Brooke Carter v. Municipal Fire and Police Retirement System of Iowa

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: November 13, 2024
• Docket: 23-1504
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1504 Filed November 13, 2024

BROOKE CARTER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

MUNICIPAL FIRE AND POLICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF IOWA, Defendant-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McAllister,

Judge.

A former police sergeant appeals a district court ruling on certiorari affirming

a board’s finding that she is not entitled to accidental disability benefits for a mental

injury. AFFIRMED.

Charles Gribble and Christopher Stewart of Gribble, Boles, Stewart &

Witosky Law, Des Moines, for appellant.

Cynthia Boyle Lande and Jennifer L. Lindberg of Brown, Winick, Graves,

Gross and Baskerville, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Heard by Schumacher, P.J., Badding, J., and Vogel, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024). 2

BADDING, Judge.

Former police sergeant Brooke Carter sought accidental disability benefits

under Iowa Code chapter 411 (2022) for a mental injury she suffered after

watching a suspect’s vehicle intentionally ram into another officer’s squad car. The

Municipal Fire and Police Retirement System denied her claim for accidental

disability benefits and awarded her ordinary disability benefits instead. Carter

sought certiorari review from the district court, asserting the board of trustees for

the system acted illegally in denying her claim for accidental benefits because the

board applied the wrong legal causation standard, and its decision was not

supported by substantial evidence. The court denied Carter’s claims and annulled

the writ of certiorari.

Carter appeals, raising the same two claims as she did before the district

court—the first of which is an issue of first impression: whether the legal causation

standard recently set out in Tripp v. Scott Emergency Communications Center,

977 N.W.2d 459 (Iowa 2022) for workers’ compensation benefits based on mental

injuries applies to accidental disability benefits for police officers under

chapter 411. We conclude the court in Tripp did not overrule the occupation-

specific, greater-magnitude standard under chapter 411 from a pair of cases the

parties refer to as Cornish-Moon. See City of Cedar Rapids v. Mun. Fire & Police

Ret. Sys. (Cornish), 572 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Iowa 1998); Moon v. Mun. Fire & Police

Ret. Sys. (Moon), 548 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Iowa 1998). Using that standard, we

agree with the district court that the board’s decision denying Carter accidental

disability benefits was supported by substantial evidence. We accordingly affirm

the court’s judgment annulling Carter’s writ of certiorari. 3

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Brooke Carter worked as a police officer for the City of Waterloo for more

than thirty years, starting in 1990 when she was just twenty years old. In 2001,

Carter was promoted to sergeant and became a shift supervisor on patrol. During

one of her shifts in December 2014, Carter and two other officers—Ben Bloker and

Randall Hammitt—were dispatched to a disorderly conduct call involving Kelvin

Plain Jr. Dispatch notified the officers that Plain was outside the reporting party’s

residence making threats and cautioned that he was “dangerous, carries

weapons.” Carter was familiar with Plain and knew he did “not like law

enforcement officers whatsoever,” had a “volatile temper,” and “usually had a

weapon with him.”

Bloker arrived on the scene first. A video from his squad car captured the

officers’ interaction with Plain, who was sitting in a vehicle parked in the driveway.

Bloker described Plain as “highly agitated and very upset.” After talking to Plain

and the reporting party, Bloker told Plain that he needed to leave. Plain was still

very upset, according to Bloker, but drove away. As Plain was leaving, Hammitt

pulled up in his squad car, with Carter not far behind. Bloker filled them in on what

happened, and Carter decided to turn her car around at the dead-end street,

intending to “stay there until [the] officers had cleared the scene.” Hammitt was

still in his car, facing her. Meanwhile, Plain called the reporting party, who was

standing outside with Bloker. She answered on speaker phone, and Plain can be

heard on the video, ranting at her.

With her car turned around and facing the street, Carter saw Plain’s vehicle

come speeding back towards them, accelerating the whole time. She didn’t have 4

time to do anything except honk her horn to warn the other two officers. Bloker

heard the horn and drew his weapon, but he could not stop Plain before he rammed

into the back of Hammitt’s squad car. The impact pushed Hammitt’s car into a

parked car and then into Carter’s squad car, before slamming into a tree.

Because of how fast Plain was going when he hit Hammitt’s car—at least

fifty-seven miles per hour—both Carter and Bloker thought Hammitt died in the

crash. They drew their weapons and cautiously approached Plain’s vehicle, “fully

expect[ing] him to start shooting us.” But they managed to get Plain on the ground

and arrest him. As Carter and Bloker were handcuffing Plain, Hammitt climbed out

the passenger side of his squad car and ran over to assist them. None of the

officers suffered serious physical injuries from the incident.

But the traumatic incident continued to affect Carter mentally, with feelings

of extreme guilt, shame, and failure. She tried to cover up those feelings by

drinking alcohol, explaining the “worse the feelings got, the more I drank.”

