Brown v. Federated Capital Corp.

991 F. Supp. 2d 857, 2014 WL 97292, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4663
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedJanuary 6, 2014
DocketCivil Action No. H-12-2863
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 991 F. Supp. 2d 857 (Brown v. Federated Capital Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Federated Capital Corp., 991 F. Supp. 2d 857, 2014 WL 97292, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4663 (S.D. Tex. 2014).

Opinion

ORDER

DAVID HITTNER, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Federated Capital Corporation’s Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Document No. 30). Having considered the motion, submissions, and applicable law, the Court determines the motion should be granted.

/. BACKGROUND

In February 2006, Plaintiff Carissa Brown (“Brown”), on behalf of Brown Boys Storage, applied for and was approved for an Advanta credit card (the “Credit Card”).1 In October 2006, her Credit Card account was closed due to insufficient payment.2 In May 2007, Advanta assigned her Credit Card account to Defendant Federated Capital Corporation (“Federated”).3 Federated brought a collection suit against Brown in a Utah state court. Subsequently, Brown filed the present case against Federated for, inter [860]*860alia, violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692i,4 which provides that a debt collector must sue a consumer on a debt in either the judicial district in which the consumer signed the contract or in which the consumer resides. 15 U.S.C. § 1692L Brown claims Federated should have sued her in Texas, not Utah.

II. LAW & ANALYSIS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), Federated seeks to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the District of Utah in accordance with the forum-selection clause in the alleged credit card agreement between Brown and Federated. When evaluating a motion to transfer venue, the Court must first determine whether a contractually valid forum-selection clause exists that applies to the present case. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex., — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 568, 581 n. 5, 187 L.Ed.2d 487 (2013); Stinger v. Chase Bank, USA, NA, 265 Fed.Appx. 224, 226-27 (5th Cir.2008) (per curiam); Braspetro Oil Servs. Co. v. Modec (USA), Inc., 240 Fed.Appx. 612, 616 (5th Cir.2007) (per curiam). If such a forum-selection clause exists, the Court must then determine whether any extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties exist that warrant denial of transfer. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 134 S.Ct. at 575, 581 & n. 5. If no such extraordinary circumstances exist, the Court should grant the motion to transfer in accordance with the forum-selection clause. Id. at 575, 581.

A. Waiver of the Right to Seek Transfer of Venue

As a threshold issue, Brown claims Federated waived the right to seek transfer of venue by failing to plead improper venue in the initial responsive pleading as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3).5 However, Rule 12(b)(3) pertains to the defense of “improper venue;” Rule 12(b) does not pertain to motions to transfer venue. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Mohamed v. Mazda Motor Corp., 90 F.Supp.2d 757, 759-60 (E.D.Tex.2000); see also Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 134 S.Ct. at 575, 577-79. Unlike a motion to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3), a motion to transfer under § 1404(a) can be filed at any time, so long as the motion is made with reasonable promptness. United Galvanizing, Inc. v. Imperial Zinc Corp., No. H-08-0551, 2010 WL 4393990, at *2 (S.D.Tex. Oct. 29, 2010).

Because Federated moves to transfer venue under § 1404(a), not to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3), Federated has not waived the right to seek transfer of venue by not pleading improper venue in the initial responsive pleading. Further, the Court finds Federated filed its motion to transfer with reasonable promptness. Accordingly, Brown’s waiver argument does not raise grounds for relief from transfer of venue.

B. Existence of a Contractually Valid Forum-Selection Clause that Applies to the Present Case

The Court must first determine whether a contractually valid forum-selection clause exists that applies to the present case, which involves two separate inquiries: (1) whether the parties agreed to a contractually valid forum-selection clause, and (2) whether the present case falls within the scope of the forum-selection clause. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 134 S.Ct. at 581 n. 5; Stinger, 265 Fed.[861]*861Appx. at 226-27; Braspetro Oil Servs., 240 Fed.Appx. at 616. To make this determination, the Court “should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.” See Stinger, 265 Fed.Appx. at 227 (internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Whether the Parties Agreed to a Contractually Valid Forum-Selection Clause

Brown contends she did not agree to the forum-selection clause, and thus is not bound by the forum-selection clause, because she did not sign the agreement that contained the forum-selection clause and because she was not delivered the agreement that contained the forum-selection clause. “A party may be bound by an agreement even in the absence of a signature, provided that the actions of the parties reflect a mutual intent to be bound.” Stinger, 265 Fed.Appx. at 227; Jones v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 235 S.W.3d 333, 338-39 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). Likewise, a party may be bound by an agreement even in the absence of actual delivery of the agreement, provided that “the part[y] manifests] an intent through [his or her] actions and words that the contract become effective.” Winchek v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 232 S.W.3d 197, 204 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); Devine v. Am. Express Centurion Bank, No. 09-10-00166-CV, 2011 WL 2732583, at *4 (Tex. App.-Beaumont July 14, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). In the context of a credit card, a party is bound by the terms of a credit card agreement if the party uses the credit card, even if the party does not sign the credit card agreement and even if the credit card agreement is not delivered to the party. Stinger, 265 Fed.Appx. at 225, 227; Winchek, 232 S.W.3d at 202-04. Use of a credit card constitutes manifestation of an intent to be bound by the credit card agreement. Ghia v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., No. 14-06-00653-CV, 2007 WL 2990295, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 11, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.); Taraldsen v. Dodeka, L.L.C., No. 01-09-01000-CV, 2011 WL 2653274, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 20, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Federated contends a document entitled “Advanta Business Card Agreement” (the “Credit Card Agreement”),6 which contains a forum-selection clause (the “Forum-Selection Clause”),7 governs this case.

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991 F. Supp. 2d 857, 2014 WL 97292, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4663, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-federated-capital-corp-txsd-2014.