Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.

197 F.2d 871, 39 C.C.P.A. 1050, 94 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 165, 1952 CCPA LEXIS 315
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJune 24, 1952
DocketPatent Appeals 5886
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 197 F.2d 871 (Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 197 F.2d 871, 39 C.C.P.A. 1050, 94 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 165, 1952 CCPA LEXIS 315 (ccpa 1952).

Opinions

JACKSON, Judge.

This is an appeal in an opposition proceeding under the Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051 et seq., from a decision of an Examiner-in-Chief of the United States Patent Office, 89 U.S.P.Q. 169, reversing a decision of the Examiner of Trade-Mark Interferences sustaining an opposition filed by appellant against the registration of appellee’s trade-mark and adjudging that such mark is not entitled to registration.

The mark disclosed in the application of appellee consists of the notation “LifeLine” with slanted letters, the first of which is composed of a larger “L” than the “L” in the second word and with a bar extending under all of the letters except the first. The application, serial No. 532,893, was filed August 29, 1947, as applied to “Electric Motors.” It is alleged in the application that first use of the mark was on April 16, 1946, and its first use in interstate commerce on July 22, 1946.

In its notice of opposition dated August 24, 1948, appellant alleges it is the owner of the trade-mark “B-Line,” registered July 13,1926 and renewed in 1946, No. 215,-250, as applied to “Electrical Motors.” It is further alleged that the goods of the respective parties to which their marks are applied are of the same descriptive properties and that their concurrent use would be likely to cause confusion or mistake in the minds of the trade or public or deceive purchasers and appellant would be damaged by the use or registration of appellee’s mark.

The Examiner of Interferences noted the concession of appellee that appellant is the prior user of its mark. He further noted that no testimony was taken by appellee and that appellant is entitled to priority in the use of the trade-mark “Line” and “Truly Life-Time Motors,” allegedly used on electrical motors prior to the filing date of appellee. The examiner stated that the only allegation of priority of use by appellant pleaded in its notice of opposition is the mark “B-Line” and therefore held that the only question for determination is whether the concurrent use by the parties of their respective marks “B-Line” and “Life-Line” on the same kind of goods is likely to be the source of confusion or mistake or deceive purchasers. It was the opinion of the examiner that the word “line” is the dominant part of the mark of appellant and therefore there would be like[872]*872lihood of confusion if that word were used by another with another letter of the alphabet substituted for the letter “B.” While he observed that the substitution of the word “life” for the letter “B” in some respects distinguished the marks he was of opinion that in other respects the likelihood of confusion is increased by the suggestion that when the goods are sold side by side or advertised through the same advertising media they had the same origin and that those marked “Life-Line” are of superior quality. Considering the marks as a whole the examiner was of opinion that there is likelihood of confusion and mistake if the respective marks of the parties are used concurrently on like products, citing Auburn Rubber Corp. v. Hanover Rubber Co., 107 F.2d 558, 27 C.C.P.A., Patents, 743; Lever Bros. Co. v. The Sitroux Co., Inc., 109 F.2d 445, 27 C.C.P.A., Patents, 858. In the former of those cases the conflicting marks were the numeral “2” over the word “Life” and “Nu-Life”; and in the latter case, the competing marks were “Sitru-lux” and “Lux.”

The Examiner-in-Chief observed that the only question properly involved is that of confusing similarity of the respective marks of the parties. He stated that appellant adopted the word “line” as one of its marks and applied for its registration on November 22, 1947; that it obtained registration on the Supplemental Register of the expression “Truly Life-Time Motors” dated August 5, 1947, registration No. 508,311; that the latter registration states the date of first use of the mark to be August 6, 1947, and used in the form of “Truly A Life-Time Motor” in February, 1947. The Examiner-in-Chief also noted that appellant refers to the copyright of the latter phrase and stated that it had reference to a copyrighted advertisement in which the phrase appeared but not of any date earlier than those alleged in the registration. .

The Examiner-in-Chief considered; that the testimony and arguments on behalf of appellant involving the mark “line” and the phrase “Truly A Life-Time Motor” were improper for the reason that the only mark relied on in the notice of opposition is the trade-mark “B-Line.” There is nothing in the notice of opposition concerning the-mark “Line” or the expression “Truly A Life-Time Motor” and no claim of prior use was made as to those marks in the notice. Therefore, he held that it cannot be assumed that appellant’s use of those two expressions was prior to appellee’s use of his mark. He further stated that even if it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that appellant could rely upon the use of those expressions which were not pleaded, it would still have upon it the burden of proving that their use was prior. There is nothing in the record to establish that such use was prior to the use by appellee of its mark and the Examiner-in-Chief stated that “in fact, the record strongly suggests that opposer adopted the two expressions after and with knowledge of applicant’s activities.”

The Examiner-in-Chief disagreed with the Examiner of Interferences who held that the word “line” is the dominant feature of appellant’s mark. In that connection he stated that merely because the word “line” appears at the end of each of the marks there is no reason for it being considered as the dominant feature and that simply because the last syllable of appellant’s mark occupies more space than the first syllable does not render the word “line” its dominant feature.

The Examiner-in-Chief held, and properly so we think, that the relative numbers of letters are not of moment in the two syllables, and he stated that it could be equally well argued that “B” is the dominant feature of appellant’s mark because it appears first in place.

It is stated in the decision of the Examiner-in-Chief that the usage of appellant’s involved mark in its various exhibits and advertisements discloses that “B” is always associated with “line.” He noted that the mark at times is written entirely in capitals, at other times in capital and lower case letters, and in the latter event occasionally in script. He observed that many advertisements of appellant carry a seal or monogram device with the “B” appearing as a large capital letter and the word “line” appearing in small letters beneath or at the ■ line.

[873]*873In the opinion of the Examiner-in-Chief the word “line” in the combination “B-Line” is either of equal significance to the letter “B” or of less significance, but not dominant over the letter section of the mark with respect to its appearance and usage. He also properly stated that the meaning of the word “line” in commerce indicates it is only a subordinate part of the mark in a combination such as that of appellant.

The Examiner-in-Chief was of opinion that there is no likelihood of confusion or mistake or deception of purchasers in the concurrent use by the parties of their respective marks and on the goods to which they apply. He did not consider the Auburn Rubber Corp.

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197 F.2d 871, 39 C.C.P.A. 1050, 94 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 165, 1952 CCPA LEXIS 315, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-brockmeyer-co-v-westinghouse-electric-corp-ccpa-1952.