Bruce L. Jensen v. State of Alaska

• Court: Court of Appeals of Alaska
• Decided: July 1, 2026
• Docket: A-14329
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 WL 1905895

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION

NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law, although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have. See McCoy v. State, 80 P.3d 757, 764 (Alaska App. 2002).

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

BRUCE L. JENSEN, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. A-14329

July 1, 2026

Trial Court No. 1JU-06-01293 CR

Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial District, Juneau, Marianna C. Carpeneti, Judge.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Appearances: Lindsey Bray, Assistant Public Defender, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Judge WOLLENBERG.

In 2007, Bruce L. Jensen pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted first-degree sexual assault involving two teenage boys and one count of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor involving a nine-year-old boy.¹ Pursuant to a plea agreement, the court imposed a composite sentence of 20 years with 8 years suspended (12 years to serve) and a 10-year term of probation. This appeal arises from the second revocation of Jensen's probation. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we remand this case to the superior court for reconsideration of the disposition, but we otherwise affirm the judgment of the superior court.

Factual and procedural background

In 2006, Jensen was indicted on seven counts: two counts of attempted first-degree sexual assault, one count of second-degree sexual assault, three counts of attempted second-degree sexual assault, and one count of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor. Jensen ultimately pleaded guilty to three counts and received a sentence of 20 years with 8 years suspended.

Following the service of his active term of imprisonment, Jensen was released to supervised probation in December 2013. Jensen had no petitions to revoke probation for the first four years of his probation.

In January 2018, the State filed a first petition to revoke probation alleging that Jensen failed to report to his probation officer and was discharged from sex offender treatment as unsuccessful. The court revoked his probation and imposed 6 months of his previously suspended 8-year term.² Jensen was also convicted of second-degree failure to register as a sex offender.³

Jensen returned to supervised probation in June 2020. For almost a year, Jensen attended probation office visits and sex offender treatment groups, although he never successfully completed sex offender treatment.

In May 2021, Jensen failed to report to his probation officer as directed. Jensen's probation officer then learned that Jensen had moved out of his residence without receiving the officer's approval, as required by his probation conditions. Based on these probation violations, the State filed a second petition to revoke probation.

Jensen was in abscond status for about a year and a half before he was apprehended by the police. In November 2022, following his arrest, the State filed an amended second petition to revoke probation, adding allegations that Jensen violated his probation by failing to register as a sex offender (and therefore also violating state law), failing to provide a sample for urinalysis, and possessing alcohol. The State also charged Jensen with first-degree failure to register as a sex offender, a felony.⁴ (This charge was later dismissed.)

Jensen informed the court at his first appearance that he did not want to be represented by counsel, and he represented himself for the first three months of the year-long probation revocation proceedings. After several hearings, however, the court realized that Jensen had never entered a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel, and the court informed Jensen that it would need to engage him in a colloquy and make findings before allowing him to waive his right to counsel. Jensen refused to engage with the court, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction. The court therefore found that Jensen had not waived his right to counsel and appointed the Public Defender Agency to represent him.

Jensen was represented by counsel for the remainder of the litigation, despite his repeated assertions that he did not want representation and the court's repeated attempts to engage him in a waiver colloquy.

Following a contested adjudication hearing, the superior court determined that Jensen had failed to report as directed, changed residence without permission, and failed to register as a sex offender (and as a result, violated state law). The court found that the State had not proven that Jensen refused to provide a sample for urinalysis or that he possessed alcohol.

At disposition, the State asked the court to impose all of Jensen's remaining suspended time. Jensen asked the court to impose 615 days of his suspended time and return him to probation. The court revoked Jensen's probation and imposed his remaining suspended time: 7.5 years.

Jensen now appeals, raising two claims. First, Jensen argues that the superior court violated his right to represent himself when it appointed counsel over his objection. Second, Jensen argues that the court erred in imposing his entire remaining suspended term. We address each claim in turn.

