24-359-cv Brookins v. Figuccio
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of June, two thousand twenty-five.
PRESENT: EUNICE C. LEE, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
Reverend Juan Jose Brookins, Trust Protector for the Claudio Bulent Akpinar Figuccio Trust, and Interpleader pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1335,
Plaintiff-Counter- Defendant-Appellant,
v. 24-359
Peter L. Blodnick, Defendant-Appellee,
Reverend Dr. Bill Akpinar,
Defendant-Cross- Defendant-Appellee,
Marc Ialenti,
Defendant-Counter- Claimant-Appellee,
Patricia Figuccio,
Defendant-Cross- Claimant-Counter- Claimant-Appellee. _____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: JUAN JOSE BROOKINS, pro se, Waterbury, CT.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Peter L. Blodnick, Peter L. Blodnick, Esq., P.C., Ronkonkoma, NY.
Bill Akpinar, pro se, Little Neck, NY.
Marc J. Ialenti, Ialenti & Macari, LLP, Mineola, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
2 District of New York (Brown, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Reverend Juan Jose Brookins, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district
court’s denial of his “motion for disqualification” of the district court judge,
following the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his case. In February 2022,
Brookins commenced this action against Patricia Figuccio, Marc Ialenti, Peter
Blodnick, and Reverend Dr. Bill Akpinar. The district court sua sponte dismissed
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In March 2023, this Court vacated
the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings because
Brookins had not been given notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to
dismissal. See Brookins v. Figuccio, No. 22-731-cv, 2023 WL 2579043, at *2 (2d Cir.
Mar. 21, 2023) (summary order).
On remand, the district court issued a show-cause order, directing Brookins
to respond as to why his complaint should not be dismissed. In October 2023, the
district court reviewed Brookins’s response and sua sponte dismissed his
complaint, without prejudice “to refiling by a licensed attorney within 21 days of
3 the date of [the] Order.” Brookins v. Figuccio, No. 22-CV-00891 (GRB) (ST), 2023
WL 6796393, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2023). The court reasoned that Brookins had
failed to show he could proceed pro se in representing the purported trust, and that
the action, “premised solely on state law claims,” did not appear to satisfy
diversity jurisdiction. Id.
Brookins moved for reconsideration and to disqualify the district court
judge, arguing that the judge denied him due process and equal access to the
courts by dismissing his case sua sponte without a hearing. The district court
denied the motions and entered judgment.
Brookins appealed. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining
facts and the procedural history.
I. Abandonment
We “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants,
reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” McLeod
v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting
Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007)). However, pro se appellants
must still comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a), which “requires
appellants in their briefs to provide the court with a clear statement of the issues
4 on appeal.” Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam). We
generally will not “manufacture claims of error” for a pro se party. LoSacco v. City
of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995).
In his brief, Brookins expressly disavows any claims related to the district
court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint or the denial of his reconsideration
motion. Instead, he argues only that the presiding judge improperly failed to
disqualify himself. Brookins has therefore abandoned any other arguments
related to the district court’s sua sponte dismissal and denial of reconsideration. See
id.; see also Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.C., 16 F.4th 1070, 1074 (2d Cir. 2021) (per
curiam).
II. Denial of Motion to Disqualify
“Recusal motions are committed to the sound discretion of the district court,
and [we] will reverse a decision denying such a motion only for abuse of
discretion.” LoCascio v. United States, 473 F.3d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
“Title 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a judge to recuse himself ‘in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Cox v. Onondaga Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 760 F.3d 139, 150 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting § 455(a)). “The standard
for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) is an objective one; the question is
5 whether an objective and disinterested observer, knowing and understanding all
of the facts and circumstances, could reasonably question the court’s impartiality.”
S.E.C. v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 29 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “[R]ecusal is not warranted where the only challenged conduct
‘consist[s] of judicial rulings, routine trial administration efforts, and ordinary
admonishments . . . to counsel and to witnesses,’ where the conduct occurs during
judicial proceedings, and where the judge ‘neither (1) relie[s] upon knowledge
acquired outside such proceedings nor (2) display[s] deep-seated and unequivocal
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24-359-cv Brookins v. Figuccio
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of June, two thousand twenty-five.
PRESENT: EUNICE C. LEE, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
Reverend Juan Jose Brookins, Trust Protector for the Claudio Bulent Akpinar Figuccio Trust, and Interpleader pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1335,
Plaintiff-Counter- Defendant-Appellant,
v. 24-359
Peter L. Blodnick, Defendant-Appellee,
Reverend Dr. Bill Akpinar,
Defendant-Cross- Defendant-Appellee,
Marc Ialenti,
Defendant-Counter- Claimant-Appellee,
Patricia Figuccio,
Defendant-Cross- Claimant-Counter- Claimant-Appellee. _____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: JUAN JOSE BROOKINS, pro se, Waterbury, CT.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Peter L. Blodnick, Peter L. Blodnick, Esq., P.C., Ronkonkoma, NY.
