Bryan M Holl v. Moose Lake Correctional Facility

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: November 18, 2024
• Docket: a240562
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-0562

Bryan M Holl, Appellant,

vs.

Moose Lake Correctional Facility, Respondent.

Filed November 18, 2024 Affirmed Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Carlton County District Court File No. 09-CV-22-2252

Bryan M. Holl, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Madeline M. Sheehy, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,

Tracy M., Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge

Appellant Bryan M. Holl challenges the district court’s dismissal of his Eighth

Amendment claim alleging a violation of his right to sanitary living conditions during his

confinement at a Minnesota correctional facility. Holl also challenges the district court’s

denial of his motion to amend the complaint. We affirm. FACTS

Holl was incarcerated at the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Moose Lake (MCF-

ML). In December 2022, Holl commenced an action for monetary damages against MCF-

ML for violating his Eighth Amendment right to sanitary living conditions by failing to

regularly provide him with clean clothes. The complaint alleges that there were two

laundry-soap shortages that prevented Holl from washing his clothes. It alleges that the

first shortage occurred from approximately November 9 to November 30, 2022, and the

second from December 8 to at least December 19, 2022, the date Holl signed the complaint.

Holl attached to the complaint two of his communications with MCF-ML staff

regarding the soap shortages. In the first communication, Holl informed staff that the

facility had not had laundry soap for over a week and asked when soap would arrive; staff

responded that an order was being processed and that the estimated arrival date was

unknown. In the second communication, Holl informed staff that the facility still had no

laundry soap; staff responded that soap should arrive by mid-December 2022, citing

“supply chain issues” as a factor “compounding” the shortage. In that communication, staff

also encouraged Holl to try ordering detergent through the facility canteen, where soap

could be purchased, or through indigent supplies, where soap could be accessed for free if

Holl qualified.

MCF-ML filed a motion to dismiss Holl’s complaint pursuant to Minnesota Rule of

Civil Procedure 12.02(e), arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief

could be granted.

2 Two weeks later, Holl filed a motion to amend the complaint as a matter of course

pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01. The proposed amendments include

a citation to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) as the mechanism authorizing Holl’s claim; an

allegation that MCF-ML had announced that it would discontinue its policy of providing

incarcerated persons with free laundry soap; the addition of four MCF-ML officials as

defendants; and a request for additional forms of relief, including injunctions, punitive

damages, and a jury trial.

Following a hearing on the motions, the district court granted MCF-ML’s motion to

dismiss and denied Holl’s motion to amend. The district court concluded that dismissal

was proper because Holl had “never been denied use of laundry facilities, including free

soap.” The district court concluded that denial of the motion to amend was appropriate

because the proposed amendments did not support a claim that could survive the motion to

dismiss and granting the motion would therefore be futile.

Holl appeals.

DECISION

I. The district court did not err by granting MCF-ML’s motion to dismiss.

Holl challenges the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. He contends that he sufficiently alleged that

MCF-ML violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment.

Appellate courts review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a case for failure to

state a claim on which relief can be granted pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure

12.02(e). Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. 2008). In deciding a

3 rule 12.02(e) motion, “the question . . . is whether the complaint sets forth a legally

sufficient claim for relief.” Id. Appellate courts must “consider only the facts alleged in the

complaint,” presume all facts alleged are true, and make all reasonable inferences in favor

of the nonmovant. Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010) (quotation

omitted). Legal conclusions and labels in the complaint are not presumed to be true. See

id. In reviewing a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss, an appellate court

may “consider documents that are embraced by the complaint.” Greer v. Pro. Fiduciary,

Inc., 792 N.W.2d 120, 126-27 (Minn. App. 2011).

The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits infliction of “cruel and

unusual” punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The protections of the Eighth Amendment

apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); id. at 675 (Douglas, J., concurring).

“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of

man.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). Interpretation of the scope of the Eighth

Amendment requires courts to consider “the evolving standards of decency that mark the

progress of a maturing society.” Id. at 101. While the Constitution “does not mandate

comfortable prisons,” a deprivation that denies an incarcerated person “the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities” is “sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth

Amendment violation.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (quotations omitted).

The Eighth Circuit has explained that, under the Eighth Amendment, incarcerated persons

“are entitled to reasonably adequate sanitation, personal hygiene, and laundry privileges,

4 particularly over a lengthy course of time.” Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th

Cir. 1989).

For a court to determine that a prison official has violated the Eighth Amendment,

the complainant must show that (1) a sufficiently serious deprivation of the incarcerated

person’s rights occurred and (2) the official acted with deliberate indifference to the

inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

With these principles in mind, we turn to Holl’s allegations. In his complaint, Holl

alleges facts regarding two periods of time in November and December 2022 in which

MCF-ML experienced laundry-soap shortages. He alleges that those shortages prevented

him from washing his clothing. Presuming all facts in the complaint and the accompanying

documents are true and making all reasonable inferences in favor of Holl, we conclude that

Holl failed to allege a colorable claim under the Eighth Amendment for the following

reasons.

