UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
PATRICK W. BROWN CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 24-423
JASON R. WILLIAMS, ET AL. SECTION “R” (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the opposed1 Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss2 of Jason Williams, in his official capacity as Orleans Parish District Attorney. For the following reasons, the Court denies Williams’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the now vacated conviction of Patrick Brown by the Orleans Parish District Attorney (“OPDA”) for the aggravated rape of a minor. Brown sues the OPDA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting that the OPDA is liable for his wrongful conviction and imprisonment based on its unconstitutional policies, practices, and customs regarding the disclosure of exculpatory or favorable evidence to criminal defendants under Brady v.
1 R. Doc. 18. 2 R. Doc. 11. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).3 Williams now moves to dismiss Brown’s complaint, arguing that prosecutors acted for the State of Louisiana, not a
municipal entity, when establishing the office’s Brady policies, and therefore he cannot be found liable under Section 1983.4 The Court considers Williams’s motion below.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. The Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2009). But the Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
3 R. Doc. 20 ¶¶ 196-199. 4 R. Doc. 11. A legally sufficient complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the party’s claim is true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need
not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must go beyond “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” See id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, “[t]he complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as true) (3) to
raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.” Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257 (citations omitted). The claim must be dismissed if there are insufficient factual
allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must limit its review to the
contents of the pleadings, including attachments. Brand Coupon Network, L.L.C. v. Catalina Mktg. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014). The Court may also consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss or an opposition to that motion when the documents are referred to in the
pleadings and are central to a plaintiff’s claims. Id. “The district court ‘may also consider matters of which [it] may take judicial notice.’” Hall v. Hodgkins, 305 F. App’x 224, 227 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1996)).
III. DISCUSSION
Section 1983 authorizes suits for damages against any “person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Courts consider municipalities and other local government units to be “persons” for the purposes of Section 1983, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 & n. 54 (1978), but not “a State nor its officials,” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). “To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Peterson
v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs therefore may sue “those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989).
Brown argues that the OPDA is liable for its Brady policies, which led to prosecutors’ alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence in his case.5 In response, Williams contends that the Court must attribute the promulgation of the Brady policies not to the OPDA, but to the State of
Louisiana, which cannot be held liable under Section 1983.6 To determine which government entity is liable for the promulgation of a policy, courts must “ask whether governmental officials are final
policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue,” based on “the actual function of [the] government official” defined “under relevant state law.” McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 784 (1997). The Fifth Circuit has already answered the question at issue and held
that a Louisiana district attorney acts on behalf of his office as a local governmental entity, not the State of Louisiana, when failing to enact constitutionally sufficient Brady policies. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 468 (5th Cir. 1999).
5 R. Doc. 20 ¶¶ 169-179, 247-260. 6 See R. Doc. 11. In Burge, the Fifth Circuit outlined the analysis set forth in McMillian and performed an “analysis of state law” to determine whether the St.
Tammany Parish District Attorney was a “policymaker[] for the local government” or the state with respect to the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. 187 F.3d at 468 (citing McMillian at 784).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
PATRICK W. BROWN CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 24-423
JASON R. WILLIAMS, ET AL. SECTION “R” (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the opposed1 Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss2 of Jason Williams, in his official capacity as Orleans Parish District Attorney. For the following reasons, the Court denies Williams’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the now vacated conviction of Patrick Brown by the Orleans Parish District Attorney (“OPDA”) for the aggravated rape of a minor. Brown sues the OPDA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting that the OPDA is liable for his wrongful conviction and imprisonment based on its unconstitutional policies, practices, and customs regarding the disclosure of exculpatory or favorable evidence to criminal defendants under Brady v.
1 R. Doc. 18. 2 R. Doc. 11. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).3 Williams now moves to dismiss Brown’s complaint, arguing that prosecutors acted for the State of Louisiana, not a
municipal entity, when establishing the office’s Brady policies, and therefore he cannot be found liable under Section 1983.4 The Court considers Williams’s motion below.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. The Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2009). But the Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
3 R. Doc. 20 ¶¶ 196-199. 4 R. Doc. 11. A legally sufficient complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the party’s claim is true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need
not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must go beyond “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” See id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, “[t]he complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as true) (3) to
raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.” Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257 (citations omitted). The claim must be dismissed if there are insufficient factual
allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must limit its review to the
contents of the pleadings, including attachments. Brand Coupon Network, L.L.C. v. Catalina Mktg. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014). The Court may also consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss or an opposition to that motion when the documents are referred to in the
pleadings and are central to a plaintiff’s claims. Id. “The district court ‘may also consider matters of which [it] may take judicial notice.’” Hall v. Hodgkins, 305 F. App’x 224, 227 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1996)).
III. DISCUSSION
Section 1983 authorizes suits for damages against any “person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Courts consider municipalities and other local government units to be “persons” for the purposes of Section 1983, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 & n. 54 (1978), but not “a State nor its officials,” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). “To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Peterson
v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs therefore may sue “those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989).
Brown argues that the OPDA is liable for its Brady policies, which led to prosecutors’ alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence in his case.5 In response, Williams contends that the Court must attribute the promulgation of the Brady policies not to the OPDA, but to the State of
Louisiana, which cannot be held liable under Section 1983.6 To determine which government entity is liable for the promulgation of a policy, courts must “ask whether governmental officials are final
policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue,” based on “the actual function of [the] government official” defined “under relevant state law.” McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 784 (1997). The Fifth Circuit has already answered the question at issue and held
that a Louisiana district attorney acts on behalf of his office as a local governmental entity, not the State of Louisiana, when failing to enact constitutionally sufficient Brady policies. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 468 (5th Cir. 1999).