Why we conclude that there was no valid waiver of Jensen's right to counsel and that, despite repeated attempts, the superior court was unable to obtain a waiver from Jensen

When a criminal defendant declares that they wish to proceed pro se, the court must engage in a thorough colloquy with the defendant to ensure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives their right to counsel.⁵ In particular, the court must describe the benefits of proceeding with counsel and the dangers of self-representation in “some detail” to ensure that the defendant “understands precisely what he is giving up by declining the assistance of counsel.”⁶ The court must also “ascertain whether a [defendant] is capable of presenting his allegations in a rational and coherent manner” and “is willing to conduct himself with at least a modicum of courtroom decorum.”⁷

Jensen contends that the superior court erred in rescinding his self-representation status after the first few hearings at which he appeared pro se. Jensen acknowledges that no court engaged him in a formal waiver-of-counsel colloquy during those initial hearings, but he contends that the collective record of those hearings nonetheless shows that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.

But “[w]e will excuse an on-record inquiry only if ‘the record as a whole unequivocally demonstrate[s] a full awareness ... of the benefits of counsel and the dangers of self-representation.’ ”⁸ Here, the record supports the court's determination that the initial hearings did not contain a sufficient colloquy or unequivocally demonstrate Jensen's full awareness and waiver of his rights.

At Jensen's first court appearance, Jensen repeatedly declared that he did not “consent” to the proceedings and referred the court to a “Paramount Claim” document he said was on file with the Department of Natural Resources. The court advised Jensen to discuss the matter with an attorney, but Jensen responded that he did not want representation. The court therefore did not appoint counsel.

The court repeatedly warned Jensen that he had a right to counsel and that self-representation was a “poor choice.” But the court did not inform Jensen of the risks of self-representation or the benefits of counsel in any detail, nor did Jensen's responses indicate that he understood the risks of self-representation or the benefits of counsel.

At the next hearing — Jensen's superior court arraignment — the court (a different judge) incorrectly assumed that Jensen had previously been fully informed of the benefits of counsel and the risks of self-representation, and its description of the benefits of counsel and risks of self-representation was correspondingly limited. Jensen continued to challenge the legitimacy of the proceedings and focus on his “Paramount Claim,” stating that “any other paperwork that the State produces, ... it is not true, and it is null and void.”

The court entered denials on Jensen's behalf to the allegations in the petition to revoke probation. The court declined to appoint an attorney over Jensen's objection, but told Jensen that proceeding without an attorney was risky and that he could request an attorney at any time. The court also advised Jensen of some of the benefits of counsel. But the court did not engage Jensen in a waiver colloquy, stating only that the court hoped he would reconsider his decision to represent himself and that it would ask him at the next hearing if he had changed his mind.

Jensen continued to represent himself at hearings on December 28, 2022, January 4, 2023, and January 30, 2023. At the January 4 hearing, the court encouraged Jensen to consider how a lawyer could help him and cautioned him that he would be at a disadvantage if he represented himself. Jensen again asked the court to obtain his “Paramount Claim” document and said he would have “no further conversation” with the court until the document was before the court. (The court treated Jensen's request as a motion to take judicial notice of the document and allowed the State an opportunity to respond to this request in writing.)

At the hearing on January 30, 2023, the court realized that there had been no prior waiver colloquy with Jensen regarding his right to counsel and thus no valid waiver by Jensen of his right to counsel. The court advised Jensen that it needed to make a series of findings before it could allow him to waive his right to counsel; the court then warned Jensen that if he declined to participate, it would find that he had not waived his right to counsel and would appoint counsel for him.⁹

Although Jensen indicated that he understood, he began discussing his “Paramount Claim” document. Jensen stated that this “document explains everything, that there's a lack of jurisdiction and authority with the State of Alaska, Inc.” Jensen again said that he would have “no further conversation” until the court reviewed the document.

The court attempted to redirect the exchange back to the waiver of counsel, but Jensen continued to assert that the court lacked jurisdiction. None of Jensen's comments addressed representation.