First, for Holl’s claim to withstand the motion to dismiss, it must allege a

“sufficiently serious” deprivation of rights. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The seriousness

component of an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim is an objective

standard. See Seiter, 501 U.S. at 298. Holl’s complaint alleges that, for two brief periods

of time, MCF-ML experienced laundry-soap shortages that deprived him of the ability to

wash his clothes. The communications that Holl submitted with his complaint show that

MCF-ML staff acknowledged the shortages and encouraged Holl to purchase laundry soap

through the facility canteen or obtain it for free through indigent supplies. The brief

5 shortages of soap alleged by Holl, especially in the context of the solutions suggested by

MCF-ML staff, are not sufficiently serious to support an Eighth Amendment claim. 1

Second, to withstand the motion to dismiss, Holl’s complaint must allege that MCF-

ML staff acted with “deliberate indifference” to Holl’s health or safety. See Farmer, 511

U.S. at 834. The complaint does not expressly address indifference, or any other state of

mind, of MCF-ML staff regarding the soap shortage. The communications submitted with

the complaint contain statements by two staff members, who each responded to Holl within

one day of his inquiries. The first communication informs Holl that an order was coming

to the facility, though its arrival date was unknown. The second states that soap was

expected by the end of the week and provides Holl with a recommendation of two

alternative sources for soap. These communications do not evidence deliberate indifference

by MCF-ML staff and, instead, show efforts to timely resolve the issue and inform Holl of

alternative soap sources.

Because the complaint and accompanying documents do not sufficiently allege a

violation of the Eighth Amendment, the district court did not err by dismissing Holl’s

complaint. 2

1 The complaint also asserts that “[t]he resulting danger to the prisoners[’] hea[l]th” from failing to provide clean clothes “is manifest in the [p]arasitic skin conditions which often plague the prisoners.” While the complaint makes this general assertion about a danger of failing to provide clean clothes, it makes no factual assertion about Holl’s own health condition as a result of the two shortage periods. 2 In its briefing, MCF-ML provides an alternative ground to justify dismissal, arguing that Holl is not entitled to monetary damages because MCF-ML is an entity of the state and so is immune from suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because we affirm the district

6 II. The district court’s denial of Holl’s motion to amend is not reversible error.

Holl argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to amend the

complaint because he had an absolute right to amend his complaint before a responsive

pleading was served.

“Generally, the decision to permit or deny amendments to pleadings is within the

discretion of the district court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”

Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., 664 N.W.2d 291, 295 (Minn. 2003). The application of the

Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, however, is a question of law that appellate courts

review de novo. Sharkey v. City of Shoreview, 853 N.W.2d 832, 834 (Minn. App. 2014).

Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01 provides, “A party may amend a pleading once

as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.”

Here, MCF-ML filed a motion to dismiss under rule 12.02(e). Holl then filed what

he captioned a “motion to amend complaint”—which was the amended complaint—and a

“notice of motion”—which stated that, at a hearing in October 2023, Holl would ask the

district court to enter his amended complaint pursuant to his right to amend the complaint

as a matter of course under rule 15.01. Following a hearing on the parties’ motions, the

district court denied Holl’s motion to amend the complaint because the proposed

amendments were futile.

Holl argues that the district court did not have discretion to reject his amended

complaint because he filed it before MCF-ML served a responsive motion. A motion to

court’s dismissal on the ground that the complaint fails to sufficiently allege an Eighth Amendment violation, we do not reach that argument.

7 dismiss under rule 12.02(e) “is not a responsive pleading under rule 15.01.” Sharkey, 853

N.W.2d at 835. Because MCF-ML had served only a motion to dismiss under rule 12.02(e)

at the time of Holl’s motion to amend his complaint, Holl is correct that he was entitled to

amend his complaint as a matter of course under rule 15.01.

The district court’s error in rejecting Holl’s motion to amend as a matter of course,

however, does not justify reversal if the error is harmless. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61. An error

is harmless if it “does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Id.

Here, if the district court had granted Holl’s motion to enter his amended complaint,

his claim would still suffer from the same defect as the initial complaint. The amended

complaint repeats the initial complaint’s factual allegation that MCF-ML experienced a

laundry-soap shortage starting in November 2022. The amended complaint also references

the two communications between Holl and MCF-ML staff about the shortage. For the

reasons explained above, even considering the factual allegation about the laundry-soap

shortage as true, the amended complaint does not state a sufficiently serious deprivation of

rights or deliberate indifference by officials to support a claim under the Eighth

Amendment. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

The amended complaint adds one new factual allegation about laundry services. It

alleges that, on February 16, 2023, MCF-ML posted a notice that it was ending the

distribution of free laundry soap to incarcerated persons and that incarcerated persons

would “be expected to purchase their own laundry soap.” Holl filed the February 16, 2023,

notice referenced in the amended complaint with the district court. The notice states that

incarcerated persons would be expected to buy their own laundry soap, but it goes on to

8 state, “Please note, MCF-Moose Lake will continue to provide laundry supplies to

[incarcerated persons] who are indigent.” Even considering the new allegation and the

notice as true, Holl’s amended complaint does not allege facts showing that he was

deprived of clean clothing. It therefore fails to allege a sufficiently serious deprivation of

rights to support a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See id.

Because the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, the district court’s denial of the motion to amend is harmless error.

Affirmed.