[Cite as Brown v. Christianson, 2019-Ohio-2937.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
MEARL BROWN : : Plaintiff-Appellant : Appellate Case No. 28188 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2017-CV-658 : MARILYN CHRISTIANSON : (Civil Appeal from : Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellee : :
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OPINION
Rendered on the 19th day of July, 2019.
DOUGLAS D. BRANNON, Atty. Reg. No. 0076603, 130 West Second Street, Suite 900, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
ANTHONY P. McNAMARA, Atty. Reg. No. 0093670 and GEORGE JONSON, Atty. Reg. No. 0027124, 600 Vine Street, Suite 2650, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
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TUCKER, J. -2-
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Mearl Brown, appeals from the trial court’s judgment of
October 23, 2018, in which the court dismissed his complaint on the motion of Defendant-
appellee, the late Marilyn Christianson. Presenting three assignments of error, Brown
argues that the trial court erred by finding that Christianson, a court reporter, was shielded
from civil liability by judicial immunity, by statutory immunity, or by both types of immunity.
As well, Brown argues that the trial court erred by vacating its earlier entry of default
judgment against Christianson in response to her motion for relief from judgment under
Civ.R. 60(B). We find that the trial court did not err by sustaining Christianson’s motion
to dismiss or by sustaining her motion for relief from judgment, although our reasoning
regarding the former motion differs somewhat from that of the trial court. The trial court’s
judgment of October 23, 2018, is therefore affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In Case No. 2006 DR 01337, a magistrate held a hearing on the allocation of
parental rights between Brown and Brown’s ex-wife that comprised parts of three days:
June 27, 2016; July 5, 2016; and August 16, 2016. Christianson served as the court
reporter for the hearing.
{¶ 3} The magistrate issued a decision on September 2, 2016, after which Brown’s
ex-wife filed objections on September 16, 2016, accompanied by a praecipe for a
transcript. Brown did not offer any objections of his own. On November 4, 2016, the
domestic relations division of the common pleas court filed an entry and order in which it
noted that the transcript of the hearing was “not available to the court for review at [that]
time,” and it therefore ordered the magistrate to hold a new hearing. Entry & Order
Resetting Hearing 2, Nov. 4, 2016. -3-
{¶ 4} In Case No. 2017 CV 00658, Brown filed a complaint against Christianson
on February 8, 2017, seeking damages on causes of action for negligence and breach of
contract. Essentially, Brown alleged that if Christianson had timely produced a transcript
of the original hearing, then the domestic relations division would not have ordered a new
hearing, and he claimed accordingly that Christianson should be liable to him for
attorney’s fees, lost income and other damages that he otherwise would have avoided.
Christianson did not answer or otherwise respond to the complaint, and the trial court
entered default judgment in Brown’s favor on April 3, 2017.
{¶ 5} On May 30, 2017, Christianson filed a motion for relief from judgment under
Civ.R. 60(B). The matter was referred to a magistrate, who recommended that the
motion be sustained, and on April 24, 2018, the trial court adopted the magistrate’s
recommendation.
{¶ 6} Having been granted leave, Brown filed an amended complaint on May 4,
2018, retaining the cause of action for negligence and omitting the cause of action for
breach of contract.1 Christianson filed a motion for dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) on
May 21, 2018. The matter was again referred to a magistrate, who recommended that
the motion to dismiss be overruled, but in its judgment of October 23, 2018, the trial court
rejected the recommendation and sustained the motion. Brown timely filed his notice of
appeal on October 30, 2018.
II. Analysis
{¶ 7} We begin our analysis with Brown’s third assignment of error because the
1 In the absence of an indication to the contrary, references to the complaint in this opinion relate to Brown’s amended complaint. -4-
reversal of the trial court’s decision sustaining Christianson’s motion for relief from
judgment would, if warranted, render the first and second assignments moot. For his
third assignment of error, Brown contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RELIEF FROM
DEFAULT JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANT UNDER CIV.R. 60(B).
{¶ 8} Brown argues that the trial court erred by sustaining Christianson’s motion
for relief from judgment because Christianson did not meet her obligation under Civ.R.
60(B) to show that she could offer a meritorious defense to his complaint against her.