The court found that Jensen was “not willing to engage with the court” in a colloquy regarding his waiver of the right to counsel. Because the court found that Jensen had not waived his right to counsel, the court appointed the Public Defender Agency to represent him.

On appeal, Jensen argues that we should combine all of the information provided to Jensen regarding the benefits of counsel and risks of self-representation during these initial hearings to conclude that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. We question whether — even combining these initial hearings — the benefits of counsel and risks of self-representation were described in the level of detail required by Alaska law.¹⁰ But even recognizing that the court advised Jensen of some of the benefits of counsel, the court never engaged Jensen in a colloquy regarding his right to counsel, and Jensen's responses to the court during these hearings do not reflect a knowing and intelligent understanding and waiver of this right.¹¹

Jensen analogizes his case to Kelly v. State, in which we excused the absence of a full waiver inquiry in a case where the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court had erred in allowing him to represent himself.¹² In Kelly, we observed that the defendant's considerable experience with the criminal justice system and the legal acumen demonstrated by his pleadings indicated a “strong likelihood” that he was aware of the advantages of counsel.¹³ We recognized, however, that these factors might not alone excuse the failure to make a proper inquiry; rather, it was these factors, together with the “substantial level of legal representation” the defendant received at trial from hybrid counsel, that were sufficient to excuse the trial court's failure to make a full inquiry on the record to establish that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.¹⁴

Unlike in Kelly, we are not confronted with a situation in which we must retrospectively evaluate a record to determine whether the court erred in allowing a defendant to proceed pro se without engaging in a full colloquy. Rather, here, the superior court rightfully recognized that it had not engaged in a waiver colloquy with Jensen regarding his right to counsel and, consistent with our case law, concluded it was necessary in the first instance to engage in one.¹⁵ Jensen had the opportunity to engage in that colloquy, but the court found he was unwilling to do so. This finding is supported by the record.

Jensen argues that the court decided to appoint counsel because it implicitly concluded that Jensen's sovereign citizen beliefs meant he was incapable of presenting his defense in an understandable way, in contravention of this Court's guidance in Falcone v. State.¹⁶ But the record does not support this assertion. Rather, the record shows that the court appointed counsel, not because of the substance of Jensen's arguments, but because Jensen was unwilling to engage with the court; he “deflected the judge's inquiries with irrelevant responses, or denied altogether the court's right to even conduct the inquiry.”¹⁷

As we have previously explained, a “knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel cannot be inferred solely from the vociferousness of [a defendant's] assertion of that right.”¹⁸ Because the record of these early hearings does not establish that Jensen “understood the advantages of proceeding with an attorney and the disadvantages of proceeding without one, and whether he would be able to present his arguments in a minimally coherent manner,” the court did not err in appointing counsel for him.¹⁹

Alternatively, Jensen argues that, even if he did not validly waive his right to counsel, the superior court abused its discretion in failing to adequately attempt to obtain a valid waiver. We reject this claim. As we noted above, the court found that Jensen was unwilling to engage in a colloquy at the late January status hearing when it rescinded his pro se status.

Even assuming, however, that the court did not provide an adequate opportunity for Jensen to waive his right to counsel during that hearing, the court repeatedly attempted to conduct a waiver colloquy at subsequent hearings, but Jensen refused to participate. Although the court repeatedly explained its duty to determine whether Jensen waived his right to counsel, Jensen focused on his “Paramount Claim” document and asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction. Indeed, Jensen — who often appeared telephonically at the hearings — engaged in a pattern of interrupting the court, declaring the hearing over, and then hanging up.

Jensen characterizes his statements during the proceedings as indicative of an “unconventional defense strategy,” but the record from these hearings demonstrates that Jensen's responses when the court sought to discuss the waiver of counsel were more than an “unconventional defense strategy”; he was not responsive to the issue of representation.²⁰ While a court should not determine that a defendant is incapable of presenting a coherent defense based on the infirmity of the defendant's legal views, it can base that judgment on a defendant's persistent assertion of irrelevant statements.²¹ Here, Jensen's repeated interruptions made it “virtually impossible to hold any meaningful discussion of his case.”²²

We therefore conclude that the superior court did not violate Jensen's right to self-representation.

