Brown v. Peckman

3 P.3d 1210, 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 3929, 2000 Colo. LEXIS 821, 2000 WL 870821
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
DecidedJuly 3, 2000
DocketNos. 00SA194, 00SA197
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 3 P.3d 1210 (Brown v. Peckman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Peckman, 3 P.3d 1210, 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 3929, 2000 Colo. LEXIS 821, 2000 WL 870821 (Colo. 2000).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

These consolidated ballot title review proceedings both pertain to a proposed initiative concerning the labeling of genetically engineered foods. The petitioners are registered electors who brought these original proceedings pursuant to section 1-40-107(2), 1 C.R.S. (1999), to review the actions taken by the initiative title setting board (the Board) in fixing the title, ballot title and submission clause ("titles"), and summary (collectively, [1212]*1212"titles and summary") 1 for Initiative 1900-00 # 265 (the Initiative).2

On May 5, 2000, the proponents of the Initiative, Jeff Peckman, Patricia West, and Randall MacKenzie, filed a draft of the Initiative with the Secretary of State's Office. The Initiative proposed to amend article 5 to title 25 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, by adding a new Part 12, consisting of sections 25-5-1201 to -1209, entitled "Labeling of Genetically Engineered Foods." The Board initially set the titles and summary following a hearing on May 17, 2000. Larry Schild and Thomas Kerbs, the petitioners in No. filed a motion for rehearing on May 24, 2000. The petitioners in No. 00SA194, Richard Brown and Mary Lou Chapman, filed a motion for rehearing on the same day. The Board heard the motions on May 26, 2000, made technical corrections to the text of the Initiative, and granted the motions in part and dered them in part.

Petitioners Schild and Kerbs assert that the Initiative contains more than one subject; that the titles and the summary are misleading because they do not address how the proposed measure affects the general assembly's power to legislate in the area of genetically engineered foods; that the titles and the summary are misleading because they do not accurately describe the types of food that must be labeled; and that the summary does not contain all of the changes that were made to it at the May 26 rehearing. Brown and Chapman contend that the summary is misleading because it omits one of two classes of food that the Initiative would require to be labeled, and that the summary is also misleading because it describes the labeling requirement for foods in which the composition or nutritional value is "significantly altered," while the Initiative says "measurably altered."

We conclude that the Initiative contains but a single subject, and that the titles and summary are not misleading.

I.

Petitioners Schild and Kerbs assert that the Board should not have set the titles and summary because the Initiative contains multiple subjects, and therefore violates article V, section 1(5.5) of the Colorado Constitution, which states:

No measure shall be proposed by petition containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject shall be embraced in any measure which shall not be expressed in the title, such measure shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed. If a measure contains more than one subject, such that a ballot title cannot be fixed that clearly expresses a single subject, no title shall be set and the measure shall not be submitted to the people for adoption or rejection at the polls.

Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(5.5); see also § 1-40-106.5, 1 C.R.S. (1999) (addressing the constitutional single-subject requirement). A proposed initiative violates this requirement when it "relate[s] to more than one subject and ... has at least two distinct and separate purposes which are not dependent upon or connected with each other." In re Proposed Initiative "Public Rights In Waters II", 898 P.2d 1076, 1078-79 (Colo.1995). But a proposed measure that "tends to effect or to carry out one general objective or purpose presents only one subject." In re 1999-2000 # 25, 974 P.2d 458, 463 (Colo.1999). We conclude that the proposed measure in this case contains a single subject, which is the labeling of genetically engineered food.

Schild and Kerbs contend that the Initiative contains a second, distinct subject, in that section 25-5-1209 of the measure attempts to limit the power of the general assembly to legislate in the area of genetically engineered foods. Proposed section 25-5-1209 states:

25-5-1209-Revisions of this law. The voters of Colorado authorize the general assembly to make changes consistent with the intent of this law so long as the changes further the purpose of this part.

The petitioners argue that section 1209 was intended to "prevent the General Assem[1213]*1213bly from enacting any laws that are in any way inconsistent with the purposes of [the Initiative] or which do not further its purpose.'" They assert that this constitutes tampering with the powers of an "independent constitutional body," and such tampering was held to constitute a separate subject in In re 1999-2000 #104, 987 P.2d 249, 257 (Colo.1999). According to the petitioners, such tampering "represents a fundamental rewrite of Art. V, § 1 [of the Colorado Constitution], and an overhaul of the present demarcation of powers and responsibilities as between the General Assembly and the voters."

The proposed constitutional amendment in In re # 104 would have changed the qualifications that were necessary for persons to hold judicial office. However, the measure would also have altered the powers of the Commission on Judicial Discipline, and we held, as we had held with respect to previous versions of the measure, that this constituted a second subject because the Commission "'is an independent constitutional body whose members are not "judicial officers." '" Id. (quoting In re Proposed Initiative for 1997-1998 #64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1199-1200 (Colo.1998)).

We are mindful of our limited role in ballot title proceedings. In general, we will not interpret or construe the future legal effects of a proposed initiative. See In re 1999-2000 #200A, 992 P.2d 27, 30 (Colo.2000). However, to accept the petitioners' argument, we would have to conclude that a statute, even if approved by the electorate, cannot override the Colorado Constitution. It is legally impossible for a statute to effect an "overhaul of the present demarcation of powers and responsibilities as between the General Assembly and the voters." On the other hand, the initiative in In re # 104 was a proposed constitutional amendment and did seek to alter the powers of a constitutional body. In re #104 is therefore distinguishable.

Accordingly, the Board was well within its discretion when it accepted the proponents' contention that section 1209 was not intended as a separate subject, but was a purely pree-atory provision intended to impress the general assembly with the seriousness of the matter. We therefore conclude that the Initiative includes but a single-subject.

IL

All of the petitioners allege that the titles and the summary are misleading and do not correctly and fairly express the Initiative's true intent and meaning. Section 1-40-106(8)(b), 1 C.R.S. (1999) provides:

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Bluebook (online)
3 P.3d 1210, 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 3929, 2000 Colo. LEXIS 821, 2000 WL 870821, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-peckman-colo-2000.