Bill Akpinar, pro se, Little Neck, NY.
Marc J. Ialenti, Ialenti & Macari, LLP, Mineola, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
2 District of New York (Brown, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Reverend Juan Jose Brookins, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district
court’s denial of his “motion for disqualification” of the district court judge,
following the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his case. In February 2022,
Brookins commenced this action against Patricia Figuccio, Marc Ialenti, Peter
Blodnick, and Reverend Dr. Bill Akpinar. The district court sua sponte dismissed
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In March 2023, this Court vacated
the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings because
Brookins had not been given notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to
dismissal. See Brookins v. Figuccio, No. 22-731-cv, 2023 WL 2579043, at *2 (2d Cir.
Mar. 21, 2023) (summary order).
On remand, the district court issued a show-cause order, directing Brookins
to respond as to why his complaint should not be dismissed. In October 2023, the
district court reviewed Brookins’s response and sua sponte dismissed his
complaint, without prejudice “to refiling by a licensed attorney within 21 days of
3 the date of [the] Order.” Brookins v. Figuccio, No. 22-CV-00891 (GRB) (ST), 2023
WL 6796393, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2023). The court reasoned that Brookins had
failed to show he could proceed pro se in representing the purported trust, and that
the action, “premised solely on state law claims,” did not appear to satisfy
diversity jurisdiction. Id.
Brookins moved for reconsideration and to disqualify the district court
judge, arguing that the judge denied him due process and equal access to the
courts by dismissing his case sua sponte without a hearing. The district court
denied the motions and entered judgment.
Brookins appealed. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining
facts and the procedural history.
I. Abandonment
We “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants,
reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” McLeod
v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting
Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007)). However, pro se appellants
must still comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a), which “requires
appellants in their briefs to provide the court with a clear statement of the issues
4 on appeal.” Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam). We
generally will not “manufacture claims of error” for a pro se party. LoSacco v. City
of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995).
In his brief, Brookins expressly disavows any claims related to the district
court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint or the denial of his reconsideration
motion. Instead, he argues only that the presiding judge improperly failed to
disqualify himself. Brookins has therefore abandoned any other arguments
related to the district court’s sua sponte dismissal and denial of reconsideration. See
id.; see also Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.C., 16 F.4th 1070, 1074 (2d Cir. 2021) (per
curiam).
II. Denial of Motion to Disqualify
“Recusal motions are committed to the sound discretion of the district court,
and [we] will reverse a decision denying such a motion only for abuse of
discretion.” LoCascio v. United States, 473 F.3d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
“Title 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a judge to recuse himself ‘in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Cox v. Onondaga Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 760 F.3d 139, 150 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting § 455(a)). “The standard
for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) is an objective one; the question is
5 whether an objective and disinterested observer, knowing and understanding all
of the facts and circumstances, could reasonably question the court’s impartiality.”
S.E.C. v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 29 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “[R]ecusal is not warranted where the only challenged conduct
‘consist[s] of judicial rulings, routine trial administration efforts, and ordinary
admonishments . . . to counsel and to witnesses,’ where the conduct occurs during
judicial proceedings, and where the judge ‘neither (1) relie[s] upon knowledge
acquired outside such proceedings nor (2) display[s] deep-seated and unequivocal
antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.’” Id. at 29–30 (quoting
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 556 (1994)).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying recusal. In
his motion for disqualification, Brookins did not assert allegations that would
suggest to an objective observer that the district court judge’s impartiality should
be questioned, or that the judge harbored “unequivocal antagonism” toward
Brookins. See id. at 30. Brookins asserted that the district court denied him due
process and equal access to the courts by dismissing his case sua sponte without a
hearing. But there was no evidence that the district court’s dismissal violated due
process or denied Brookins equal access to the courts. On remand, the district
6 court issued a show-cause order, offering Brookins notice of the court’s concerns
and an opportunity to respond before dismissing his complaint. The district court
subsequently issued a written order, reviewing Brookins’s response to the show-
cause order and explaining why the court concluded that dismissal was
warranted.
Brookins also made general assertions that the judge was biased, prejudiced,
and ignored the law. These assertions were baseless. An unfavorable ruling, by
itself, is “insufficient to establish the sort of extreme antagonism required for
disqualification.” Gallop v. Cheney, 645 F.3d 519, 521 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam);
see Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid
basis for a bias or partiality motion.”); Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552
F.3d 218, 227 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[A]dverse rulings, without more, will rarely suffice
to provide a reasonable basis for questioning a judge’s impartiality.”). Brookins
criticized the district court’s reference to his prior litigation, but the court’s
objective account of his other litigation was not a basis to “reasonably question the
court’s impartiality.” See Razmilovic, 738 F.3d at 29.
There was no basis for recusal, and the district court therefore did not abuse
its discretion in denying Brookins’s motion for disqualification.
7 * * *
We have considered Brookins’s remaining arguments and conclude they are
without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court