Why we remand for reconsideration of the disposition

Second, Jensen argues that the superior court's decision to revoke his probation and impose all remaining suspended time was clearly mistaken. We remand on this claim for further consideration of the disposition by the superior court.

Probation revocation proceedings involve a two-step process.²³ The first question is whether the probationer violated a condition of probation.²⁴ Here, the court found, following a contested adjudication, that Jensen had violated his probation.

If the court finds that the defendant violated probation, the court proceeds to the second step, which is determining the appropriate disposition.²⁵ As part of the disposition stage, the court determines whether there is “good cause” to revoke probation.²⁶ In order to find “good cause,” the court must find that “continuation of probationary status would be at odds with the need to protect society and society's interest in the probationer's rehabilitation.”²⁷ Probation revocation follows when a probation violation “indicates that the corrective aims of probation cannot be achieved.”²⁸

But “even if it is clear from the record that the defendant cannot benefit further from probation, the court may not simply impose all previously suspended time.”²⁹ Instead, the court must consider all available sentencing information, including “information concerning the defendant's background, the seriousness of the original offense, the nature of the defendant's conduct while on probation, and the seriousness of the violations that led to the revocation,”³⁰ and impose a sentence appropriate to the nature and circumstances of the original offense.³¹ This sentence must be justified in light of the Chaney criteria.³²

It is clear from the record in this case that the superior court found that “the corrective aims of probation” could not be achieved at this point and that probation revocation was appropriate.³³ This “good cause” finding to revoke probation is supported by the record. Although Jensen had some periods of probation in which he was reporting and following his conditions, he absconded from probation for a long stretch of time.

But while the court focused on why there was good cause to revoke Jensen's probation, the court did not mention or evaluate the Chaney criteria and thus did not explain why a sentence of 7.5 years (i.e., that Jensen will serve the full 20-year sentence for his underlying offenses) was necessary in light of the Chaney criteria.³⁴

We recognize that a sentencing court need not “recite the sentencing goals by rote,” but its remarks and the record “must clearly demonstrate that the Chaney criteria have been properly considered.”³⁵ While there may be good reasons for imposing a lengthy sentence that could be inferred from the record, we think the better course under the circumstances of this case is to “remand the case for further explanation and/or resentencing.”³⁶

We therefore remand this case for evaluation of the Chaney criteria and reconsideration of Jensen's sentence in the first instance.³⁷ We express no view as to whether the imposition of Jensen's remaining term, 7.5 years, is clearly mistaken.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we REMAND for reconsideration of the disposition in light of the Chaney criteria, but otherwise AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.

Footnotes

1

Former AS 11.41.410(a)(1) (1994; 1996) & AS 11.31.100, and AS 11.41.436(a)(2), respectively.

2

The first petition to revoke probation is not in the record, so a description of the allegations is taken from the most recent letter update. (It is unclear from the record which of the alleged probation violations Jensen was found to have committed.) The letter update indicates that Jensen was also alleged to have violated probation by failing to submit to a polygraph examination, but his underlying judgment states that he “may not be required to undergo polygraph examination.” Given the references to failed polygraphs in the letter update, the court may wish to clarify this issue on remand.

3

AS 11.56.840.

4

AS 11.56.835(a)(1).

5

James v. State, 730 P.2d 811, 813-14 & n.1 (Alaska App. 1987); see also Johnson v. State, 188 P.3d 700, 703-04 & n.4 (Alaska App. 2008) (noting that a trial judge is not obligated to undertake a thorough, on-record inquiry into a defendant's request for self-representation unless the defendant's request is clear and unequivocal).

6

McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 91-92 (Alaska 1974); accord Hinshaw v. State, 515 P.3d 129, 138 (Alaska App. 2022).

