Bryan E. Green v. Rachelle Barlow

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided August 10, 2016·No. 10-15-00387-CV·Published

Opinion

IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-15-00387-CV

BRYAN E. GREEN, Appellant v.

RACHELLE BARLOW, ET AL, Appellee

From the 12th District Court Walker County, Texas Trial Court No. 1527478

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this appeal, appellant Bryan E. Green, challenges the trial court’s dismissal of

his lawsuit against appellees, Rachelle Barlow, Robert Castleberry, and the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”). Because we conclude that Green has not

complied with the requirements of Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies

Code, we affirm. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.001-.014 (West 2002 & Supp.

2015). I. BACKGROUND

On July 1, 2015, Green, an inmate, filed suit against Officer Barlow and Major

Castleberry, in their individual and official capacities, and the TDCJ. Specifically, Green

alleged that Officer Barlow “committed assault and battery against [him] . . . when she

used excessive, non-provoked, and unnecessary force . . . in a malicious and sadistic

manner . . . and shoved the Plaintiff . . . by initially pushing against my chest with her

chest and then shoving me with her arms in an extremely forceful manner” while he was

in the infirmary for an ankle injury. Green further asserted that Officer Barlow assaulted

him when he was shoved for interfering with Officer Barlow’s headcount. Moreover,

Green alleged that Officer Barlow exposed him to significant risk by threatening to tell

other inmates that he was incarcerated for child molestation.

Green also contended that Major Castleberry threatened him with imminent

bodily injury when Major Castleberry stated “the next time I will make sure that we leave

bigger bruises on your chest” in response to comments made by Green. And finally,

Green asserted negligence claims against TDCJ for its investigation of his grievances and

for allowing Officer Barlow and Major Castleberry to act in the manner about which he

complains.

In addition to his original petition, Green filed a declaration of inability to pay

court costs, a certified copy of his inmate account, a declaration of previous lawsuits, and

a declaration “as to grievance system decision and exhaustion of administrative

Green v. Barlow Page 2 remedies.” The Texas Attorney General’s Office responded to Green’s lawsuit by filing

an Amicus Curiae Chapter 14 Advisory advancing numerous grounds for dismissal.

Green filed an opposition to the Attorney General’s Advisory. Without a hearing, the

trial court dismissed Green’s lawsuit “as frivolous for failure to comply with Chapter

Fourteen of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.” This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

An inmate proceeding in forma pauperis, as Green alleges, is subject to the

procedural requirements of Chapter 14. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.002;

see also Moore v. Zeller, 153 S.W.3d 262, 263 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, pet. denied).

Under Chapter 14, the trial court has broad discretion to dismiss a lawsuit as frivolous or

malicious. Moore, 153 S.W.3d at 262 (citing Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 94

S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied)). As such, we review

the dismissal of suits under Chapter 14 under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. (citing

Hines v. Massey, 79 S.W.3d 269, 271 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, no pet.)). A trial court

abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules or principles. See Downer

v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985).

Chapter 14 requires the inmate to file an affidavit or declaration “relating to

previous filings” in which the inmate must detail all previous actions filed pro se, other

than a suit under the Family Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.004(a); see

also McClure v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, No. 10-12-00481-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS

Green v. Barlow Page 3 2284, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 27, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Moreover, the inmate

is required to file a certified copy of his “inmate trust account statement” that “reflect[s]

the balance of the account at the time the claim is filed and activity in the account during

the six months preceding the date on which the claim is filed.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 14.004(c), .006(f); see Amir-Sharif v. Mason, 243 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2008, no pet.). These filings are “an essential part of the process by which courts

review inmate litigation.” Hickson v. Moya, 926 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996,

no writ).

Here, Green filed an affidavit purportedly complying with section 14.004 that lists

only one previous filing in federal court. As listed by Green, the facts in his federal

lawsuit are the same operative facts as involved in this case. Moreover, Green’s federal

and state claims involve the same defendants and similar causes of action. Green also

alleges in his affidavit that the suit is still pending in federal court.

With regard to situations such as this, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals has noted:

The purpose of sections 14.003 and 14.004 is obvious; the Texas Legislature recognized the problem of constant, often duplicative, inmate litigation in this state, and sought to reduce it by requiring the inmate to notify the trial court of previous litigation and the outcome. In this way, the trial court could determine, based on previous filings, if the suit was frivolous because the inmate had already filed a similar claim.

Bell v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice-Inst. Div., 962 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).

Green v. Barlow Page 4 Indeed, section 14.003(b)(4) provides that the trial court may dismiss an inmate

suit as frivolous or malicious if “the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed

by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(b)(4). Therefore, based on Green’s affidavit, the trial court could

have dismissed his suit under section 14.003(b)(4). See id.; see also Samuels v. Strain, 11

S.W.3d 404, 406-07 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Bell, 962 S.W.2d at 158.

In any event, in its Amicus Curiae Advisory filed in the trial court, the Attorney

General’s Office stated that Green’s federal lawsuit was actually disposed of prior to

Green’s filing of his original petition in this case. The Attorney General’s Office noted

that the federal court dismissed Green’s federal suit “for failure to state a claim predicated

on failure to exhaust,” which is the equivalent of dismissing an inmate suit for failing to

exhaust administrative remedies. See Houser v. Harrell, No. 09-05-350-CV, 2006 Tex. App.

LEXIS 8641, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 5, 2006, no pet.) (“In essence, section 14.005

allows the trial court to ensure that an inmate proceeding in forma pauperis has first

exhausted an applicable grievance procedure. See Smith v. Tex.

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Related

Moore v. Zeller
153 S.W.3d 262 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2004)
Smith v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division
33 S.W.3d 338 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Hines v. Massey
79 S.W.3d 269 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Hickson v. Moya
926 S.W.2d 397 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1996)
Retzlaff v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice
94 S.W.3d 650 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Bell v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division
962 S.W.2d 156 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1998)
Bishop v. Lawson
131 S.W.3d 571 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2004)
Samuels v. Strain
11 S.W.3d 404 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)
McClain v. Terry
320 S.W.3d 394 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2010)
Moreland v. Johnson
95 S.W.3d 392 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Amir-Sharif v. Mason
243 S.W.3d 854 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2008)
Allred v. Lowry
597 S.W.2d 353 (Texas Supreme Court, 1980)
Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc.
701 S.W.2d 238 (Texas Supreme Court, 1985)