Brown v. Grand Hotel Eden

214 F. Supp. 2d 335, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7773, 2002 WL 826818
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 29, 2002
Docket00 CIV. 7346(NRB)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 214 F. Supp. 2d 335 (Brown v. Grand Hotel Eden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Grand Hotel Eden, 214 F. Supp. 2d 335, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7773, 2002 WL 826818 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

BUCHWALD, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, H. Harding Brown and Roberta Brown, sue defendants Grand Hotel Eden — A Summit Hotel (“Hotel Eden”), Summit Hotels and Resorts (“Summit Hotels”), Prima Hotels, HRI Company, Rez-solutions, Inc., Pegasus Solutions, Inc., and other unnamed parties for injuries suffered by Mrs. Brown while staying at Hotel Eden, located in Lugano, Switzerland. Hotel Eden moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction or for forum non conveniens. For the reasons discussed below, Hotel Eden’s motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Hotel Eden is an independently owned and operated hotel in Lugano, Switzerland. It is also part of the Summit Hotels group of independent hotels that have affiliated for advertising and reservation purposes. Hotel Eden appears on the Summit Hotels website, www.summithotels.com, on which customers can make and confirm reservations for all Summit Hotels. Formerly, Hotel Eden was part of the Prima Hotels group, a similar organization. Hotel Eden also maintains its own website, www.eden-lugano.ch, which enables users to request room and rate information, but which requires the customer to send a return email or fax in order to confirm the reservation.

Plaintiffs made their reservation through a travel agency, Creative Travel Services, Inc., which made the reservation at Hotel Eden with Travel Bound, Inc., a travel wholesaler based in New York, New York. Plaintiffs received a voucher from Travel Bound indicating that they had a fully paid booking. Pulver Decl. ¶ 4. Travel Bound was able to make and confirm the reservations without having to contact Hotel Eden. Id. at ¶ 3. Travel Bound is an affiliate of Gulliver’s Travel Agency (“Gulliver’s”) 1 , located in the United Kingdom, with whom plaintiffs aver Hotel Eden has a rate contract agreement that gives Gulliver’s the right to make and confirm reservations at Hotel Eden. Hotel Eden has denied that it has any relationship with Travel Bound, nor any knowledge of Travel Bound’s relationship with Gulliver’s Travel Agency, though it does state that it *338 does occasionally enter into agreements with Gulliver’s to fill allotments of rooms. Reply Aff. Ex. A, Cert, of Dante Somensi-ni, ¶ 3-5.

On October 4,1999, the first night of her stay at Hotel Eden, Mrs. Brown tripped and fell on a raised step at the entrance to the ladies’ room in Hotel Eden’s restaurant. Plaintiffs allege Mrs. Brown did not see the step because it was improperly lit. Mrs. Brown suffered a fractured hip and required surgery. Plaintiffs have brought suit for damages to Mrs. Brown in the amount of one million dollars and for damages to Mr. Brown for loss of society, companionship, and services in the amount of $100,000. The parties conducted discovery for purposes of determining jurisdiction, at the conclusion of which Hotel Eden moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conve-niens.

DISCUSSION

1. Personal Jurisdiction

In a diversity action, personal jurisdiction is determined by the law of the state in which the Court sits. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir.1963) (en banc). Accordingly, we must determine: (1) whether there is jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 301 because it is doing business in New York 2 ; and (2) if so, whether the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal due process requirements.

Plaintiff bears the burden of proof in establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See, e.g., Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (citation omitted); Savin v. Ranier, 898 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir.1990) (citation omitted). Where, as in this case, discovery has been conducted but the Court has not held an evidentiary hearing, plaintiffs showing “must include an averment of facts that, if credited by the trier [of fact], would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant... [meaning] the prima facie showing must be factually supported.” Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir.1990) (citations omitted). See also, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir.1996) (citing Ball).

New York law has developed a body of cases relating specifically to the assertion of personal jurisdiction over hotels. A hotel is deemed to be subject to suit in New York if it has an agent doing business within the state. The key factor appears to be whether the potential instate agent has the ability to bind the hotel by accepting and confirming reservations without having to contact the hotel itself. See I. Oliver Engebretson, Inc. v. Aruba Palm Beach Hotel & Casino, 587 F.Supp. 844, 851 (1984) (relying on the agent’s ability to bind the hotel in its finding of personal jurisdiction). See also Russell v. Hilton Int’l of Puerto Rico, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 2552, 1994 WL 38516, at *3 (1994) (citing Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int’l *339 Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 227 N.E.2d 851 (1967) and explicitly rejecting the arguments that Frummer had relied on the affiliation between the booking agent and the principal and that finding an agency in that case would create jurisdiction over all foreign entities who accepted bookings through travel agencies because ordinary travel agencies lack the power to bind the hotels in which they take bookings).

Plaintiffs’ travel agent made the Browns’ reservation with Global Travel, which accepted payment and confirmed the reservation without contacting Hotel Eden. This is strong evidence of agency for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction. The record presented is limited because Travel Bound did not respond to requests regarding its relationship with Hotel Eden, and the hotel declined to stipulate to the mechanism by which Travel Bound books rooms in Hotel Eden. Furthermore, Hotel Eden has declined to turn over documents that might demonstrate the lack of an agency relationship. Based on the record before the Court, it appears that plaintiffs have averred sufficient facts that, if proven, demonstrate that Travel Bound was acting as an agent for Hotel Eden in New York. Hotel Eden’s argument to the contrary must, on this record, be rejected.

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Bluebook (online)
214 F. Supp. 2d 335, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7773, 2002 WL 826818, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-grand-hotel-eden-nysd-2002.