Brown v. Kansas City Police Department

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedOctober 26, 2022
Docket4:20-cv-00920
StatusUnknown

This text of Brown v. Kansas City Police Department (Brown v. Kansas City Police Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Kansas City Police Department, (W.D. Mo. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI WESTERN DIVISION

GLEANICE BROWN, ) LATONDRA MOORE, and ) TAMARA SOLOMON, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) Case No. 4:20-CV-00920-DGK v. ) ) KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI BOARD ) OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS, ) BY AND THROUGH ITS MEMBERS, ) DON WAGNER, MARK TOLBERT, ) CATHY DEAN, NATHAN GARRETT ) AND QUINTON LUCAS, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY DISPUTES Plaintiffs are three female African-Americans who were formerly detectives in the Crimes Against Children Unit (“CAC”) of the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department (“KCPD”). They allege their immediate supervisors in the unit discriminated against them on the basis of their race, age, and gender, and the KCPD discriminated against them in how it punished them for alleged procedure and policy violations in the CAC. They are suing the Kansas City, Missouri, Board of Police Commissioners by and through its various members (collectively “Defendant BOPC” or “Defendant”), under various federal civil rights laws for discrimination, retaliation, and harassment based on race, age, and gender. Now before the Court are numerous long-running discovery disputes the parties have been unable to resolve without the Court’s intervention. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ requests for relief are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Additionally, as explained in the conclusion section of this order, the Court directs the parties to carefully comply with the letter and the spirit of the rules of discovery. Failure to do so may result in sanctions under Rule 11, Rule 26(g), Rule 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, or the Court’s inherent authority.

Background These disputes initially covered an enormous number of topics, including Plaintiffs’ collective request to have all of Defendant’s objections to Plaintiffs’ interrogatories waived because Defendant inadvertently late-served its responses,1 forty-six of Plaintiff Solomon’s fifty- seven requests for production of documents (“RFP”), nineteen of Solomon’s twenty-one initial interrogatories, and a comparable number of interrogatories and RFPs involving the other two Plaintiffs. After repeated re-briefing of the issues and prodding by the Court to resolve these issues without its intervention, the parties managed to narrow down the issues somewhat for the Court to consider in a discovery dispute teleconference with the parties. In its last order, after once again encouraging the parties to resolve at least some of these

issues on their own, the Court issued specific instructions on how any remaining issues should be briefed. The Court instructed any party wishing to raise a remaining discovery issuing to file a memorandum that identifies by separately numbered paragraph each outstanding interrogatory and/or request for production by number that remains in dispute; (2) explains in detail with pinpoint citation to relevant legal authority (preferably 8th Circuit caselaw) why the opposing party’s response to that particular interrogatory or request for

1 The late responses were due to an administrative oversight; once the mistake was brought to Defense counsels’ attention, the interrogatory responses were served that same day. Finding good cause for the delay, the Court excused the violation.

2 production is insufficient; and (3) states the specific relief sought. The disputed request or response should be attached to the memo as an exhibit.

Order Re Disc. Disputes and Scheduling Order at 4, ECF No. 79. These directions were identical to those given in the Court’s previous order. ECF No. 63. Plaintiffs’ counsel subsequently filed three memorandum, one for each Plaintiff. ECF Nos. 80 (Plaintiff Brown), 81 (Plaintiff Moore), and 82 (Plaintiff Solomon). Portions of all three memos, however, do not comply with the Court’s very specific instructions on how to identify and brief these issues. Defendant filed a single consolidated memorandum in response, which largely complied with the Court’s instructions. ECF No. 83. After reviewing the parties’ filings at length, the Court determined a teleconference with the parties would serve no useful purpose and decided to rule on the existing record, as the Court previously advised the parties it might do. Analysis I. Any relief sought by Plaintiffs with respect to Defendant’s RFP responses is denied. As a threshold matter, to the extent Plaintiffs are seeking any relief related to their RFPs, it is denied. The Court cannot tell if Plaintiffs are requesting the Court order Defendant to provide additional documents in response to Plaintiffs’ RFPs. Each of Plaintiffs’ discovery dispute memos complain that “Defendant BOPC still has not provided adequate responses to . . . the requests for production of documents,” and “the documents requested by the plaintiffs in the RFPs

are needed in order to investigate her discrimination and retaliation claims.” Brown Mem. at 1, Moore Mem. at 1, Solomon Mem. at 1 (each memo is worded identically). Additionally, 3 throughout Plaintiffs’ discussion of Defendant’s interrogatory responses, Plaintiffs complain about Defendant’s responses to their requests for production, asserting “Defendant failed to show specifically how each request for production is not relevant . . .” See, e.g., Moore’s Mem. at 3- 10 (repeating the quoted phrase 19 times). Plaintiffs, however, have not identified a single RFP

response as still being in dispute. Thus, the Court has no idea whether any RFPs are still in dispute, or if the complaints in Plaintiffs’ briefs about Defendant’s RFP answers are vestigial remnants from earlier briefs. In any event, the Court holds that if there are any outstanding disputes concerning Plaintiffs’ RFPs, Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the Court’s order to specifically identify any RFP that is in dispute, and so any request for relief concerning Defendant’s response to an RFP is denied. II. The relief sought with respect to Plaintiffs’ interrogatories is granted in part. The Court begins its analysis with a few observations. A. Defendant’s answers use impermissible boilerplate objections extensively.

At the outset, the Court notes Defendant has used impermissible “boilerplate” objections extensively. By “boilerplate objection,” the Court means an objection that “merely states the legal grounds for the objection without (1) specifying how the discovery request is deficient and (2) specifying how the objecting party would be harmed if it were forced to respond to the request.” Smash Technology, LLC v. Smash Solutions, LLC, 335 F.R.D. 438, 441 (D. Utah 2020). For example, an objection that asserts a request is “overly broad” or “irrelevant” without explaining why is a boilerplate objection. Id. Such objections “are taglines, completely devoid of any

4 individualized factual analysis,” which are often “used repetitively in response to multiple discovery requests.” Id. The most obvious problem with these objections is that they violate the requirement in the Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery “that ‘the grounds for objecting’ be ‘stated with

specificity’ as to interrogatories and that objections to document requests be ‘state[d] with specificity . . . including the reasons.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (governing interrogatory objections) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) (governing requests for production of documents)). The Court acknowledges that the use of “boilerplate” objections is painfully widespread in litigation, particularly “scorched earth” litigation where the strategy is to drive-up the opposing party’s litigation costs.

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Brown v. Kansas City Police Department, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-kansas-city-police-department-mowd-2022.