Brown v. Sherry

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedMay 9, 2025
Docket25-6018
StatusUnpublished

This text of Brown v. Sherry (Brown v. Sherry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Sherry, (10th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-6018 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 05/09/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 9, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court FRANKIE JOE BROWN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 25-6018 (D.C. No. 5:24-CV-00916-R) FNU SHERRY; FNU WESTBROOKS; (W.D. Okla.) K. GOLDEY,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Frankie Joe Brown, a federal inmate, filed a pro se complaint against

federal officers, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights under

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403

U.S. 388 (1971). 1 The magistrate judge granted Brown’s motion to proceed in

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 Because Brown proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his filings, but we do not serve as his advocate. See United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (footnote continued) Appellate Case: 25-6018 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 05/09/2025 Page: 2

forma pauperis (IFP) and ordered him to pay an initial partial filing fee. Brown

failed to pay the fee and the magistrate judge recommended that the complaint

be dismissed. The district court accepted the recommendation and dismissed the

complaint without prejudice. After the district court entered final judgment,

Brown filed a motion requesting appointment of counsel and for the district

court to send his case to the appeals court. The district court denied his motion

and Brown timely filed a notice of appeal. Brown also filed a motion in the

district court to proceed IFP on appeal, which the district court denied because

it found the appeal was not taken in good faith under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Brown now appeals the district court’s order denying him counsel and

requests leave to proceed IFP. Exercising our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, we deny Brown’s request to proceed IFP and affirm the district court’s

dismissal.

BACKGROUND

In the district court, Brown alleged that staff members at a federal

correctional institution provided him inadequate medical care in violation of

the Eighth Amendment. The magistrate judge granted Brown’s motion to

proceed IFP and held that he was not required to fully prepay the $350 filing

(10th Cir. 2009). Though the district-court docket identified Brown’s claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which applies to state actors, his complaint appears to asset claims against federal defendants only. So his claims are brought under Bivens. See Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1127 n.1 (10th Cir. 2001). 2 Appellate Case: 25-6018 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 05/09/2025 Page: 3

fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). But pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the

magistrate judge held that Brown was still required to pay the $350 filing fee in

installments, with an initial $28.84 payment due within the month. At Brown’s

request, the magistrate judge extended the deadline for the initial payment by a

month. Brown failed to pay the fee by the extended deadline.

The magistrate judge entered a report recommending that the district

court dismiss Brown’s complaint without prejudice for failure to pay the initial

payment and for failure to comply with the court’s orders. Brown timely

objected, arguing that the merits of his claims outweighed his failure to pay the

initial payment. The district court overruled Brown’s objections, adopted the

report and recommendation, and dismissed Brown’s complaint without

prejudice for failure to pay the initial payment and failure to comply with court

orders.

Brown moved for appointment of counsel or, in the alternative, for the

district court to send his case to the appeals court. 2 The district court denied the

motion. Brown timely appealed. Brown also moved to proceed IFP on appeal,

which the district court denied, reasoning that Brown “ha[d] not presented a

reasoned, nonfrivolous” argument on the issues he intends to appeal. R. vol. I,

at 51.

2 Though not included in the record on appeal, we may take judicial notice of docket information from the district court. See Bunn v. Perdue, 966 F.3d 1094, 1096 n.4 (10th Cir. 2020); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). 3 Appellate Case: 25-6018 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 05/09/2025 Page: 4

DISCUSSION

Brown’s notice of appeal says he appeals only the district court’s January

23, 2025 order denying him counsel. But his opening brief discusses the merits

of his complaint and makes no mention of his failure to pay the initial partial

filing fee. Because Brown has presented no persuasive argument or authority

that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint for his failure to pay the

initial partial filing fee and for his failure to comply with court orders, we

affirm the dismissal of his complaint. See Bronson v. Swensen, 509 F.3d 1099,

1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments

that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant’s opening

brief.”).

We next turn to Brown’s IFP motion. Pursuant to § 1915(a)(3) “[a]n

appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing

that it is not taken in good faith.” The district court found that Brown’s appeal

was not taken in good faith because he failed to present a nonfrivolous

argument on the issues he intends to appeal. So the district court denied his

motion to proceed IFP on appeal and, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate

Produce 24(a)(4)(A), notified the parties and this court of its decision. Though

§ 1915(a)(3) uses mandatory language to deny the availability of an IFP appeal

after a district court has certified that the appeal is not taken in good faith,

we’ve held that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5) still permits us to

consider a motion to proceed IFP on appeal. Rolland v. Primesource Staffing,

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Related

Kinnell v. Graves
265 F.3d 1125 (Tenth Circuit, 2001)
United States v. Pinson
584 F.3d 972 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Rolland v. Primesource Staffing, L.L.C.
497 F.3d 1077 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Pease v. Raemisch
673 F. App'x 877 (Tenth Circuit, 2016)

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