Bryant Levine v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided April 20, 2017·No. 02-15-00411-CR·Published

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-15-00411-CR

BRYANT LEVINE APPELLANT V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. 1355299D

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

I. INTRODUCTION

A jury found Appellant Bryant Levine guilty of two counts of indecency with a child by contact, and the trial court sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment on each count and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. In two points, Levine argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

the trial court abused its discretion by admitting, over his objections, two photographs of a penis. Because the evidence is sufficient to sustain Levine’s convictions and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the two complained-of photographs, we will affirm.

II. FACTUAL OVERVIEW2

Rachel3 was sixteen years old when her stepfather Levine touched her genitals on top of her clothes on two separate occasions. Around that same time, Levine showed Rachel nude photos of women, attempted to show her nude photos of himself, and sent Rachel text messages referencing sexual touching that he had already performed on her and requesting to sexually touch her again.

Mother found the text messages from Levine on Rachel’s phone and asked Rachel about them; Rachel immediately started crying and told Mother that Levine had touched her inappropriately. When Mother confronted Levine, he initially denied any inappropriate touching but ultimately broke down in tears, confessed that he had inappropriately touched Rachel, and said he was sorry.

2 We provide a more detailed recitation of the facts in connection with the analysis of Levine’s sufficiency point.

3 We use aliases to refer to the victim, her family members—other than Levine—and any other person necessary to protect the victim’s identity. See 2d Tex. App. (Fort Worth) Loc. R. 7; McClendon v. State, 643 S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982); see also Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(a), 9.10.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE In his first issue, Levine argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for indecency with a child by contact. Levine argues that there is no evidence to show that he acted with the specific intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire when he touched Rachel.

A. Standard of Review

In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Jenkins, 493 S.W.3d at 599.

The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1979); Blea v. State, 483 S.W.3d 29, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Thus, when performing an evidentiary sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. See Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Instead, we determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the

cumulative force of the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 198 (2015). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution. Id. at 448–49; see Blea, 483 S.W.3d at 33.

B. Elements of the Offense A person commits the offense of indecency with a child by contact if, with a child younger than seventeen years of age and not the person’s spouse, the person engages in sexual contact with the child. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1) (West 2011). “Sexual contact” means the following acts, if committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person: any touching by a person, including touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a child. Id. § 21.11(c)(1). A person acts intentionally with respect to the nature of the conduct or a result of the conduct when it is the person’s conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Id. § 6.03(a) (West 2011). In the context of indecency with a child, the factfinder can infer the requisite intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire from conduct, remarks, or all the surrounding circumstances. See McKenzie v. State, 617 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). The intent to arouse or gratify may be inferred from conduct alone. Id. No oral expression of intent or visible evidence of sexual arousal is necessary. Gregory v. State, 56 S.W.3d

164, 171 (Tex. App.––Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism’d), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 978 (2003).

C. The Evidence

1. Rachel’s Testimony and Evidence of Text Messages Rachel, who was a senior in high school at the time of the trial, testified that Levine’s relationship with her changed from 2012 leading up until November 2013; the relationship went from being a friendly relationship to being “I like you, I want to be with you type of relationship.” Rachel said that made her feel nasty and disgusting because she did not have romantic feelings for Levine.

Rachel described an inappropriate touching that occurred after school on or about November 1, 2013, when Levine was giving her a ride to her job. Rachel testified that she had her backpack in her lap and that Levine told her to put it on the floor. When she refused, Levine put Rachel’s backpack on the floorboard and told her, “Open your legs.” Rachel said no. Levine repeated his command and then pushed Rachel’s legs apart, used his finger to press on her “private” on top of her clothes, and told her not to “let any man’s penis go in there.” Levine also told Rachel not to let any man’s penis go in her mouth. Rachel told Levine that she did not like what he did.

Rachel testified that Levine texted her on November 5, 2013, and asked why she was wearing tights more often. Rachel thought his text was unusual because Levine did not typically concern himself with what she wore and because she had worn tights only twice.

Rachel testified that Levine approached her more than once after the November 1 event and offered her $500 to watch him masturbate and to let him watch her touch herself. Rachel told Levine “no.”

Rachel described a second inappropriate touching that occurred on or about November 18, 2013. Rachel testified that when Levine picked her up after school, she got in the car and told him that she had marijuana in her purse because she had agreed to hold the marijuana for a friend so that the friend would not get in trouble. Levine acted like it was not a big deal that she had marijuana and told her that he “could flip it easy” because he knew other drug dealers. When they got home, Levine asked Rachel to come to the bedroom he shared with Mother. When Rachel came into the bedroom, Levine positioned Rachel with her butt facing a mirror, told her that this is how “they’re going to do you in prison,” and squeezed her butt. Levine also cupped his hand and moved it along her private part in the front, which made Rachel feel “nasty and disgusting.” Rachel froze up and backed away. Rachel did not tell Mother because she did not want to hurt her.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Bryant Levine v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2017).

Bryant Levine v. State (Bryant Levine v. State) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Sony v. State
307 S.W.3d 348 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2009)
Young v. State
242 S.W.3d 192 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Batiste v. State
217 S.W.3d 74 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Lagrone v. State
942 S.W.2d 602 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1997)
McClendon v. State
643 S.W.2d 936 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1982)
McKenzie v. State
617 S.W.2d 211 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1981)
Moses v. State
105 S.W.3d 622 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2003)
Weatherred v. State
15 S.W.3d 540 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Martinez v. State
327 S.W.3d 727 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2010)
Isassi v. State
330 S.W.3d 633 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2010)
Gallo v. State
239 S.W.3d 757 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Montgomery, Jeri Dawn
369 S.W.3d 188 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2012)
Murray, Chad William
457 S.W.3d 446 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2015)
Blea v. State
483 S.W.3d 29 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2016)
Jose L. Jimenez v. State
507 S.W.3d 438 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2016)
Carter County Board of Education v. Carter County Education Ass'n
56 S.W.3d 1 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1996)
Jenkins v. State
493 S.W.3d 583 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2016)
Frazier v. U.S. Airways, Inc.
128 S. Ct. 2882 (Fourth Circuit, 2008)