Browne v. United States

• Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 6, 2025
• Docket: 23-CF-0455
• Status: Published

Opinion

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 23-CF-0455

CLIFTON A. BROWNE, APPELLANT,

V.

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2021-CF1-006943)

(Hon. Marisa J. Demeo, Trial Judge)

(Argued October 8, 2024 Decided March 6, 2025)

Sean R. Day for appellant.

Peter F. Andrews, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Matthew M. Graves, United States Attorney at the time of argument, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Nicholas P. Coleman, and Dennis G. Clark, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before MCLEESE, DEAHL, and HOWARD, Associate Judges.

MCLEESE, Associate Judge: Appellant Clifton A. Browne challenges the trial

court’s pretrial ruling that the United States could use Mr. Browne’s prior

convictions in Maryland for second-degree assault to impeach Mr. Browne if he 2

testified at trial. We affirm the trial court’s ruling and therefore affirm Mr. Browne’s

conviction for voluntary manslaughter.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The evidence at trial included the following. Luther Brooks was renting the

basement unit of a house in the District of Columbia that was owned by Valerie

Mann. Ms. Mann was interested in selling her house, so she told Mr. Brooks that he

would need to vacate the unit, which caused some tension in their relationship.

Ms. Mann needed to do some work on the house before placing it on the market, so

she enlisted the help of her friend’s nephew, Mr. Browne. While discussing repairs

that needed to be done, Ms. Mann told Mr. Browne that Mr. Brooks had been

“dragging his feet” about vacating the unit. Believing that Mr. Brooks might be

taking advantage of Ms. Mann, Mr. Browne offered to talk with Mr. Brooks “man

to man.”

After Mr. Browne went down to the basement, a physical altercation broke

out between Mr. Browne and Mr. Brooks. Ms. Mann testified about the altercation

as follows. Mr. Browne knocked on the door to Mr. Brooks’s unit, and the two

began talking. Their voices escalated, and Ms. Mann heard shouting and cursing.

Mr. Browne kicked the closed door to Mr. Brooks’s unit, and then Mr. Brooks ran

out of the unit carrying a big stick. Mr. Brooks banged the stick into Mr. Browne’s 3

chest, which caused Mr. Browne to fall into the laundry room across from

Mr. Brooks’s unit. From there, Mr. Browne ran into Mr. Brooks’s unit, and the two

began physically fighting. Ms. Mann entered the unit, and she saw Mr. Browne

straddled on Mr. Brooks. Mr. Browne was repeatedly punching Mr. Brooks, and

Ms. Mann did not see Mr. Brooks fighting back. Ms. Mann attempted to pull

Mr. Browne off of Mr. Brooks, and Ms. Mann eventually got Mr. Browne to stand

up. Mr. Brooks, however, was unable to stand up and began to wobble while

speaking incoherently. Mr. Brooks was also bleeding from his nose. Ms. Mann then

went to retrieve her phone so that she could call 911 for an ambulance, while

Mr. Browne took Mr. Brooks outside for some air. As Ms. Mann was calling 911,

Mr. Brooks fell and hit his head on concrete.

Ms. Mann told the 911 operator that Mr. Brooks had fallen down six or seven

steps, was barely conscious, and was bleeding from his head. Ms. Mann did not

mention the altercation with Mr. Browne. Emergency medical personnel eventually

arrived and took Mr. Brooks to the emergency room for treatment. Police officers

also came to Ms. Mann’s home, and Ms. Mann did not mention the altercation to the

police, instead telling the police that Mr. Brooks had fallen. After Mr. Brooks was

taken to the hospital and the police had left, Mr. Browne cleaned up a few blood

stains that were left on the carpet in Mr. Brooks’s unit during the fight. 4

Mr. Brooks never regained consciousness after the altercation, and he was

taken off of life support approximately eleven days later. The medical examiner

concluded that the cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries to Mr. Brooks’s

head and neck that caused Mr. Brooks’s brain to swell and hemorrhage. Mr. Brooks

also suffered multiple blunt force injuries to his torso and ribs. The death was

classified as a homicide.