See Appellant’s Brief 13-14. As well, he argues that the trial court erred by finding that
Christianson should be granted relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(5) because
his complaint against her was unlikely to survive a motion to dismiss under Civ.R.
12(B)(6). See id.
{¶ 9} Civ.R. 60(B) states:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, [a] court may relieve a
party * * * from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under [Civ.R.] 59(B); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the [reversal, satisfaction or
discharge of the] judgment * * *; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from
the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for
reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or -5-
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion [for relief from judgment] does
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
To prevail on a motion under the rule, the moving party
must demonstrate that: (1) [it would have] a meritorious defense or claim to
present [were relief granted]; (2) [it] is entitled to relief under * * * Civ.R.
60(B)(1)[-](5); and (3) the motion [was] made within a reasonable time, and,
where the [party relies on] Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3) [as grounds for relief],
[the motion was filed] not more than one year after the judgment, order or
proceeding [at issue].
(Citations omitted.) GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d
146, 150-151, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976). On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on a motion for
relief from judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Staub v. Miller, 2d Dist. Greene
No. 2018-CA-2, 2018-Ohio-3603, ¶ 18.
{¶ 10} In her motion, Christianson argued, among other things, that Brown could
not recover on his cause of action against her because she was shielded from civil liability
by statutory immunity as an employee of a political subdivision. Defendant’s Motion for
Relief from Judgment 8-9, May 30, 2017. Brown alleged in his complaint that
Christianson was either an independent contractor, or an “employee” of the Domestic
Relations Division of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, who was “the
designated court reporter” in Case No. 2006 DR 01337. Amended Complaint,
Montgomery C.P. No. 2017 CV 00658 (May 4, 2018), ¶ 3-4. Given Brown’s allegations,
Christianson’s invocation of statutory immunity was a potentially meritorious defense
pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A). -6-
{¶ 11} Brown maintains that Christianson waived the immunity defense because
she did not file an answer to his original complaint. See Appellant’s Brief 14. The trial
court found, and we agree, that Christianson did not waive the defense. Decision, Order
and Entry Overruling Plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate’s Decision 7-9, Apr. 24, 2018.
In his brief, Brown cites Turner v. Cent. Local School Dist., 85 Ohio St.3d 95, 706 N.E.2d
1261 (1999), and Spence v. Liberty Twp. Trustees, 109 Ohio App.3d 357, 672 N.E.2d
213 (4th Dist.1996), to support his argument to the contrary, but neither of the decisions
states, as Brown suggests, that Christianson’s “fail[ure] to file an answer” raising the
defense “also prohibit[ed] her from raising [the] defense for purposes of Civ.R. 60(B).”
Appellant’s Brief 14. In Turner, the Ohio Supreme Court clearly indicated that the
defendant—the Central Local School District—could have raised the defense of political
subdivision immunity by seeking “leave to amend its answer to include the * * * defense,”
which hardly supports Brown’s thesis that the defense is irrevocably waived if not raised
at the first possible opportunity. Turner at 99; see also, e.g., Am. Express Travel Related
Servs., Inc. v. Carleton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-1400, 2003-Ohio-5950, ¶ 10 (finding
that even “if an affirmative defense is not raised in the answer, it is not necessarily waived
ad infinitum”). The Fourth District reached essentially the same conclusion. See
Spence at 366.
{¶ 12} With respect to her entitlement to relief under the rule, Christianson argued
that relief should be granted under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) on the basis of excusable neglect
because her abuse of alcohol and other drugs was the result of mental illness; and,
independently, she argued that relief should be granted under Civ.R. 60(B)(5) because
Brown had failed to state a cognizable claim against her. Defendant’s Motion for Relief -7-
from Judgment 7-15, May 30, 2017. The trial court did not discuss Christianson’s
argument under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) in its decision, but instead, found that she had
demonstrated her entitlement to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5).2 Decision, Order and Entry
Overruling Plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate’s Decision 11-12.