5 R. Doc. 20 ¶¶ 169-179, 247-260. 6 See R. Doc. 11. In Burge, the Fifth Circuit outlined the analysis set forth in McMillian and performed an “analysis of state law” to determine whether the St.
Tammany Parish District Attorney was a “policymaker[] for the local government” or the state with respect to the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. 187 F.3d at 468 (citing McMillian at 784). The court considered provisions of the Louisiana Constitution now cited by Williams7 that state
“that a district attorney has charge of every criminal prosecution by the State in his district, and is the representative of the State before, and legal advisor to, the grand jury.” Id. at 469 (citing La. Const. art. 5, § 26). It also looked
to Louisiana statutes describing the powers and duties of a district attorney, as well as case law on the liability of a local governmental entity for the torts of its employees. Id. at 469-70. Additionally, the court considered that the district attorney is an autonomous local governmental official and not
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 469. The Fifth Circuit concluded that “in a suit against a district attorney in his official capacity under § 1983 for constitutional torts caused by the district attorney’s policies regarding the acquisition, security, and disclosure of Brady material, a
victory for the plaintiff imposes liability on the district attorney’s office as an independent local entity.” Id. at 470. This precedent controls here.
7 R. Doc. 11-1 at 10. Williams argues that the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Daves v. Dallas County, 22 F.4th 522, 532 (5th Cir. 2002), overrules Burge, and that
Daves and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Arnone v. Dallas County, 29 F.4th 262, 266 (5th Cir. 2022), indicate that the OPDA was acting for the state with respect to the adoption of its Brady policies. He argues that these cases rejected the application of factors such as Eleventh Amendment immunity,
vicarious liability, and the autonomy of the office that were considered in Burge. 8 See Daves, 22 F.4th at 540-41; Arnone, 29 F.4th at 269-70. But neither Daves nor Arnone purports to overturn Burge, and “[a]n ‘en banc’
decision cannot overturn a binding published panel decision unless it does so clearly.” United States v. Lamartiniere, 100 F. 4th 625, 640 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Vega, 960 F.3d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 2020). Although Williams asserts that these decisions have “undermined” Burge so
that it is no longer controls,9 this Court cannot refuse to follow binding Fifth Circuit precedent on the grounds that another case “abrogated” or “implicitly overruled it.” In re Bonvillian Marine Serv. Inc., 19 F.4th 787, 789 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that a district court correctly considered itself bound by a
Fifth Circuit precedent, despite an intervening change in the law).
8 R. Doc. 11-1 at 19. 9 Id. at 16-17. Moreover, Burge, Daves, and Arnone all purport to conduct the same McMillian analysis of state law. See Arnone, 29 F.4th at 267 (noting that the
Daves opinion “clarifies how to attribute a policymaker’s actions under McMillian”). Daves and Arnone did not create a new analysis. Further, Daves and Arnone inquired into substantively different policies and state laws than those at issue in Burge. In Daves, an en banc Fifth Circuit held
that Dallas County district and county judges acted on behalf of Texas, not Dallas County, when they set bail schedules. 22 F.4th at 540-41. Likewise, in Arnone, a Fifth Circuit panel held that Texas district attorneys acted on
behalf of the state when they set policies regarding when to seek revocation of probation or deferred adjudication. 29 F.4th at 269-70. Neither ruling examined policies involving the acquisition, security, and disclosure of Brady materials, as considered in Burge. Moreover, McMillian made clear
that the relevant analysis is state law specific. See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 782 (“[T]he question is . . . whom [officials] represent in a particular area or on a particular issue . . . [which] is dependent on the definition of the official’s function under relevant state law.” (emphasis added)). As neither ruling addressed what Louisiana law provides with respect to district attorneys making Brady policies, they do not require rejection of Burge.10
As six other sections of the Eastern District of Louisiana have already held, neither Daves nor Arnone abrogates the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Burge on the attribution of a Louisiana district attorney’s Brady policies. See Dent v. Williams, No. 23-3104, 2024 WL 4188521, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Sept. 13,
2024) (Long, J.); Williams v. Williams, No. 23-1922, 2023 WL 6160990, at *2-4 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2023) (Africk, J.); Jones v. Williams, No. 22-5097, 2023 WL 3211865, at *3-4 (E.D. La. May 2, 2023) (Ashe, J.); Reeder v.
Williams, No. 22-4614, 2023 WL 2771481, at *2-3 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2023) (Zainey, J.); Floyd v. Dillman, 659 F. Supp. 3d 724, 728-29 (E.D. La. 2023) (Milazzo, J.); Smith v. Williams, No. 22-1550, 2023 WL 2263841, at *6-10 (E.D. La. Feb. 28, 2023) (Brown, C.J.). The Brady policies underlying
Brown’s Section 1983 claim are attributable to the OPDA “as an independent local entity,” 187 F.3d at 470, not to the State of Louisiana. The Court therefore denies Williams’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
10 Indeed, in a recent, unpublished decision of the Fifth Circuit, the panel cited the decision in Burge with approval for the proposition that “‘[f]or purposes of “official capacity” suits under § 1983, the district attorney’s office resembles other local government entities.’” Kimble v. Jefferson Par. Sheriff’s Off., 2023 WL 1793876, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 7 2023) (quoting Burge, 187 F.3d at 470). IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Williams’s motion to dismiss.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this_28th_ day of October, 2024. Lernk Varese. SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE