Bryan v. American Airlines, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJune 15, 2020
Docket1:17-cv-12460
StatusUnknown

This text of Bryan v. American Airlines, Inc. (Bryan v. American Airlines, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bryan v. American Airlines, Inc., (D. Mass. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS __________________________________________ ) ) JON L. BRYAN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) Case No. 17-cv-12460-DJC ) ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION and ) AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., ) ) Defendants. ) ) ) __________________________________________)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CASPER, J. June 15, 2020

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Jon L. Bryan (“Bryan”) brings this action under the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”). D. 1. Bryan alleged that Defendant Allied Pilots Association (“APA”) breached its duty of fair representation (Count I) and Defendant American Airlines breached the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in effect prior to Bryan’s termination (Count II). Id. This Court previously dismissed the claim against American Airlines. D. 40. APA now moves for summary judgment on the remaining count. For the reasons stated below, the Court ALLOWS APA’s motion, D. 60. II. Standard of Review The Court grants summary judgment where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the undisputed facts demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.” Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Sanchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1996)). The movant “bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2000); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant meets its burden, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in her pleadings, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986), but “must,

with respect to each issue on which she would bear the burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably resolve that issue in her favor,” Borges v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010). “As a general rule, that requires the production of evidence that is ‘significant[ly] probative.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). “Neither party may rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated denials, but must identify specific facts derived from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits to demonstrate either the existence or absence of an issue of fact.” Magee v. United States, 121 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997). In conducting this inquiry, the Court “view[s] the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing reasonable inferences in his favor.” Noonan v. Staples, Inc.,

556 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2009). III. Factual Background

The following facts are drawn from APA’s statement of material facts, D. 61, Bryan’s response to same, D. 66, and other supporting documents and are undisputed unless otherwise noted.1

1 At oral argument, counsel for Bryan argued that the newly stated facts in his response to APA’s statement of material facts must be admitted as true because APA did not respond to it. Local Rule 56.1, upon which Bryan relies, however, states that “[m]aterial facts of record set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed for purposes of the motion to be admitted by opposing parties unless controverted by the statement required to be served by opposing parties.” Here, APA is the moving party, and thus a response was required to APA’s statement of material facts by Bryan, the opposing party. Moreover, it is up to the discretion A. Bryan’s Grievance with US Airways Bryan was a captain with US Airways until he retired in 1999. D. 66 Resp.2 ¶ 14. Until 2008, the Air Line Pilots Association (“ALPA”) was the duly certified collective bargaining agent for US Airways pilots. D. 66 Resp. ¶ 2. In or around December 1996, Bryan was elected to a two- year term as the chairman of the ALPA Master Executive Council. D. 66 Resp. ¶ 15. During his

two-year term, Bryan ceased piloting commercial aircraft and did not participate in any recurrent pilot training. D. 66 Resp. ¶¶ 16, 19. As a result, Bryan’s qualification to fly lapsed in 1997. D. 66 Resp. ¶ 19. US Airways and ALPA agreed to an Early Retirement Program (“ERIP”), which permitted up to 325 pilots to opt into the program to retire between May 1998 and May 2000. D. 66 Resp. ¶¶ 21, 22. Under the ERIP, pilots could designate their preferred retirement date, but US Airways would assign retirement dates based on operational needs and other considerations. D. 66 Resp. ¶ 23. Bryan voluntarily opted into the ERIP in or around March 1998. D. 66 Resp. ¶ 20. In or around the summer of 1998, Bryan sought to enroll in training to regain qualification to fly. D. 66

Resp. ¶ 28. Bryan was scheduled to participate in a training program in August 1998, but his participation was canceled by US Airways. D. 66 Resp. ¶ 29. US Airways advised Bryan that his training was canceled because US Airways determined the training was not an appropriate use of company resources.3 D. 66 Resp. ¶ 30. US Airways selected Bryan to retire on January 1, 1999

of this court whether facts stated in a statement of material facts are to be admitted as true, see Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007); Navarro v. U.S. Tsubaki, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 2d 487, 492 n.1 (D. Mass 2008), which the Court declines to do here. 2 Citations to “D. 66 Resp.” refer to the section of Bryan’s statement of material facts responding to APA’s statement of material facts, beginning on page twenty-one of D. 66. Citations to “D. 66” refer to Bryan’s statement of material facts beginning on page one of D. 66. 3 In a letter detailing his grievance, Bryan indicated that he contested US Airways’ cancellation of his training as a “misinterpretation and misapplication” of the US Airways Pilots’ Working Agreement. D. 63-1 at 98. Bryan contends that the cancellation of his training resulted under the second phase of retirements pursuant to the ERIP. D. 66 Resp. ¶ 35. Bryan received all benefits called for under the ERIP. D. 66 Resp. ¶ 35. On February 24, 1999, Bryan filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement between US Airways and ALPA regarding US Airways’ cancellation of his training. D. 66 Resp. ¶ 37. US Airways denied the grievance at the first step of the grievance process, stating, in part,

that “Bryan was properly assigned a retirement date . . . and was appropriately withheld from training consistent with the intent of not expending training resources on a pilot scheduled to retire.” D. 66 Resp. ¶ 38. US Airways subsequently denied Bryan’s grievance at step two of the process on August 2, 2000. D. 66 Resp. ¶ 39. Pursuant to standard practices, the ALPA submitted Bryan’s dispute to the U.S. Airways Pilots System Board of Adjustment for arbitration on August 29, 2000. D. 66 Resp. ¶ 40.

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