Brown v. The City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 17, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-05924
StatusUnknown

This text of Brown v. The City of New York (Brown v. The City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. The City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ARTHUR LAMAR BROWN, Plaintiff, 23-CV-5924 (JGLC) -against- ORDER OF SERVICE THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants. JESSICA G. L. CLARKE, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently detained at the North Infirmary Command (“NIC”) on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights and his rights under state law. By order dated August 14, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court (1) requests that the named defendants waive service of summons; (2) directs the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”) to assist Plaintiff in identifying the Doe defendants; (3) orders Plaintiff to show cause, within 30 days of the day of this order, why his claims arising from events occurring before June 30, 2020, should be not dismissed as time-barred; and (4) denies Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief without prejudice to renewal at a later time. DISCUSSION A. Waiver of Service The Clerk of Court is directed to notify the New York City Department of Correction and the New York City Law Department of this order. The Court requests that the following

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Defendants waive service of summons: (1) the City of New York; (2) NIC Warden (or former Warden) Ronald Miller; (3) Captain Moses #1881; (4) Correction Officer Mohamed #7586; (5) Correction Officer Omer #16031; (6) Correction Officer Porter #7592; (7) Correction Officer Wu #11367; (8) Correction Officer Kendall #9028; (9) Correction Officer Mendelsohn #17787;

(10) Adjudication Captain Vasquez #404; and (11) Chief of Security Charlton Lemon. B. Valentin Order Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the district court in identifying a defendant. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). In the complaint, Plaintiff supplies sufficient information to permit DOC to identify the three Jane Doe Adjudication Captains who presided over Plaintiff’s administrative hearings on the dates provided in the complaint. It is therefore ordered that the New York City Law Department, which is the attorney for and agent of DOC, must ascertain the identity and badge number of each Jane Doe whom Plaintiff seeks to sue here and the address where the defendant may be served.2 The Law Department must provide this information to Plaintiff and the Court within 60 days of the date of this order. Within 30 days of receiving this information, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint

naming the Jane Doe defendants. The amended complaint will replace, not supplement, the original complaint. An amended complaint form that Plaintiff should complete is attached to this order. Once Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint, the Court will screen the amended complaint and, if necessary, issue an order asking the newly named defendants to waive service.

2 If the Doe defendant is a current or former DOC employee or official, the Law Department should note in the response to this order that an electronic request for a waiver of service can be made under the e-service agreement for cases involving DOC defendants, rather than by personal service at a DOC facility. If the Doe defendant is not a current or former DOC employee or official, but otherwise works or worked at a DOC facility, the Law Department must provide a residential address where the individual may be served. C. Timeliness In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from events that occurred between May 2019 and the present. It appears that some of Plaintiff’s claims are time- barred. The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d

76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013). Plaintiff filed this action when he placed the complaint into the prison mailing system on June 20, 2023. See Walker v. Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560, 562-64 (2d Cir. 2005) (under the prison mailbox rule, a motion is deemed filed when it is given to prison officials for mailing). Plaintiff’s claims arising from events occurring before June 30, 2020, are therefore untimely. The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court, “under compelling circumstances, [to] make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations in order ‘to prevent inequity.’” In re U.S.

Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The statute of limitations may be equitably tolled, for example, when a defendant fraudulently conceals from a plaintiff the fact that the plaintiff has a cause of action, or when the plaintiff is induced by the defendant to forego a lawsuit until the statute of limitations has expired. See Pearl, 296 F.3d at 82-83. In addition, New York law provides that where a person “is under a disability because of . . . insanity at the time the cause of action accrues,” the applicable statute of limitations will be tolled. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208; Gardner v. Wansart, No. 05-CV-3351, 2006 WL 2742043, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2006) (although mental illness is on its own insufficient for equitable tolling purposes, tolling is appropriate if a plaintiff is insane at the time the cause of action accrues and is “unable to protect [his] legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society”). New York also provides by statute for other circumstances in which a limitations period may be tolled. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 204(a) (where commencement of an action has been stayed by court order), id. at § 204 (where a dispute has been submitted to arbitration but is ultimately determined to be non-

arbitrable), id. at § 207(3) (defendant is outside New York at the time the claim accrues), id. at § 208 (plaintiff is disabled by infancy or insanity), id. at § 210 (death of plaintiff or defendant). Plaintiff does not provide any facts suggesting that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled in this case. Because the failure to file an action within the limitations period is an affirmative defense, a plaintiff is generally not required to plead that the case is timely filed. See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Brown v. The City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-the-city-of-new-york-nysd-2023.