. “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks 22 subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 23 A state court defendant may remove to federal court any civil action brought in the 24 state court over which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 25 § 1441(a). “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the 26 ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a 27 federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” 28 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 1 “The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” California 2 ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). The party invoking the 3 statute bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Id. “The ‘strong presumption 4 against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing 5 that removal is proper,’ and that the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state 6 court.” Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gaus 7 v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). 8 The plaintiff is the “master of the claim” and “may avoid federal jurisdiction by 9 exclusive reliance on state law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. A plaintiff, therefore, may 10 choose to have a case heard in state court “by eschewing claims based on federal law.” Id. 11 at 399. Removing Defendants state in their Notice of Removal that Plaintiff “has asserted 12 claims of violation of his Civil Rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including allegations 13 of malicious prosecution.” (Doc. 1 at 2.) However, although Plaintiff cites federal cases 14 as relevant law in his Complaint, Plaintiff does not explicitly allege that Defendants 15 violated his federal constitutional rights or that his claim arises under federal law. 16 At best, Plaintiff’s statements in the Complaint are ambiguous. But ambiguity is 17 resolved in favor of remand. Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042. Moreover, Plaintiff has cleared up 18 any ambiguity by clearly indicating in his Motion to Remand that his Complaint “involves 19 a malicious prosecution claim under Arizona law,” and that there is “no federal question” 20 presented on the face of his Complaint. (Doc. 7 at 2.) The Court will construe this 21 statement as evidence of Plaintiff’s intent to eschew any claims based on federal law. See 22 Leon v. Securaplane Techs., Inc., 2009 WL 3157176 at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 24, 2009) 23 (granting motion to remand where language of complaint was unclear but plaintiff 24 demonstrated through a motion to remand that he intended to allege only state law claims 25 and eschew claims based on federal law); see also Tate v. Nakashyan, 2019 WL 8333576, 26 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2019) (noting that plaintiff’s complaint was ambiguous because 27 it mentioned “standards typically present in . . . § 1983 causes of action,” but construing 28 plaintiff’s objections indicating he did not intend to assert any claims based on federal law 1| as “evidence of Plaintiff’s intent to “eschew claims based on federal law’ and as a waiver 2| of federal claims to the extent any are asserted in the Complaint, which he may do as the 3| master of his complaint”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1547895 (E.D. 4} Cal. Apr. 1, 2020). Thus, the Court will grant Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and will 5 | remand this case to the Superior Court of Maricopa County. 6| III. Motion to Dismiss 7 Because the Court 1s remanding this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it 8 | will deny Removing Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as moot. 9| ITIS ORDERED: 10 (1) Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to State Court (Doc. 7) is granted. This matter 11 | is remanded to the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona. 12 (2) The Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) is denied as moot. 13 (3) The Clerk of Court must mail a certified copy of this Order to: 14 Joseph W.

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Related

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams
482 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
511 U.S. 375 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Gonzales v. City of Phoenix
52 P.3d 184 (Arizona Supreme Court, 2002)
Hunter v. Philip Morris USA
582 F.3d 1039 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Bradshaw v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
758 P.2d 1313 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1988)

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Bryant v. Arizona, State of, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bryant-v-arizona-state-of-azd-2025.