Brown v. Brown

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Brown v. Brown

190 A.D.2d 668, 594 N.Y.S.2d 620, 1993 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 793

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 1, 1993

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 190 A.D.2d 668 (Brown v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brown v. Brown, 190 A.D.2d 668, 594 N.Y.S.2d 620, 1993 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 793 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1993).

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Opinion

— In a child custody proceeding, the appeal is from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County (De-Maro, J.), dated January 28, 1992, which, upon the appellant’s default in appearing for scheduled court dates, inter alia, directed that the appellant have no contact with her infant son.

Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.

No appeal lies from an order made upon the default of the aggrieved party (see, CPLR 5511). The proper procedure would have been for the appellant to move to open her default and to vacate the order dated January 28, 1992, and if necessary, appeal from the denial of the motion to vacate the default (see, Grober v Busigo, 133 AD2d 389; Imor v Imor, 114 AD2d 552; Calvagno v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 110 AD2d 741). Bracken, J. P., Fiber, Ritter and Santucci, JJ., concur.

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— In a child custody proceeding, the appeal is from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County (De-Maro, J.), dated January 28, 1992, which, upon the appellant’s default in appearing for scheduled court dates, inter alia, directed that the appellant have no contact with her infant son.

Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.

No appeal lies from an order made upon the default of the aggrieved party (see, CPLR 5511). The proper procedure would have been for the appellant to move to open her default and to vacate the order dated January 28, 1992, and if necessary, appeal from the denial of the motion to vacate the default (see, Grober v Busigo, 133 AD2d 389; Imor v Imor, 114 AD2d 552; Calvagno v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 110 AD2d 741). Bracken, J. P., Fiber, Ritter and Santucci, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

190 A.D.2d 668, 594 N.Y.S.2d 620, 1993 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 793, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-brown-nyappdiv-1993.

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