7

McCracken, 518 P.2d at 91-92; see also Lampley v. State, 33 P.3d 184, 189 (Alaska App. 2001) (noting that a court may deny a request for self-representation if the defendant is incapable of presenting their defense “without being unusually disruptive”).

8

Gladden v. State, 110 P.3d 1006, 1010 (Alaska App. 2005) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Evans v. State, 822 P.2d 1370, 1375 (Alaska App. 1991)).

9

See Shorthill v. State, 354 P.3d 1093, 1109 (Alaska App. 2015) (recognizing that, while the constitutional right of self-representation “exists alongside the constitutionally guaranteed right to the assistance of counsel,” the right of representation by counsel is “paramount”).

10

See McCracken, 518 P.2d at 92 (explaining “[t]he advantages of legal representation should be explained to the [defendant] in some detail”).

11

See Gladden, 110 P.3d at 1009-10 (“We have cautioned courts against relying on a general explanation of the right to counsel in lieu of objective indications that the defendant appreciated what he was giving up by waiving his right to counsel in that particular case.”); see also Hinshaw, 515 P.3d at 138-39 (reasoning there was a knowing and intelligent waiver where “Hinshaw's responses to the trial court's questions were coherent and intelligent” and “Hinshaw repeatedly demonstrated an understanding of what the trial court had explained to him, even if Hinshaw did not always agree with the trial court about the wisdom of his decision to proceed pro se”).

12

Kelly v. State, 663 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Alaska App. 1983).

13

Id. at 969.

14

Id. at 969-70.

15

See Shorthill v. State, 354 P.3d 1093, 1109 (Alaska App. 2015) (recognizing that, even though “a defendant has clearly and unequivocally declared his or her intention to appear pro se, the trial judge must [nevertheless] conduct a thorough inquiry [before allowing the defendant to proceed without an attorney]” (alterations in original) (quoting James v. State, 730 P.2d 811, 814 n.1 (Alaska App. 1987))); see also Gladden, 110 P.3d at 1009 (discussing the type of inquiry required before a court may grant a defendant's request to represent himself).

16

Falcone v. State, 227 P.3d 469, 474 (Alaska App. 2010) (“The question is not whether the defendant correctly understands the law and is capable of distinguishing a good defense from a poor one. Rather, the question is whether the defendant is capable of presenting his or her case in an understandable way.”).

17

Bourdon v. State, 2018 WL 3933557, at *3 (Alaska App. Aug. 15, 2018) (unpublished); see also Bartman v. State, 563 P.3d 121, 128 (Alaska App. 2025) (noting that the defendant's “non-responsiveness and deflection in the face of trial court questioning prevented the trial court from determining that the defendant was minimally capable of representing himself”).

18

Gladden, 110 P.3d at 1010.

19

Bartman, 563 P.3d at 128.

20

We note that the record before us also raises questions as to whether Jensen could present his case in a minimally coherent fashion. See, e.g., Lampley v. State, 33 P.3d 184, 189 (Alaska App. 2001) (“The court can deny a defendant's request for self-representation if the defendant is not minimally capable of presenting their case in a coherent fashion.”).

21

See Falcone, 227 P.3d at 474.

22

Id.; see also People v. Lavadie, 489 P.3d 1208, 1216 (Colo. 2021) (affirming denial of defendant's request to represent himself where he “repeatedly gave unresponsive answers, reasserted his sovereign citizen beliefs, or refused to participate in the proceeding”).

23

State v. Pulusila, 467 P.3d 211, 218 (Alaska 2020); Johnson v. State, 477 P.3d 665, 669 (Alaska App. 2020).

24

Trumbly v. State, 515 P.2d 707, 709-10 (Alaska 1973).

25

Pulusila, 467 P.3d at 218.

26

Id. at 217-18; Johnson, 477 P.3d at 669.

27

Trumbly, 515 P.2d at 709; accord Johnson, 477 P.3d at 669-70.

28

Trumbly, 515 P.2d at 709.