{¶ 13} We concur with the trial court. Under Ohio law, “[i]t is well-settled * * * that
a default judgment is improper when the [underlying] complaint fails to state” a claim on
which relief can be granted. Buckeye Supply Co. v. Northeast Drilling Co., 24 Ohio
App.3d 134, 135-136, 493 N.E.2d 964 (9th Dist.1985), citing Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of
Florida v. Leist, 117 Ohio App. 20, 25-26, 189 N.E.2d 456 (4th Dist.1962). In other
words, a plaintiff should not be able to obtain, or enforce, a default judgment in the
absence of any legal right to recovery. Civ.R. 60(B)(5) allows a court to relieve a party
from a final judgment for any reason, other than those enumerated in the rule, “justifying
relief from the judgment.” Where a plaintiff has obtained a default judgment against a
defendant despite having no legal right to recovery, relief from the judgment would seem
to be well justified.
{¶ 14} Finally, this court has jurisdiction to review the trial court’s decision of April
24, 2018, because the decision merged into the trial court’s final judgment of October 23,
2 Brown states in his brief “that the trial court correctly found that [Christianson]’s voluntary us[e] of alcohol and drugs was not ‘excusable neglect’ ” for purposes of Civ.R. 60(B). Appellant’s Brief 14. The trial court, however, made no such finding. Yet, the trial court did refer to Christianson’s substance abuse while considering Brown’s argument that Christianson had waived the defense of immunity by failing to file an answer. The trial court deemed her condition to be an acceptable explanation for her failure to file an answer, which suggests, if anything, that the court might have accepted Christianson’s condition as “excusable neglect” for purposes of Civ.R. 60(B)(2). In any event, Brown fails to cite any authority establishing that a litigant’s substance abuse can never support a claim of excusable neglect. -8-
2018. See Appellee’s Brief 7-8. Brown’s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 15} We address Brown’s first and second assignments of error together
because both of them relate to the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint under Civ.R.
12(B)(6). For his first assignment of error, Brown contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY TO A COURT REPORTER.
And for his second assignment of error, Brown contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT
WAS ENTITLED TO STATUTORY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.
{¶ 16} Brown challenges the trial court’s determination that he “is unable to state
a claim [against Christianson] upon which relief can be granted” because Christianson “is
entitled to both absolute judicial immunity as an agent of the court, and [to] statutory
immunity under R.C. 2744.03.” Decision, Order and Entry Sustaining Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss 10, Oct. 23, 2018 [hereinafter Dismissal Entry]; Appellant’s Brief 2-13.
He argues, first, that the trial court erred by finding that absolute judicial immunity shielded
Christianson from civil liability because the court based its finding on precedent that has
since been superseded. Appellant’s Brief 2-4. He argues, second, that the trial court
erred by finding that statutory immunity shielded Christianson from civil liability because,
contrary to the mandate of Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the trial court based its finding on factual
assumptions that are incompatible with the allegations in his complaint. See id. at 5-6.
Although we concur with the trial court’s determination that Brown has failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, our reasoning differs.
{¶ 17} A motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) “is [a] procedural [motion -9-
that] tests the sufficiency of [a] complaint” as a matter of law. See State ex rel. Hanson
v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992). When
a court reviews a motion to dismiss, it “must presume that all factual allegations of the
complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”
(Citations omitted.) Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753
(1988). Given the purpose of a motion to dismiss, the moving party “may not rely on
allegations or evidence outside the complaint.” Hanson at 548.
{¶ 18} Dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is warranted only if the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of the claim or claims asserted in the complaint that would entitle
the plaintiff to the relief requested. See Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. v. McKinley, 130
Ohio St.3d 156, 2011-Ohio-4432, 956 N.E.2d 814, ¶ 12, citing O’Brien v. Univ. Community
Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 245, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975), and LeRoy v. Allen,
Yurasek & Merklin, 114 Ohio St.3d 323, 2007-Ohio-3608, 872 N.E.2d 254, ¶ 14; see also
Sacksteder v. Senney, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24993, 2012-Ohio-4452, ¶ 35-46.
Appellate “review of a trial court’s decision to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Civ.R.
12(B)(6) is de novo.” (Citation omitted.) McKinley at ¶ 12.