Mr. Browne spoke to the police at the scene of the incident, saying that

Mr. Brooks had fallen down the stairs. The police later recorded a phone interview

with Mr. Browne, who gave the following account of the altercation. Ms. Mann

entered her basement and knocked on the door to Mr. Brooks’s unit before placing

a key into the door. Mr. Brooks verbally responded in a combative manner that the

two should leave and then rushed out of the door swinging a stick. Mr. Browne

pushed Ms. Mann out of the way, but Mr. Brooks struck Mr. Browne with the stick,

knocking Mr. Browne to the ground. Mr. Browne stood up and entered

“self-defense mode” because he believed Mr. Brooks was trying to “kill” or “hurt”

him. The two started “rumbling,” moving from the entry further into the unit.

During the struggle, Mr. Browne “picked up” Mr. Brooks and “slammed him” to the

ground. Mr. Browne also hit Mr. Brooks with “body shot[s] and head shots” and at

one point got on top of Mr. Brooks and “beat[] him.” Mr. Browne eventually

“threw” Mr. Brooks outside at the direction of Ms. Mann, who had told Mr. Browne 5

that Mr. Brooks needed to “go.” Mr. Brooks hit a wall and did not get up from the

ground.

Mr. Browne was charged with second-degree murder. Before trial, the United

States filed a motion asking the trial court to rule that if Mr. Browne testified at trial,

he could be impeached with prior convictions in Maryland for second-degree assault.

The United States relied on D.C. Code § 14-305(b)(1), which (with exceptions not

applicable here) requires the trial court to admit evidence that a witness was

convicted of a criminal offense “punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of

one year under the law under which [the witness] was convicted.” The United States

further explained that second-degree assault in Maryland is punishable by more than

one year of imprisonment. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-203(b) (West 2015)

(authorizing punishment of up to ten years of imprisonment).

Mr. Browne objected, but the trial court ruled that Mr. Browne could be

impeached with the convictions at issue if he testified. Mr. Browne elected not to

testify at trial. The jury found Mr. Browne not guilty of second-degree murder but

guilty of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. 6

II. Analysis

Mr. Browne argues that the trial court erred by ruling that the United States

could use his Maryland convictions for second-degree assault to impeach his

credibility if he testified. As a threshold matter, the United States contends that

Mr. Browne forfeited this argument by electing not to testify. We need not address

the issue of forfeiture. Rather, we assume without deciding that Mr. Browne

properly preserved this argument, and we hold that the trial court correctly ruled that

Mr. Browne’s Maryland convictions for second-degree assault are impeachable

convictions under Section 14-305(b)(1).

“We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.” Lucas v. United

States, 240 A.3d 328, 335 (D.C. 2020). Generally, “we will give effect to the plain

meaning of a statute when the language is unambiguous and does not produce an

absurd result.” Yazam, Inc. v. D.C. Dep’t of For-Hire Vehicles, 310 A.3d 616, 623

(D.C. 2024) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “The plain meaning

of a statute may not be controlling, however, when there is a clearly expressed

legislative intention to the contrary.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “We

consider statutory context and structure, evident legislative purpose, and the

potential consequences of adopting a given interpretation.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). “We may also look to the legislative history to ensure that our 7

interpretation is consistent with legislative intent.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). “When interpreting statutes, we assume that the legislature acted logically

and rationally and we avoid interpretations of statutes which lead to implausible

results.” Wade v. United States, 173 A.3d 87, 95 (D.C. 2017) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

In pertinent part, Section 14-305(b)(1) provides that

for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted . . . if the criminal offense (A) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted . . . .

The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous: with exceptions not applicable

here, if a witness was convicted of a criminal offense that is punishable by more than

one year of imprisonment, that conviction is admissible in order to impeach the

witness’s credibility. Section 14-305(b)(1) is equally clear that to determine whether

a conviction was punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, courts must

look to “the law under which [the witness] was convicted.” Id. As we have noted,

in Maryland, second-degree assault is punishable by “imprisonment not exceeding

10 years.” Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-203(b). Thus, under the plain language

of Section 14-305(b)(1), Mr. Browne’s Maryland convictions for second-degree

assault are admissible for impeachment purposes. 8

Mr. Browne argues, however, that (1) Maryland convictions for

second-degree assault cannot be used to impeach witnesses under Maryland law;

