Brooks v. One Miracle Property CA2/6

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 16, 2023
DocketB324231
StatusUnpublished

This text of Brooks v. One Miracle Property CA2/6 (Brooks v. One Miracle Property CA2/6) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brooks v. One Miracle Property CA2/6, (Cal. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

Filed 11/16/23 Brooks v. One Miracle Property CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

BRENT BROOKS, 2d Civ. No. B324231 (Super. Ct. No. 56-2019- Plaintiff and Appellant, 00527617-CU-PO-VTA) (Ventura County) v.

ONE MIRACLE PROPERTY, LLC,

Defendant and Respondent.

An independent contractor was hired to clean solar panels on the roof of a commercial building. A worker employed by the independent contractor was injured when he tripped and fell through a skylight. The worker sued the building owner alleging, among other causes of action, the failure to warn of a concealed hazard. The trial court granted summary judgment to the building owner on the ground that a landowner is not liable for injuries to an employee of an independent contractor. The court concluded that no exception to the rule applied. We affirm. FACTS One Miracle Property, LLC (One Miracle) owns multiple properties, including a commercial building in Oxnard (Oxnard building). One Miracle purchased the land in 1997 and built the Oxnard building in 2004. The Oxnard building’s roof has skylights, solar panels, and electrical conduits for the solar panels. For more than a decade, West Hills Construction, Inc. (West Hills), a licensed general contractor, has performed construction work for One Miracle, including work on the Oxnard building. One of West Hills’ ongoing tasks is to maintain and oversee the solar panels and skylights on the roof of the Oxnard building. West Hills inspects the roof several times a year. Should any repairs or maintenance be required, West Hills performs the work or hires a subcontractor. Prior to July 18, 2018, West Hills marked certain skylights on the Oxnard building for replacement, not because the skylights were defective, but because a different model was preferred. At all times West Hills was an independent contractor for One Miracle. On or about July 19, 2018, West Hills subcontracted with KCM Landscaping Services, Inc. (KCM), an independent contractor, to clean the solar panels on the Oxnard building’s roof. West Hills did not supervise KCM’s work and no one from One Miracle was present while KCM was working. On July 19, 2018, Brent Brooks was employed by KCM, assisting in cleaning the solar panels on the Oxnard building’s roof. He tripped on a conduit, fell through a skylight, and landed on cardboard boxes below. Although Brooks landed on cardboard boxes, he suffered significant injuries.

2 Brooks admitted that he knew there were skylights on the roof and that he could distinguish what was a skylight. He testified that due to the location of the Oxnard building next to a factory, the skylights were covered with a dusty film. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review Summary judgment is properly granted only if all papers submitted show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The trial court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence set forth in the papers except where such inferences are contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue of fact. (Ibid.) In examining the supporting and opposing papers, the moving party’s affidavits or declarations are strictly construed and those of the opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Szadolci v. Hollywood Park Operating Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 16, 19.) The moving party has the initial burden of showing that one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established. (Saelzer v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.) Where the moving party has carried that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show a triable issue of material fact. (Id. at p. 767.) On summary judgment, once the defendant establishes that the Privette presumption of non-liability pursuant to Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 (Privette) , applies, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether one of the exceptions applies. (Miller v. Roseville Lodge

3 No. 1293 (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 825, 834.) Our review of the trial court’s grant of the motion is de novo. (Saelzer v. Advanced Group 400, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 767.) II. Rules of Liability In Privette, supra, (1993) 5 Cal.4th, our Supreme Court held that a property owner hiring an independent contractor is not liable for work-related injuries suffered by an employee of the independent contractor. (Id. at p. 702.) The employee’s remedy is in workers’ compensation. (Ibid.) Brooks relies on an exception to the Privette rule stated in Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, holding that a landowner may be liable to an independent contractor’s employee for a concealed hazardous condition on the property. The landowner’s liability under this exception applies only where: 1) the landowner knew, or should have known, of a pre-existing latent or concealed hazardous condition on its property; 2) the contractor did not know and could not have reasonably discovered the hazardous condition; and 3) the landowner failed to warn the contractor about the condition. (Id. at p. 664.) III. Evidence One Miracle has established by uncontradicted evidence that both West Hills and Brooks’ employer KCM were independent contractors. Thus, One Miracle established that the Privette presumption of non-liability applies. (See Miller v. Roseville Lodge No. 1293, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 834.) Brooks relies on the declaration of William Dexter. Dexter is the former director of the Center for Construction Education at California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo. Dexter declared in part:

4 “The evidence submitted by [One Miracle] in support of the summary judgment motion, . . . , shows that [One Miracle] built the [Oxnard] building in 2004; with no other evidence, I can only assume that the skylights were installed at that time. The injuries sustained by Mr. Brooks were the result of two factors, namely failure by [One Miracle] to install the required fall restraint guards above or below the skylights during the original construction and failure to periodically replace the skylight domes after extended periods of exposure to the known harmful and deleterious effects of the [ultraviolet (UV)] spectrum of sunlight. “The relevant provision of the Code of California Regulations is [title 8, section 3212]: Floor Openings, Floor Holes, Skylights and Roofs. As amended with an operative date of November 8, 1993, this section of the code states in pertinent part as follows: “(e) Any employee approaching within 6 feet of any skylight shall be protected from falling through the skylight or skylight opening by any one of the following methods: [¶] (1) Skylight screens installed above the skylight . . . . [¶] (2) Skylight screens installed below the skylight . . . . “When the [Oxnard] building was constructed in 2004, therefore, it was subject to the laws mandating skylight screens, installed above or below the skylights. The description of the fall presented in the evidence shows no indication that any screen was ever present, and, the evidence submitted by the movant includes no reference to any screen ever having been installed. If such screens had been present, the fifteen-to-twenty-foot fall described by Mr. Brooks . . . would have been stopped much earlier.

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Related

Privette v. Superior Court
854 P.2d 721 (California Supreme Court, 1993)
Mitchell v. United National Insurance
25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627 (California Court of Appeal, 2005)
Szadolci v. Hollywood Park Operating Co.
14 Cal. App. 4th 16 (California Court of Appeal, 1993)
Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400
23 P.3d 1143 (California Supreme Court, 2001)
Reid v. Google, Inc.
235 P.3d 988 (California Supreme Court, 2010)
Kinsman v. Unocal Corp.
123 P.3d 931 (California Supreme Court, 2005)
Serri v. Santa Clara University
226 Cal. App. 4th 830 (California Court of Appeal, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
Brooks v. One Miracle Property CA2/6, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brooks-v-one-miracle-property-ca26-calctapp-2023.