{¶ 19} Here, the trial court dismissed Brown’s complaint against Christianson
because it determined that Christianson was “entitled to both absolute judicial immunity
as an agent of the court, and [to] statutory immunity under R.C. 2744.03.” Dismissal
Entry 10. Regarding absolute judicial immunity, the trial court based its determination
on our decision in Fahrig v. Greer, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 6596, 1980 WL 352570 (May
1, 1980). In Fahrig, we held that the “principle of judicial immunity applies to acts of * * *
judge[s] and court reporters while acting in their official capacities,” but we relied for our -10-
holding, without offering independent analysis, on federal precedent that has since been
superseded by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc.,
508 U.S. 429, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993). See also, e.g., Loyer v. Turner,
129 Ohio App.3d 33, 36-38, 716 N.E.2d 1193 (1998) (6th Dist.). We find consequently
that the trial court erred by determining that Christianson was protected by absolute
judicial immunity.
{¶ 20} Regarding statutory immunity, the trial court held that Christianson was
entitled to immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a)-(c) because she was an employee of a
political subdivision, because the acts and omissions for which Brown sought redress
were within the scope of Christianson’s employment, and because Brown could prove no
set of facts establishing that Christianson was divested of immunity pursuant to the
provisions of R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). 3 See Dismissal Entry 8-10. To establish that
Christianson was divested of immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), Brown would have
to prove that Christianson’s “acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith,
or [were] wanton or reckless.” Brown alleged in his complaint that Christianson’s failure
to produce a transcript constituted “bad faith” and “willful, wanton and reckless” conduct,
which he attributed to “her voluntary consumption of alcohol and/or [sic] drugs.”
Amended Complaint, Montgomery C.P. No. 2017 CV 00658 (May 4, 2018), ¶ 40-41.
{¶ 21} The trial court deemed these allegations insufficient to survive
3 Neither party disputes that Brown’s complaint relates to acts and omissions within the scope of Christianson’s employment, which precludes the applicability of the exception to immunity set forth in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a). The trial court did not find specifically that “[c]ivil liability [was not] expressly imposed” on Christianson by statute, which is the exception set forth in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c). Dismissal Entry 9. Brown, however, has not argued that R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c) applies to his cause of action. -11-
Christianson’s motion to dismiss for two reasons. First, the court determined that
because “a substance abuse problem” is not the equivalent of bad faith—which the court
defined as actual or constructive fraud, dishonesty or moral obliquity—Brown could not
prove that Christianson acted in bad faith merely because she struggled with addiction.
Dismissal Entry 9. Second, the court posited that Christianson could not have acted with
a wanton or reckless disregard for Brown’s interests without owing a duty to Brown. See
id. at 9-10.
{¶ 22} We find that the trial court erred by holding that Brown could not prove any
set of facts demonstrating that R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) applied to his cause of action
against Christianson. Theoretically, Brown could have proven that Christianson’s failure
to produce a transcript was a deviation from her moral obligations as a court reporter
employed by the court—i.e. that she acted in bad faith—without proving that she abused
alcohol and other drugs.
{¶ 23} Similarly, Brown could have proven that Christianson acted with
recklessness, which is defined as conduct “characterized by the conscious disregard of[,]
or indifference to[,] a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under
the circumstances,” without proving that Christianson owed him a duty to provide a
transcript. (Citation omitted.) Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-
5711, 983 N.E.2d 266, ¶ 34. The definition makes no reference to a risk of harm to a
person to whom a duty of care is owed, but only to a risk of harm “to another.” By
contrast, the definition of “wanton conduct” is “the failure to exercise any care towards
those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great probability
that harm will result.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 33. Moreover, the “terms ‘willful,’ -12-
‘wanton,’ and ‘reckless’ as used in [R.C. 2744.02 and 2744.03] are not interchangeable.”
Id. at ¶ 39. We find, then, that the trial court erred by holding that Brown could not prove
any set of facts sufficient to implicate the exception to immunity for recklessness under
R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b).4 Nevertheless, we concur with the trial court’s proposition that
Christianson did not owe Brown the duty to produce a transcript.
{¶ 24} In his complaint, Brown effectively asserted a single cause of action for
negligence against Christianson, although he presented his claim for compensatory
damages and his claim for punitive damages as if each were a separate cause of action.
