Bryan v. Reifschneider

150 N.W.2d 900, 181 Neb. 787, 1967 Neb. LEXIS 634
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedMay 26, 1967
Docket36494
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 150 N.W.2d 900 (Bryan v. Reifschneider) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bryan v. Reifschneider, 150 N.W.2d 900, 181 Neb. 787, 1967 Neb. LEXIS 634 (Neb. 1967).

Opinion

Carter, J.

Plaintiff commenced this suit to quiet title against the defendants to a strip, of land along the west side of a 40-acre tract to which plaintiff holds the legal title by a deed of conveyance. Defendants allege that they are the owners of a 20-foot strip of land along the west side of the 40 acres, by adverse possession. The trial court found for the defendants and quieted title in them to the 20-foot strip. Plaintiff has appealed.

Plaintiff purchased the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 25, Township' 22 North, Range 54 West of the 6th P.M., in Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, in 1948. Defendants purchased the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 25, Township 22 North, Range 54 West of the 6th P.M., in Scotts Bluff County, in 1964. The common boundary of these two 40-acre tracts affords, the situs of the dispute in the instant case. Plaintiff’s west line and defendants’ east line are a common boundary line between the two 40-acre tracts.

Defendants’ immediate predecessors in title were as follows: Drexel J. Sibbernsen acquired title in 1928. In 1931, he conveyed the property to Marion T. Sibbernsen, who, in 1938, reconveyed it to him. Drexel J. Sibbernsen retained the title until his death in 1962. The executrix of his estate conveyed the land to Drexel J. Sibbernsen, Jr., and Everts S. Sibbernsen in 1964. Subsequently in 1964, the land was conveyed to the defendants. Prior to this conveyance, the 40-acre tract has been farmed by tenants, the Sibbernsens having been nonresident landlords at all times. The plaintiff’s 40-acre tract ap *789 pears to have been farmed by tenants although the plaintiff was a local resident.

There is no disagreement as to the location of the government survey line between the two 40-acre tracts according to the original government survey. Admittedly it is correctly shown on exhibit No. 1 contained in the record. Approximately 235 feet north of the south line of the two tracts, a feedlot on the west tract extends over the line into the east tract. The feedlot is about 135 feet in width and extends 9 feet across the line on the south and 7.2 feet on the north. The two points are connected by a straight fence or feedrack. This encroachment on the east tract has existed for many years.

For many years, the tenants on the west tract have used a road from their farmyard south of the feedlot to get to the north part of their farm. This road goes east around the feedlot protruding into the east tract, and turns to the northwest. The east edge of the road, as found by the trial court, is 20 feet east of the government survey line where it passes the feedlot. The evidence shows that two small buildings were located on this line extended south which were maintained by the defendants and their predecessors. The record shows and the plaintiff appears to concede that this 20-foot strip of ground south of the north edge of the feedlot has been acquired by the defendants by adverse possession. The issue here is the width of the strip of land north of the feedlot, if any, which has been acquired by the defendants. There is evidence that an old cedar post is located 62 feet north of the north fence of the feedlot and 20 feet east of the government survey line between the two tracts. There is evidence in the record that a fence once existed beginning at a point 20 feet east of the division line between the tracts on the south line of the east tract which extended straight north to the old cedar post, and continued straight north to the north line of the east 40-acre tract. There is also evidence that this fence was destroyed or removed many years ago. There is also *790 evidence of a stub fence, which enclosed nothing, which came from the north line for a distance of 500 or 600 feet. This fence was removed by plaintiff’s tenant in 1951 and has; not been in existence since that time. There is no evidence that defendants’ predecessors in title ever claimed ownership of the land to this through fence to which the old cedar post is alleged to have been a part. The most that has ever been claimed by defendants and their predecessors in title was to the east edge of the farm road going north from the north fence of the feedlot. It is the location of the road and not the old through fence that is important here. The evidence also shows that the plaintiff and his tenants have farmed their lands to the toe of the slope of the road and have used the road to turn their machinery in cultivating row crops.

In late 1964, the defendants did some leveling of their land. In doing so, they made a fill in a low area that extended over into the east 40-acre tract. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the defendants filled over the existing road and into the plaintiff’s cornfield. It was the alleged encroachment of this fill upon the land of the plaintiff that brought about the present litigation. The defendants contend that the fill extended only to the east edge of the existing road to which they claim ownership.

The defendants became the owners of the west 40 acres in 1964. It is necessary for the defendants, to sustain their claim of ownership by adverse possession for the statutory period of 10 years, tO' tack on the adverse possession of the land by their predecessors, in title. Plaintiff contends the right to tack the adverse possession by the predecessors in title has not been established by the evidence in this case.

The deed from the Sibbemsens to the defendants described only the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 25. Plaintiff asserts that there was no privity between the defendants and their predecessors *791 in title sufficient to permit tacking in establishing adverse possession.

A deed does not of itself create privity between the grantor and the grantee as to land not within the calls of the deed, but which may have been occupied by the grantor in connection therewith. Kramper v. St. John’s Church, 131 Neb. 840, 270 N. W. 478. Possession cannot be tacked to make a title by prescription where the adverse occupant did not come in under another, and the deed under which the last occupant claims title does not include the land in dispute or show any privity between him and his grantor in regard thereto. Pohlman v. Evangelical Lutheran Trinity Church, 60 Neb. 364, 83 N. W. 201. The rule that the adverse possession of land cannot be extended beyond the calls of the deed means that possession by construction cannot be extended beyond the calls: of the written instrument, but if land be actually occupied beyond the calls of the deed, hostile to the true owner, the deed does not preclude such occupancy from being adverse. The occupancy does not refer to the deed, but to the fact itself and its hostile character. Rice v. Kelly, 81 Neb, 92, 115 N. W. 625.

In order to tack the possession of predecessors in title to support a claim of adverse possession, each predecessor occupant must show derivative title from his predecessor in order to link his possession with that taken under a previous or original entry. Successive occupancies alone do not establish privity but only show a succession of independent trespasses. In the case before us, defendants cannot successfully claim that privity exists with their grantors as to land beyond the calls of the deed because of the deed alone since they have derived no rights thereto from the deed. Maas v.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
150 N.W.2d 900, 181 Neb. 787, 1967 Neb. LEXIS 634, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bryan-v-reifschneider-neb-1967.