29

Luepke v. State, 765 P.2d 988, 990 (Alaska App. 1988); see also Crouse v. State, 736 P.2d 783, 787 (Alaska App. 1987) (recognizing that “despite conclusive evidence that the defendant could not benefit from probation, the trial court still had to justify any sentence imposed by reference to the Chaney criteria” (citing Gilbert v. State, 706 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Alaska App. 1985))); Gorla v. State, 1988 WL 1511738, at *2 (Alaska App. July 20, 1988) (unpublished) (“A finding of good cause to revoke probation does not automatically justify imposition of all previously suspended incarceration. In determining an appropriate sentence upon revocation of probation, the court is obligated to consider the totality of the evidence relating to the defendant, including the seriousness of the original offense, the nature of the defendant's conduct while on probation, and the circumstances that led to the probation revocation. The court must assess this information in light of the Chaney sentencing criteria.”).

30

Toney v. State, 785 P.2d 902, 903 (Alaska App. 1990); accord DeMario v. State, 933 P.2d 558, 562 (Alaska App. 1997); see also Crouse, 736 P.2d at 787 (recognizing that, even when it is clear that the defendant cannot benefit from further probation, the court should still “consider intervening conduct, and the circumstances of the original offense, as well as the defendant's background and experience as they existed at the time of the original sentencing,” when determining an appropriate sentence).

31

Toney, 785 P.2d at 903; Luepke, 765 P.2d at 991; see also Medina v. State, 418 P.3d 861, 864 (Alaska App. 2018) (recognizing that “probation revocations relate back to the underlying criminal offense, constituting ‘continuing punishment for the crime for which probation was originally imposed’ ” (quoting Demientieff v. State, 814 P.2d 745, 747 (Alaska App. 1991))).

32

Luepke, 765 P.2d at 991; see also Harris v. State, 980 P.2d 482, 487 (Alaska App. 1999) (“When deciding whether to revoke a defendant's probation and impose some or all of the defendant's previously suspended jail time, a judge must evaluate all of the circumstances of the case in light of the Chaney criteria.”); see generally Fletcher v. State, 532 P.3d 286, 310 (Alaska App. 2023) (“Sentencing courts are constitutionally required to consider the Chaney criteria when sentencing a criminal defendant under Alaska law.”).

33

Trumbly, 515 P.2d at 709.

34

See Toney, 785 P.2d at 903 (“Because a sentence imposed upon revocation of probation constitutes punishment for the defendant's original offense, the length of the sentence ultimately imposed must be appropriate to the nature and circumstances of the original offense. However, a defendant's poor performance on probation may constitute an exceptional circumstance justifying imposition of a sentence that would not have been appropriate in the first instance.” (citation omitted)).

35

Fletcher, 532 P.3d at 310 (citing Evans v. State, 574 P.2d 24, 26 (Alaska 1978)); see also Johnson v. State, 477 P.3d 665, 670 (Alaska App. 2020) (“Although the district court did not expressly discuss the Chaney factors, the court generally addressed the important circumstances of Johnson's cases.”).

36

Fletcher, 532 P.3d at 310 (stating that “in cases where the on-the-record sentencing explanation is inadequate or incomplete, the appellate courts have not hesitated to remand the case for further explanation and/or resentencing”); see generally Houston v. State, 648 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Alaska App. 1982) (explaining the benefits of a full explanation of the sentencing decision).

37

See Gilbert v. State, 706 P.2d 345, 347 (Alaska App. 1985) (holding that, where the court's imposition of the defendant's remaining suspended time was based solely on its conclusion that the defendant — who had twice absconded and committed new offenses while on probation — could not benefit from further probation, and the court did not explain its sentence by reference to the Chaney criteria, a remand was required to permit effective appellate review); see also Soroka v. State, 598 P.2d 69, 71-72 (Alaska 1979) (remanding for resentencing on a probation violation without addressing the issue of excessiveness where the appealed sentence was imposed without considering the nature of the original offense or the Chaney criteria and the relative weight of the different criteria).

End of Document