Brown v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp.

Supreme Court of Missouri

Brown v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp.

150 S.W.3d 287, 2004 Mo. LEXIS 143, 2004 WL 2796446

CourtSupreme Court of Missouri

DecidedDecember 7, 2004

DocketSC 85773

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 150 S.W.3d 287 (Brown v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brown v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 150 S.W.3d 287, 2004 Mo. LEXIS 143, 2004 WL 2796446 (Mo. 2004).

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Opinions

PER CURIAM.

Kevin and Melody Brown borrowed money from First Horizon Home Loan Corp. A deed of trust secured the loan. The Browns paid the loan in full. They sent a demand letter to Home Loan requesting a release of the real estate. Home Loan filed the release with the recorder of deeds. The release was recorded 32 days after Home Loan received the Browns’ demand letter.

The Browns filed suit, alleging that Home Loan failed to comply with section 443.1301, which requires the release to be delivered to the person making satisfaction within 15 business days after the request. The Browns sought judgment for the statutory 10% penalty. Home Loan attacked the validity of section 443.130. The trial court sustained the Browns’ motion for summary judgment. Home Loan appeals. This Court has jurisdiction. Mo. Const, article V, section 3. Because the demand letter did not sufficiently track the statutory requirements of section 443.130, the judgment is reversed.

As this Court recently noted in Garr v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Mo. banc 2004): section 443.130 is penal in nature and must be strictly construed. Any demand letter purporting to invoke section 443.130 should closely track the language of the statute to place the mortgagee on notice that the statutory demand is being made.

While no particular language is specifically required to be included in the letter, the letter must somehow put the lender on notice that a demand is made under section 443.130. The Browns’ letter has neither a reference to section 443.130 nor the 15 business days Home Loan has to respond. The person making satisfaction is not identified. No demand is made that the release be given to the person making satisfaction rather than filing the release with the recorder of deeds. As in Garr, in this case the Browns’ letter as a whole does not place Home Loan on notice that demand is made under section 443.130.

The judgment is reversed.

[289]*289WOLFF, STITH, PRICE and LIMBAUGH, JJ., and CALLAHAN, Sp.J., concur. TEITELMAN, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. WHITE, C.J. and RUSSELL, J., not participating.

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PER CURIAM.

Kevin and Melody Brown borrowed money from First Horizon Home Loan Corp. A deed of trust secured the loan. The Browns paid the loan in full. They sent a demand letter to Home Loan requesting a release of the real estate. Home Loan filed the release with the recorder of deeds. The release was recorded 32 days after Home Loan received the Browns’ demand letter.

The Browns filed suit, alleging that Home Loan failed to comply with section 443.1301, which requires the release to be delivered to the person making satisfaction within 15 business days after the request. The Browns sought judgment for the statutory 10% penalty. Home Loan attacked the validity of section 443.130. The trial court sustained the Browns’ motion for summary judgment. Home Loan appeals. This Court has jurisdiction. Mo. Const, article V, section 3. Because the demand letter did not sufficiently track the statutory requirements of section 443.130, the judgment is reversed.

As this Court recently noted in Garr v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Mo. banc 2004): section 443.130 is penal in nature and must be strictly construed. Any demand letter purporting to invoke section 443.130 should closely track the language of the statute to place the mortgagee on notice that the statutory demand is being made.

While no particular language is specifically required to be included in the letter, the letter must somehow put the lender on notice that a demand is made under section 443.130. The Browns’ letter has neither a reference to section 443.130 nor the 15 business days Home Loan has to respond. The person making satisfaction is not identified. No demand is made that the release be given to the person making satisfaction rather than filing the release with the recorder of deeds. As in Garr, in this case the Browns’ letter as a whole does not place Home Loan on notice that demand is made under section 443.130.

The judgment is reversed.

[289]*289WOLFF, STITH, PRICE and LIMBAUGH, JJ., and CALLAHAN, Sp.J., concur. TEITELMAN, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. WHITE, C.J. and RUSSELL, J., not participating.

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150 S.W.3d 287, 2004 Mo. LEXIS 143, 2004 WL 2796446, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-first-horizon-home-loan-corp-mo-2004.

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