Bryan v. Austin

148 F. Supp. 563

• Court: District Court, E.D. South Carolina
• Decided: January 23, 1957
• Docket: Civ. A. 5792
• Status: Published

Opinions

WILLIAMS, District Judge.

This is an action by Negro school teachers against the School Superintendent and the Board of Trustees of a school district in South Carolina. Its purpose is to obtain a declaratory judgment that the South Carolina statute making unlawful the employment by the state, or by a school district of the state-, of any member of the National Association- for the Advancement of Colored People is unconstitutional and void- and to enjoin the enforcement of the statute in violation of their constitutional rights. As the defendants are engaged in the enforcement of a statute of state wide application and injunction is asked against them, a court of three judges is appropriate for the hearing of the case. City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329, 65 S.Ct. 280, 89 L.Ed. 274. Such a court has accordingly been convened', the parties have been heard, the Attorney General of the State has been- heard orally and by brief, and the parties after the hearing have been allowed to file additional briefs, which have been received and considered.

There is no dispute as to the facts. Plaintiffs are seventeen Negro school teachers, who had been employed in Elloree Training School of School District No. 7 of. ..Orangeburg County, South Carolina, prior to June 1956 for varying periods of time, one for as long as ten years. There is evidence to the effect that they were competent teachers and there is no evidence that their service was unsatisfactory in any way. In March 1956 the Legislature of South Carolina passed the act here complained of, 49 St. at Large, p. 1747, one of the provisions of which authorized the board of trustees- of any school to demand of any teacher that he submit a statement under oath as to whether or not he was a member of the National Association for Advancement of Colored People, and provided that anyone refusing to submit such statement should be summarily dismissed. Other sections of the act made it unlawful for any member of that association to be employed by any school district and imposed, a fine of $100 for employing any individual contrary to the provisions of the Act. When plaintiffs in May of 1956 were given blank applications by the School Superintendent to be filled out and sworn to, which contained questions as to their membership in the Association and their views as to the desirability of segregation in the schools, they declined to answer these questions. Only one of the plaintiffs, however, was a member of the Association. Upon being told that they would have to fill in the answers or tender their resignations, they chose the latter course and were not elected as teachers for the ensuing year. Three questions are presented by the case: (1) Is the statute unconstitutional as plaintiffs contend? (2) Are plaintiffs in position to raise the question as to its unconstitutionality? And (3) Can the court grant plaintiffs any relief in view of the fact that plaintiffs have resigned as teachers and others have been elected to their places ?

We think we should use our discretion in refusing to pass on the issues in this controversy at this time. It does not appear that the statute in question has been interpreted by a state court, and it is not proper to pass upon the controversy presented herein until a South Carolina court has first heard the case and passed upon the constitutionality of the Act in question.

In 1941 the United States Supreme Court had before it the case of Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 645, 85 L.Ed. 971. This case involved a regulation by a state commission authorized by statute, and it was contended that the regulation was in violation of the Equal Protection, the Due Process arid the Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. The United States Supreme Court had the following statement to make with reference to the three-judge District Court’s decision which enjoined the enforcement of the regulation:

“ * * * But no matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it cannot escape being a forecast rather than a determination. The last word on the meaning of Article 6445 of the Texas Civil Statutes, and therefore the last word on the statutory authority of the Railroad Commission in this case, belongs neither to us nor to the district court but to the supreme court of Texas. In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication. Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177, 54 S.Ct. 138, 78 L.Ed. 252; Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415, 54 S.Ct. 727, 78 L.Ed. 1337. The reign of law is' hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court. The resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the fribtion of a premature constitutional adjudication.”

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In the case of American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 761, 90 L.Ed. 873, the Court held that the bill had equity, but the trial court erred in adjudicating the merits of the controversy, saying:

“ * * * The crux of the matter is the allegation that there is an imminent threat to an entire system of collective bargaining, a threat which, if carried through, will have such repercussions on the relationship between capital and labor as to cause irreparable damage. We conclude for that reason that the bill states a cause of action in equity.

“As we have said, the District Court passed on the merits of the controversy. In doing so at this stage of the litigation, we think it did not follow the proper course. The merits involve substantial constitutional issues concerning the meaning of a new provision of the Florida constitution which, so far as we are advised, has never been construed by the Florida courts. Those courts have the final say as to its meaning. When authoritatively construed, it may or may not have the meaning or force which appellees now assume that it has. In absence of an authoritative interpretation, it is impossible to know with certainty what constitutional issues will finally emerge. What would now be written on the constitutional questions might therefore turn out to be an academic and needless dissertation.” 327 U.S. at pages 595-596, 66 S.Ct. at page 767.

