Brown 272631 v. Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMarch 5, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00318
StatusUnknown

This text of Brown 272631 v. Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry (Brown 272631 v. Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown 272631 v. Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry, (D. Ariz. 2024).

Opinion

1 MDR 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Douglas Bryce Brown, No. CV-24-00318-PHX-JAT (DMF) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation & Reentry, et al., 13 14 Defendants.

15 16 Self-represented Plaintiff Douglas Bryce Brown, who is confined in CoreCivic's 17 Red Rock Correctional Center, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 18 § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). The Court will 19 grant the Application to Proceed and will dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend. 20 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee 21 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 22 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915(b)(1). The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. Id. The statutory filing 24 fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited 25 to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. 26 § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government 27 agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 28 . . . . 1 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 3 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 4 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 5 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 7 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 8 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 9 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 10 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 11 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 12 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 14 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 15 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 16 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 17 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 18 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 19 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 20 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 21 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 22 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 23 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 24 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 25 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 26 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 27 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 28 . . . . 1 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 2 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 3 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The 4 Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend, 5 because it may possibly be amended to state a claim. 6 III. Complaint 7 In his three-count Complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendants 8 Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation & Reentry (ADC); ADC Director Ryan 9 Thornell; and Correctional Officer III Joseph Gonzalves. 10 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to false arrest when Defendant 11 Gonzalves used an “EXPIRED case # 2011-007732-001” to place Plaintiff “in custody 12 after time served had been compl[e]ted.” Plaintiff contends the time served in that case 13 “took place prior to current case #2014-0126610-001.” He also asserts Defendant 14 Gonzalves “then replied by us[]ing false information regarding early release information.” 15 Plaintiff claims the “original late release began in 2022” and the “[p]revious release in 2021 16 was not provided due to Covid.” He contends he lost his home, vehicle, income, and 17 freedom “[a]s a result of false arrest.” 18 In Count Two, Plaintiff raises a false arrest claim, alleging Defendant Thornell has 19 the authority “to ensure in[t]er state transfer process be provided to all inmates” but denied 20 Plaintiff, “through Red Rock Staff ‘Process to Transfer’ submitted to staff and denied 21 process April 2023.” He claims “NO TIME PERMITTED” and asserts the staff at the Red 22 Rock Correctional Center “refused to accept $200.00 fee to transfer [Plaintiff]” to 23 Mississippi. Plaintiff asserts the “home leased 1 yr. lost in the effort to be returned to home 24 state.” 25 In Count Three, Plaintiff raises an access-to-the-court claim based on an “unlawful 26 warr[a]nt.” He claims the extradition warrant identification was “invalid for transport of 27 prisoner,” “no governor warr[a]nt [was] provided,” and “no consent from [Plaintiff was] 28 1 provided.” Plaintiff alleges that when he was arrested, he was “not serving p[a]role, 2 previous late release in 2021-2022 served all time in custody.” 3 IV. Failure to State a Claim 4 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 5 520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 6 v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a liberal interpretation of a 7 civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 8 pled. Id. 9 A. Defendant ADC 10 Under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a state or 11 state agency may not be sued in federal court without its consent. Pennhurst State Sch. & 12 Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 13 Cir. 1989).

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Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman
465 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 1984)
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512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
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Bluebook (online)
Brown 272631 v. Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-272631-v-arizona-department-of-corrections-rehabilitation-and-azd-2024.