Bryan Prather v. Office of Personnel Management

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 10, 2023
DocketDE-844E-21-0025-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Bryan Prather v. Office of Personnel Management (Bryan Prather v. Office of Personnel Management) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bryan Prather v. Office of Personnel Management, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

BRYAN K. PRATHER, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-844E-21-0025-I-1

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL DATE: March 10, 2023 MANAGEMENT, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Leah B. Kille, Esquire, Lexington, Kentucky, for the appellant.

Jo Bell, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2 Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure. 2

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review and the appellant has filed a cross petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the final decision by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) denying the appellant’s application for disability retirement under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS). Generally, we grant petitions such as these only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party has established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition or cross petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and the cross petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Boar d’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The appellant’s request for interim relief is denied. ¶2 The Board’s regulations commit the granting of interim relief to the administrative judge’s discretion. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.111(c)(1); see 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(i). In this case, the administrative judge denied interim relief. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 20, Initial Decision (ID) at 9. In his cross petition, the appellant requests that the Board nonetheless award interim relief, arguing that the lack of interim payment would cause him a significant financial burden. 3

Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3 at 8-10. However, there is no authority that provides for requesting interim relief that was not ordered. See Dean v. Department of the Army, 57 M.S.P.R. 296, 300 (1993). In any event, the appellant’s arguments in this regard are now moot because interim relief is in effect only pending the disposition of a petition for review. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A); Garcia v. Department of State, 106 M.S.P.R. 583, ¶ 7 (2007). Accordingly, we deny the appellant’s cross petition.

OPM’s petition for review does not provide a basis for further review. ¶3 Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2), an employee bears the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence in an appeal from OPM's deci sion on a voluntary disability retirement application. Chavez v. Office of Personnel Management, 6 M.S.P.R. 404, 417 (1981). To be eligible for a disability retirement annuity under FERS, an employee must show that: (1) he completed at least 18 months of creditable civilian service; (2) while employed in a position subject to FERS, he became disabled because of a medical condition, resulting in a deficiency in performance, conduct or attendance, or, if there is no such deficiency, the disabling medical condition is incompatible with useful and efficient service or retention in the position; (3) the disabling medical condition is expected to continue for at least 1 year from the date the application for disability retirement benefits was filed; (4) accommodation of the disabling condition in the position held must be unreasonable; and (5) he did not decline a reasonable offer of reassignment to a vacant position. Doe v. Office of Personnel Management, 109 M.S.P.R. 86, ¶ 8 (2008); see 5 U.S.C. § 8451(a); 5 C.F.R. § 844.103(a). On review, OPM argues that the administrative judge erred in finding that the appellant established requirement (4) by a preponderance of the evidence. ¶4 In Bracey v. Office of Personnel Management, 236 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that, for purposes of determining eligibility for disability retirement under the Civil Service Retirement System, an accommodation precludes disability retirement only if it 4

(1) adjusts the employee’s job or work environment, enabling him to perform the critical or essential duties of his position; or (2) reassigns the employee to an established, vacant position at the same grade and pay. Id. at 1358-59. The court found that, in that case, the employee’s assignment to a light -duty position did not constitute an accommodation because he did not perform the “critical or essential elements” of the position but performed lower -graded duties instead. Id. at 1360-61. The court further concluded that the assignment did not constitute a reassignment to a vacant position since the light-duty assignment consisted of a “set of duties selected on an ad hoc basis to fit the needs of a particular disabled employee” and was not a definite, preexisting position that was classified and graded according to its duties, responsibilities, and qualification requirements. Id. at 1359-60. In Marino v. Office of Personnel Management, 243 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the court extended the holding of Bracey to disability retirement applications under FERS. ¶5 OPM argues that, because the record does not provide the details of the light-duty assignment the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) offered the appellant, it is unknown whether it would have permitted the appellant to perform the critical or essential elements of his position. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8.

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Bruce A. Bracey v. Office of Personnel Management
236 F.3d 1356 (Federal Circuit, 2001)
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243 F.3d 1375 (Federal Circuit, 2001)
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582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Bryan Prather v. Office of Personnel Management, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bryan-prather-v-office-of-personnel-management-mspb-2023.