(2) the Maryland offense of second-degree assault is equivalent to the offense of

simple assault in the District of Columbia, and convictions for the latter offense are

not impeachable under Section 14-305(b)(1); and (3) it therefore would be “absurd

and plainly unjust” to treat Maryland second-degree assault convictions as basis for

impeachment under Section 14-305(b)(1). The United States does not dispute the

first two steps in Mr. Browne’s argument, and we agree that Mr. Browne is correct

about those points. See Rosales v. State, 206 A.3d 916, 931 (Md. 2019) (explaining

that misdemeanor convictions for acts of violence such as assault are typically

inadmissible under Maryland Rule 5-609 because such “a conviction . . . is not

relevant to a witness’ credibility”); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-203(a) & (b)

(second-degree assault is misdemeanor and simply requires proof of assault); Ross

v. United States, 520 A.2d 1064, 1065 (D.C. 1987) (conviction in D.C. for “simple

assault . . . is not an impeachable offense” under Section 14-305(b)(1)). We

disagree, however, that it follows that it is absurd to treat Maryland second-degree

assault convictions as basis for impeachment under Section 14-305(b)(1).

Section 14-305(b)(1)’s plain terms reflect Congress’s choice to make the

question of whether a prior conviction can be used to impeach a witness in D.C.

Superior Court depend on a bright-line rule: the punishment available for the 9

conviction in the jurisdiction in which the conviction was imposed. Indeed, the

legislative history of Section 14-305(b)(1) indicates that Congress wanted to

overturn the approach reflected in Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (D.C.

Cir. 1965), which gave trial courts discretion over whether to allow impeachment by

prior conviction. H.R. Rep. No. 91-907, at 62-63 (1970). Finding the discretionary

rule “unworkable” and “inconsistent with the practice in the vast majority of other

jurisdictions,” Congress removed trial-court discretion and adopted a clear

bright-line rule. Id. at 63.

Because other jurisdictions take varying approaches to what types of

convictions can be used for impeachment, it necessarily follows from Congress’s

choice of a bright-line rule that sometimes a conviction can be used for impeachment

in Superior Court even though the conviction could not be used for impeachment

under the law of the jurisdiction in which the conviction was imposed. Similarly,

because jurisdictions vary as to the amount of punishment that may be imposed for

given conduct, it equally follows that sometimes a conviction from another

jurisdiction can be used for impeachment in Superior Court even though a conviction

in the District of Columbia for the same conduct could not be used for impeachment

in Superior Court. In other words, the points that Mr. Browne raises are not

absurdities that would warrant disregarding the plain language of

Section 14-305(b)(1). Rather, they are entirely predictable consequences of 10

Congress’s choice to adopt the bright-line rule. See generally, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of

Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 52 (2008) (Court “see[s] no

absurdity in reading [statute] as setting forth a simple, bright-line rule”; “[I]t is not

for us to substitute our view of policy for the legislation which has been passed by

Congress.”) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted); Delong v. Dep’t of

Health & Hum. Servs., 264 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Like all bright-line

rules, [25 U.S.C.] § 3207 is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, but the

imprecision of the statute does not make it unconstitutional”; Congress “could

rationally have concluded . . . that the expense and other difficulties of individual

determination justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule.”) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

As Mr. Browne notes, the House Committee Report relating to

Section 14-305(b)(1) does indicate that the Committee intended to preclude the

impeachment use “primarily” of convictions for misdemeanor crimes “of passion

and short temper, such as assault.” H.R. Rep. No. 91-907, at 62; Henson v. United

States, 399 A.2d 16, 20 (D.C. 1979) (Historically, “felony” was defined as “any

offense for which the maximum penalty . . . [was] imprisonment for more than one

year,” and “all other crimes [were] misdemeanors.”). If Congress had wanted to use

the categories of “felony” and “misdemeanor” as the dividing line for admissibility

of evidence of prior convictions, however, Congress would have used those terms in 11

the text of the statute. See Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. v Off. of Tax & Revenue, 308

A.3d 1205, 1210 (D.C. 2024) (“[T]he unambiguous text of the [statute] is strong

evidence that [Congress] intended to do precisely what that language says.”).

Instead, Congress chose a numerical cutoff, and “[i]t is not within the judicial

function to rewrite the statute.” Allman v. Snyder, 888 A.2d 1161, 1169 (D.C. 2005)

(internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).

“Normally, the plain language and ordinary meaning of a statute control.”

Booz Allen Hamilton, 308 A.3d at 1210 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The

burden on a litigant who seeks to disregard the plain meaning of the statute is a heavy

one.” Id. (brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted). We hold that

Mr. Browne has failed to carry that burden.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

So ordered.