Brophy v. School Committee of Worcester

383 N.E.2d 521, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 731, 1978 Mass. App. LEXIS 642
CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedDecember 18, 1978
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 383 N.E.2d 521 (Brophy v. School Committee of Worcester) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brophy v. School Committee of Worcester, 383 N.E.2d 521, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 731, 1978 Mass. App. LEXIS 642 (Mass. Ct. App. 1978).

Opinion

Keville, J.

This is an appeal by the defendants, members of the Worcester school committee (committee) from *732 a judgment entered in the Superior Court in favor of the plaintiffs, who are teachers in the Worcester public school system, on a complaint for a declaratory judgment under G. L. c. 231A. The plaintiffs comprise five named teachers and two classes of teachers for whom the named individuals serve as class representatives. The first class is made up of "long term substitutes” and the second of "federal programs” teachers, that is, teachers in federally reimbursed programs.

The committee challenges the certification by a Superi- or Court judge of these classes under Mass.R.Civ. P. 23, 365 Mass. 767 (1974), and the judgment of the trial judge that the five named plaintiffs have acquired tenure under G. L. c. 71, § 41, having served for three consecutive years within the system, that each school year of "regular and continuous” teaching service as either a long term substitute or as a Federal programs teacher shall be credited as one of the three consecutive school years necessary to acquire tenure under § 41, and that all teachers who have taught for three consecutive school years as long term substitutes, Federal programs teachers, regular teachers or a combination of these are entitled to the protection of the provisions of G. L. c. 71, § 42.

The committee has not taken issue with the trial judge’s order for payment of compensation set forth in paragraph 5 of the judgment made pursuant to his rulings on the issue of tenure. 1

*733 The case was tried and comes here upon the pleadings, a single deposition and accompanying exhibits which by stipulation constitute the evidence in the case. The judge filed a “Memorandum and Order.” In reviewing the case we stand in the same position as the trial judge and draw our own conclusions, unaffected by his findings. Hiller v. Submarine Signal Co., 325 Mass. 546, 549, 551 (1950), and cases cited. Pertinent facts are as follows:

The named plaintiff Paula Brophy has been employed continuously by the committee since December 20,1971, to teach on a full-time basis in the Operation Reading Base (ORB) program for which the committee receives Federal reimbursement under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965). The plaintiff Patricia Gaudette has been employed since October 10,1972, continuously and on a full-time basis in the ORB program. The plaintiff Dorothy Shea taught in the ORB program for three consecutive school years and part of another until she took a maternity leave of absence from March, 1975, to September, 1976, when she resumed teaching in the ORB program. The plaintiff Donald Gannon taught continuously in DI-STAR, another federally reimbursed program of compensatory reading instruction, from September, 1970, until June, 1974. DISTAR has since been discontinued. During the next two school years he served as a long term substitute teacher. In September, 1976, he was elected as a regular teacher in the school system but to date has not been granted tenure. The fifth plaintiff Alan Nordberg has been granted tenure by the committee, effective September, 1976, subsequent to the initiation of this suit but only on the basis of his years of service as a regular teacher. His prior service as a long term substitute was not counted towards tenure.

*734 With respect to the first certified class, the judge found that long term substitutes have the same duties as regular teachers and are hired and evaluated in the same manner but are paid on a per diem basis at a single rate, "Step 1” of the teachers’ salary schedule, regardless of teaching experience or educational degrees and not according to a progressive salary schedule. Like regular teachers, they must be certified by the State Department of Education. But unlike "daily substitutes,” who are called each day on which they are asked to teach, long term substitutes are given the same assignment "for a predetermined period of time” which "in many cases” may be for an entire school year. Among approximately 160 long term substitutes currently employed in the school system, about seventy are replacements for teachers on leaves of absence. The remainder fill teaching positions denominated "temporary” by the committee. Long term substitutes are eligible for the teachers’ retirement system and the municipality’s group insurance program under G. L. cc. 32 and 32B, respectively.

Federal programs teachers, the second certified class, work in programs which supplement the regular curriculum and for which the school committee receives Federal reimbursement under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. These teachers work in one of four programs: (1) the Operation Reading Base (ORB) program: (2) the LAMP program (a mathematics program otherwise unidentified in the record); (3) the English as a Second Language (ESL) program; and (4) the School Committee Liaison (SCL) program, which employs individuals whose duties include helping elementary school children with problems which may transcend the school environment. 2 By and large, the federally reimbursed programs are designed to assist economically or socially deprived youngsters.

*735 Federal programs teachers must be certified like regular teachers, and like regular teachers are paid on an annual basis. They receive increases according to the salary schedule for regular teachers except that they may not advance beyond “Step 3” of the schedule. Almost all are full-time employees who serve during the entire school year. The criteria for employing a teacher in a Federal program are the same as the criteria for regular teachers although the evaluation forms for the two groups differ. Due to a Federal requirement that such programs be supplementary to the regular curriculum, a teacher in a Federal program cannot replace a regular teacher, who teaches the same subject, and still remain as part of the Federal program. These teachers are eligible for the retirement system and group insurance programs.

1. The challenge of the committee to the certification of the two classes of teachers is that the criteria for maintenance of a class action under Mass.R.Civ.P. 23, have not been met. A judge has broad discretion under rule 23 in determining whether an action may be maintained as a class action. E.g., Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1975). See 3B Moore’s Federal Practice par. 23.50, at 23-436 to 23-437 (2d ed. 1978).

The committee first argues that the two classes of teachers are not so numerous that joinder of all members is “impracticable” under rule 23(a)(1). However, the word impracticable in the context of rule 23 has been interpreted to mean impractical, unwise or imprudent rather than impossible or incapable of being performed. See, e.g., Goldstein v. North Jersey Trust Co., 39 F.R.D. 363, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Arkansas Educ. Assn. v. Board of Educ. of Portland,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Delgado v. Arbor Homecare Services, LLC
33 Mass. L. Rptr. 388 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 2016)
Norell v. Spring Valley Country Club, Inc.
33 Mass. L. Rptr. 299 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 2016)
Sandoval v. M.J.F. Bowery Corp.
29 Mass. L. Rptr. 24 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 2011)
Campbell v. Glodis
28 Mass. L. Rptr. 465 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 2011)
Hiller v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.
23 Mass. L. Rptr. 202 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 2007)
Woodruff v. Niles Co.
22 Mass. L. Rptr. 469 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 2007)
Waters v. Earthlink, Inc.
22 Mass. L. Rptr. 527 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 2006)
Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
18 Mass. L. Rptr. 651 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 2004)
Lyons v. School Committee
440 Mass. 74 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2003)
Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome Inc.
434 Mass. 81 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2001)
Ballotte v. City of Worcester
9 Mass. L. Rptr. 63 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 1998)
Freeman v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
7 Mass. L. Rptr. 565 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 1997)
Dowell v. Gallant
4 Mass. L. Rptr. 549 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 1995)
Berry v. Town of Danvers
613 N.E.2d 108 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1993)
Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc.
492 N.E.2d 1112 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1986)
McAndrew v. School Committee of Cambridge
480 N.E.2d 327 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1985)
Fletcher v. Cape Cod Gas Co.
477 N.E.2d 116 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1985)
Ripley v. School Committee
451 N.E.2d 721 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1983)
Stafford v. Valley Community School District
328 N.W.2d 323 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1982)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
383 N.E.2d 521, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 731, 1978 Mass. App. LEXIS 642, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brophy-v-school-committee-of-worcester-massappct-1978.