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Plaintiffs in this case claim that the act in question is so clear that it should be construed by us and that we should decide all of the issues. In the case of Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242, 73 S.Ct. 600, 602, 97 L.Ed. 983, the issues were equally clear and free from ambiguity. The appellants challenged the definitions in the act as being void for vagueness. Mr. Justice Douglas in a dissenting opinion said:

’“ * * * There are no ambiguities involving these appellants. The constitutional questions do not turn on any niceties in the interpretation of the Michigan law. The case is therefore unlike Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666, and its forebears where the nature of the constitutional issue would depend on the manner in which uncertain and ambiguous state statutes were construed. See especially A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 598, 66 S.Ct. 761, 768, 90 L.Ed. 873. Here there are but two questions:

“(1) Can Michigan require the Communist Party of Michigan and its Executive Secretary to register?

“(2) Can Michigan forbid the name of any Communist or of any nominee of the Communist Party to be printed on the ballot in any primary or general election in the state ?”

However, the opinion of the Court in this case states:

“We deem it appropriate in this case that the state courts construe this statute before the District Court further considers the action. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 1947, 331 U.S. 549, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666; American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 1946, 327 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 761, 90 L.Ed. 873; and Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 1944, 323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101.

“The judgment is vacated and the cause remanded to the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan with directions to vacate the restraining order it issued and to hold the proceedings in abeyance a reasonable time pending construction of the statute by the state courts either in pending litigation or other litigation which may be instituted.”

The case of Government and Civic Employees Organizing Committee, CIO v. Windsor, D.C., 116 F.Supp. 354, affirmed in a per curiam decision without opinion, 347 U.S. 901, 74 S.Ct. 429, 98 L.Ed. 1061, is even stronger than the Albertson case supra. This case involved a statute prohibiting state public employees from belonging to labor unions or organizations and provided for forfeiture of certain rights of those who joined a labor union or organization. The statute was clear and free from ambiguity. Plaintiffs there took the same position as the plaintiffs in the case at bar as indicated in the district court’s opinion, 116 F.Supp. at page 357:

“Plaintiffs contend that the challenged statute is self-executing and that it lends itself to no possible construction other than that of unconstitutionality under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They insist that they do not have to wait longer before seeking relief in a federal court, because they think that ‘Alabama’s Legislature has used unmistakably simple, clear, and mandatory language’ and that ‘there is neither need for interpretation of the statute nor any other special circumstance requiring the federal court to stay action pending proceedings in the State courts.’ Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 392, 68 S. Ct. 1156, 1160, 92 L.Ed. 1460. The defendants assert among other grounds that plaintiffs have not exhausted available state administrative and judicial remedies and that consequently this court, as a matter of sound, equitable discretion, should decline to exercise jurisdiction.

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“The exercise of jurisdiction under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act [28 U.S.C.A. § 2201] is discretionary and not compulsory. Smith v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 167 F.2d 990; Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 86 L.Ed. 1620. The remedy by injunction is likewise discretionary. Peay v. Cox, 5 Cir., 190 F.2d 123.”

The district court withheld exercise of jurisdiction and retained the ease to permit the exhaustion of state administrative and judicial remedies as might be available.

In every case in which the question was raised since the Pullman case in 1941, the United States Supreme Court has held that a district court should not pass on the merits of a controversy in a case such as the one before us until the highest court of the state has interpreted the state constitutional provision, statute, or regulation in question. City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168, 62 S.Ct. 986, 86 L.Ed. 1355; Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101; A. F. of L. v. Watson, supra; Shipman v. Du Pre, 339 U.S. 321, 70 S.Ct. 640, 94 L.Ed. 877; Albertson v. Millard, supra; Government and Civic Employees Organizing Committee, CIO v. Windsor, supra.

In the instant case, there is no question that the Supreme Court of South Carolina is in a better position than the federal court to interpret the state statute. The fact that there might be delay, inconvenience and cost to the parties does not call for a different conclusion. We are here concerned with a much larger issue as to the appropriate relationship between state and federal authorities functioning as an harmonious whole.

It may be true that the statute in question is clear and unequivocal but this does not prevent us from exercising our discretion in requiring that it be submitted to the state court for interpretation. Government and Civic Employees Organizing Committee, CIO v. Windsor, supra. It appears to us that the Michigan and Alabama Acts were clear and free from ambiguity. The Supreme Court, however, held that the district court should refrain from taking any action until the highest state court had passed upon the constitutionality of the Act. The state and federal courts of South Carolina have always worked in perfect harmony. To declare an act of the state legislature unconstitutional should be left to the state court. This, of course, would not apply to statutes and constitutional provisions which have already been declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in the school segregation cases. We hold that the federal court should stay proceedings and permit the state court to pass upon the constitutionality of the Act in question. It is only by doing this that we avoid conflict between state and federal courts and preserve harmonious relationships which have heretofore existed between them.

The case should not be dismissed but should be retained and remain pending to permit the plaintiffs a reasonable time for the exhaustion of state administrative and judicial remedies as may be available; but thereafter such further proceedings, if any, will be had by this court as may then appear to be lawful and proper.

It is so ordered.