See Amended Complaint, Montgomery C.P. No. 2017 CV 00658 (May 4, 2018), ¶ 38-44
and 47-50. To establish his right to recovery on the basis of Christianson’s alleged
negligence, Brown would have to prove that Christianson owed him a duty; that
Christianson breached her duty to him; that Christianson’s breach of duty was the direct
cause of harm to him; and that Christianson’s breach of duty was the proximate cause of
harm to him. See, e.g., Strother v. Hutchinson, 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 285, 423 N.E.2d 467
(1981). Brown, however, cannot prove that Christianson owed him a duty.
{¶ 25} According to Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i), a “party may file written objections to a
magistrate’s decision within fourteen days of the filing of the decision,” and if a party
“timely files objections, any other party may also file objections not later than ten days
after the first objections are filed.” As indicated in our recitation of the facts, in Case No.
2006 DR 01337, a magistrate held a hearing on the allocation of parental rights between
4 We agree, of course, that Brown could not have proven that Christianson’s failure to produce a transcript was “wanton conduct,” for purposes of the exception, without proving that she owed a duty to him. -13-
Brown and Brown’s ex-wife that comprised parts of three days: June 27, 2016; July 5,
2016; and August 16, 2016. The magistrate issued a decision on September 2, 2016,
and Brown’s ex-wife filed her objections on September 16, 2016, accompanied by a
praecipe for a transcript. Brown did not offer any objections of his own. On November
4, 2016, the domestic relations division of the common pleas court ordered the magistrate
to hold a new hearing because the transcript of the original hearing was “not available to
the court for review at [that] time.” Entry & Order Resetting Hearing 2, Nov. 4, 2016.
{¶ 26} Under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii), a party’s “objection to a [magistrate’s] factual
finding, whether or not specifically designated [by the magistrate] as a finding of fact under
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), shall be supported by a transcript of all [relevant] evidence
submitted to the magistrate * * * or an affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is not
available.” The rule establishes that rather than the court reporter, the “objecting party
shall file the transcript or affidavit within thirty days after filing objections[,] unless the court
extends the time in writing for preparation of the transcript or [for any] other good cause.”
(Emphasis added.) Id. Hence, the “ ‘duty to provide a transcript to the trial court rests
with the person objecting to the magistrate’s decision,’ ” not with the court reporter. Fogt
v. Fogt, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-8-10, 2019-Ohio-1403, ¶ 12, quoting Slepsky v. Slepsky,
11th Dist. Lake No. 2016-L-032, 2016-Ohio-8429, ¶ 20; see also Petrovich v. Auto Repair,
Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105216, 2017-Ohio-8731, ¶ 8, citing Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii).
As a matter of law, then, Christianson owed no duty to Brown with respect to the filing of
the transcript, meaning that Brown can prove no set of facts demonstrating his entitlement
to recover damages from Christianson’s estate on a cause of action for negligence.
{¶ 27} In his brief, Brown argues that Christianson’s “failure to comply and act in -14-
accordance with R.C. 2301.23 constitutes malice negating any defense of statutory
immunity.” Appellant’s Brief 12. Under the statute, “[w]hen notes have been taken or
an electronic recording has been made in a case as provided in [R.C.] 2301.20 * * *, if the
court or either party to [a] suit requests written transcripts of any portion of the
proceeding[s], [then] the reporter reporting the case shall make full and accurate
transcripts of the notes or electronic recording.” Much like Civ.R. 53(D), the court
reporter’s obligation to prepare a transcript is implicated by a request, thus the court
reporter’s failure to prepare a transcript in response to the request is a breach of a duty
owed to the party who made the request. Here, the only party who requested a transcript
was Brown’s ex-wife; Brown cannot demonstrate a right to recover damages for breach
of a duty not owed to him.
{¶ 28} Inasmuch as we find that Christianson was not entitled to absolute judicial
immunity, Brown’s first assignment of error is sustained. Otherwise, because we find
that the dismissal of the complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) was proper, Brown’s second
assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 29} We find that the trial court did not err by sustaining Christianson’s motion
for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) or by dismissing Brown’s complaint under
Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Therefore, the trial court’s judgment of October 23, 2018, is affirmed.
WELBAUM, P.J. and FROELICH, J., concur. -15-
Copies sent to:
Douglas D. Brannon Anthony P. McNamara George Jonson Marilyn Christianson Hon. Mary Lynn Wiseman