Brown v. Ross

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedJune 14, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-00030
StatusUnknown

This text of Brown v. Ross (Brown v. Ross) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Ross, (E.D. Mo. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION ROBERT BROWN, ) . Plaintiff, . v. No. 1:22-cv-00030-SNLJ JOE ROSS, et al., Defendants. □

. ‘ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Robert Brown for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 2). Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court has determined that plaintiff lacks sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee, and will assess an initial partial filing fee of $3.10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will order plaintiff to file an amended complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the eenen is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly

payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id. oy In support of his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, plaintiff has submitted a copy of his certified inmate account statement. (Docket No. 5). The account statement shows an average monthly deposit of $15.50. The Court will therefore assess an initial partial filing fee of $3.10, which is 20 percent of plaintiff's average monthly deposit. Legal Standard on Initial Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim under 42 'U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial-experience and common sense. Jd. at 679. The must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not-legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8" Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8 Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should

construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8" Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8 Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8'" Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint’). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). The Complaint Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at the Eastern Reception, Diagnostic, and Correctional Center in Bonne Terre, Missouri. He brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference while he was an inmate at the Mississippi County Detention Center. His complaint names Jail Administrator Joe Ross and Nurse Amy Ross as defendants. (Docket No. 1 at 2-3). They are sued in both their individual and official capacities. According to plaintiff, defendants are married. (Docket No. 1 at 5). In the “Statement of Claim,” plaintiff asserts that “[i]n the month of July [he] happened to cut [his] finger on the sink while washing a bowl in D-Pod in the county jail.” (Docket No. 1 at 3). He states that he “requested to see the nurse several times to take care” of his “minor injury,” but was “denied multiple times by Amy Ross to treat the cut.” Eventually, plaintiff “received basic A&D ointment from her.” Despite the ointment, he alleges that the “small cut on [his] finger got

3.

infected with [MRSA]” and a staph infection, “which led to the amputation of [his] fingertip.” Plaintiff concludes that this “could have been prevented” had he received “proper [and] adequate medical attention.” (Docket No. 1 at 4), With regard to Jail Administrator Ross, plaintiff states that at some time between July 7 and uly 16, 2021, he was in his “cell in A-Pod in [the] Mississippi County Detention Center.” His cell door was secure, and he was “reading from [his] Bible.” Plaintiff claims that Ross came “out of nowhere,” ran up the stairs to plaintiff's cell, opened plaintiff's cell door, and pointed the taser at him. Ross demanded that plaintiff give him the Bible, but plaintiff refused.

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Brown v. Ross, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-ross-moed-2022.