Brown v. Deol

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedNovember 1, 2019
Docket4:18-cv-03020
StatusUnknown

This text of Brown v. Deol (Brown v. Deol) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Deol, (D. Neb. 2019).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

JESUS BROWN,

Plaintiff, 4:18CV3020

vs. MEMORANDUM DR. DEOL, Nebraska Department of AND ORDER Correctional Services Medical Director, individually and in their official capacities; GARY J. HUSTAD, MD, individually and in their official capacities; DAN DANAHER, Physician Assistant, individually and in their official capacities; and DR. JEFFREY KASSELMAN, in his individual and official capacity;

Defendants.

This matter is before the court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Filing No. 42.) For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (“NDCS”) and currently confined at the Lincoln Correctional Center (“LCC”), brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants Dr. Deol, the NDCS Medical Director; Gary J. Hustad, M.D., a doctor responsible for NDCS inmates housed at LCC and the Diagnostic & Evaluation Center (“DEC”); Dr. Jeffrey Kasselman, the pain specialist for the NDCS; and Physician Assistant (“P.A.”) Dan Danaher. (Filing No. 1 & Filing No. 21.) Plaintiff claims that Defendants have failed to provide him medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Filing No. 1 & Filing No. 21.)

Plaintiff alleges that he entered NDCS custody with an existing back injury from a car accident for which he had been receiving treatment. Upon admission at the DEC, Plaintiff informed NDCS medical staff of his back injury and pain, as well as medical issues with his neck, feet, hand, elbow, shoulder, and knee. Plaintiff asserts that his medical conditions are documented in his medical records, in MRIs, and by specialists, and that Defendants are “well aware of the plaintiff’s medical issues and still wish to not treat him for them as they should be.” (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 3.) More specifically, Plaintiff complains that he was given Gabapentin for his pain issues, rather than Lyrica as was recommended by another doctor (Filing No. 1-1 at CM/ECF pp. 3, 14), and that his prescription pain medication eventually was tapered off, and then discontinued, “even though the[re] is written documentation and [a] specialist that say[s] he needs pain medication.” (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 3; Filing No. 1-1 at CM/ECF p. 8. In a supplement, Plaintiff indicates that he has been put back on Gabapentin as of July 31, 2018 but maintains that he is still in extreme pain and medical is refusing to provide necessary medical treatment. (Filing No. 15 at CM/ECF pp. 1, 86–91.)

With respect to Dr. Hustad and P.A. Danaher, Plaintiff alleges that they both were responsible for the medical care of inmates housed at the LCC. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 2.) Plaintiff alleges that both Dr. Hustad and P.A. Danaher were aware of Plaintiff’s medical needs, his complaints of extreme pain, and that outside prison doctors had ordered certain treatments and medications. Despite this knowledge, they refused to administer Plaintiff the necessary treatments and medications recommended by Plaintiff’s outside physicians. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that one specialist “even recommended a stronger pain medication and P.A. Danaher refused to give this medication to [Plaintiff] and ordered a less stronger medication for his pain so as [Plaintiff] had to suffer in pain.” (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 3.) Further, Plaintiff alleges “P.A. Danaher also told the Plaintiff that because he complained so much about being in pain [P.A. Danaher] did not believe that he was in pain and took him off all of his pain medication even though the[re] is written documentation and [a] specialist that say he needs pain medication.” (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 3.) Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Hustad oversees P.A. Danaher and knew of Plaintiff’s medical needs but failed to ensure Plaintiff received the treatment he needs. The Inmate Interview Requests (“IIRs”) attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint show that Dr. Hustad consulted with P.A. Danaher about Plaintiff’s medical complaints and personally responded to some of Plaintiff’s IIRs about his medical issues. (Filing No. 1-1 at CM/ECF pp. 11, 13-14.)

Regarding Dr. Kasselman, Plaintiff alleges that he is the pain specialist for the NDCS who “agreed to remove [Plaintiff] off his medication, even when he was in serious pain.” (Filing No. 21 at CM/ECF pp. 1, 3, ¶¶ 4, 20.)

Plaintiff further alleges that Dr. Deol, the NDCS Medical Director, was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs and “knew or should have known” about Plaintiff’s medical needs and lack of treatment because “he oversees all of the Department of Medical and is the one whom approves all Medical procedures and treatments being done to any prison inmate . . . and is the one whom told all his staff to make cuts in spending and to stop treating some things.” (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 5; Filing No. 21 at CM/ECF p. 5, ¶ 28.)

As relief for the Defendants’ alleged deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, $500,000.00 in compensatory damages, and $500,000.00 in punitive damages against each Defendant.1 (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 5; Filing No. 21 at CM/ECF pp. 5-6.)

1 The court previously determined that this action could proceed to service of process as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants in their individual capacities, as well as in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief only. (Filing No. 16 at CM/ECF p. 15; Filing No. 28 at CM/ECF p. 4.) Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on July 8, 2019. (Filing No. 42.) Along with their Motion, Defendants filed a Brief in Support and an Index of Evidence. (Filing No. 43 & Filing No. 43.) Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendants’ Motion.

Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, is “bound by and must comply with all local and federal procedural rules.” NEGenR 1.3(g). The court’s local rules require the party moving for summary judgment to file a brief containing a “separate statement of material facts about which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried and that entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.” This statement of facts “should consist of short numbered paragraphs, each containing pinpoint references to . . . materials that support the material facts . . . .” NECivR 56.1(a). The opposing party must respond to the moving party’s statement of material facts in a brief containing separate numbered paragraphs with citations to supporting references and with identification of material facts that are disputed. NECivR 56.1(b). See also NECivR 7.1(b)(2)(A) (“When filing the opposing brief, the opposing party must also file and serve supporting evidentiary material not previously filed.”). Properly referenced material facts in the movant’s statement of facts are “considered admitted unless controverted in the opposing party’s response.” NECivR 56.1(b)(1).

The court has carefully reviewed the documents submitted by Defendants. While Defendants have submitted a statement of material facts in accordance with the court’s rules, Plaintiff has not filed any response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.2 Further, Defendants submitted evidence which was properly authenticated by medical records and declarations. In light of this, the court adopts

2 The court does consider the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s verified Complaint and attached exhibits, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, and Plaintiff’s Supplement and attached exhibits. See Roberson v. Hayti Police Dep’t, 241 F.3d 992, 994-95 (8th Cir.

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Brown v. Deol, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-deol-ned-2019.