Although this continued for years, Carter kept working as a police officer until

August 2021, when she sought substance-use treatment.

Carter completed an inpatient treatment program, following which she

sought counseling. She was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder,

substance use disorder, and anxiety, which her treatment providers linked to the

incident with Plain in December 2014. Carter did not return to the police

department after finishing treatment, instead applying for accidental disability

benefits in November 2021. The system’s executive director notified Carter in April

2022 that while she “qualified for an ordinary disability pension instead,” she was

not entitled to accidental disability benefits because the “evidence does not 5

establish [her] incapacity was caused by an incident which was unusually stressful

for police officer work.” Carter appealed that decision to a three-person disability

appeals committee from the system’s board of trustees. At the hearing on her

appeal, the City waived its right to present evidence or question Carter’s witnesses,

who included Carter, Bloker, Hammitt, and another officer.

Following the hearing, the committee denied Carter’s appeal for accidental

disability benefits but affirmed her award of ordinary disability benefits. The

committee first determined that Carter had to establish the legal causation

component of her claim under the Cornish-Moon standard, which provides that “an

accidental disability pension is payable under Iowa Code [chapter] 411 for a mental

injury only if the injury was caused by workplace stress of greater magnitude than

the day-to-day stresses experience by other police officers.” See Cornish, 572

N.W.2d at 922; Moon, 548 N.W.2d at 568. The committee found that because

Carter and other “officers often face dangerous suspects and entered this situation

aware that the suspect was likely armed,” the incident “was not above and beyond

the day to day stress experienced by other police officers.” The committee

alternatively found that if, as Carter urged, the supreme court meant to

replace the legal causation standard it adopted in Moon and Cornish with the standard it recently announced in the workers’ compensation context in Tripp, Applicant’s mental injury still does not meet that standard. For the Tripp standard to apply, there must be a readily identifiable event, which is sudden, traumatic, and unexpected or unusual. The Incident was not sudden, unexpected, or unusual.

The committee’s decision was ratified by the full board.

Carter then petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the district court, claiming

the board acted illegally by applying the wrong legal causation standard and 6

issuing a decision that was not supported by substantial evidence. In a thorough

and well-reasoned decision, the court annulled the writ. On Carter’s first claim, the

court found that “[u]ntil the Iowa Supreme Court says otherwise, the Cornish-Moon

test remains the legal causation test in Iowa for a chapter 411 disability action.” As

for her second claim, the court concluded “that substantial evidence supports the

[board’s] decision to deny the award of accidental disability retirement benefits

under both the Cornish-Moon legal causation standard that is the current law and

the Tripp legal causation standard that Carter urges the Court to apply.”

II. Standard of Review

Because Iowa Code chapter 411 lacks any appeal procedure, Carter

properly challenged the board’s decision through her certiorari action. See

Cornish, 572 N.W.2d at 921. We review a district court’s ruling in a certiorari action

for correction of errors at law. See Carstensen v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Ret. Sys.,

253 N.W.2d 560, 561 (Iowa 1977).

Certiorari actions are proper when an inferior board, exercising judicial functions, acts illegally. An inferior board acts illegally if it has not acted in accordance with a statute or if its decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Evidence is substantial “when a reasonable mind could accept it as adequate to reach the same findings.” Evidence is still substantial even though it would have supported contrary inferences.

Cornish, 572 N.W.2d at 921 (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

A. Legal Standard

Claims for accidental disability benefits under Iowa Code section 411.6(5)

are reviewed for “(1) permanent incapacity; (2) causation by a work duty; and

(3) ‘injury’ or ‘disease.’” Id. at 922. The parties do not dispute that Carter’s 7

disability is an injury resulting in permanent incapacity. But Carter must also prove

medical and legal causation. See id. (noting that in “workers’ compensation

cases, factual causation means medical causation: the employee’s injury must be

causally connected to the employee’s employment”). Only legal causation is at

issue here. See id. (explaining that “[l]egal causation is a policy question: How far

will the law extend responsibility to those consequences which have in fact been

produced?”).

Legal causation for mental injuries under section 411.6(5) is determined by

the Cornish-Moon standard referred to above: “the claimant must show that the

mental injury was caused (1) in fact by mental stimuli in the work environment,

and (2) by workplace stress ‘of greater magnitude than the day-to-day mental

stresses experienced by other workers employed in the same or similar jobs,

regardless of their employer.’” Moon, 548 N.W.2d at 568 (citation omitted). The

court in Moon adopted this standard from Dunlavey v. Economy Fire and Casualty

Co., 526 N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 1995), a workers’ compensation case under Iowa

Code chapter 85, concluding that “the rationale of Dunlavey would be equally

pertinent in a disability case under chapter 411.” In reaching this conclusion, the

court noted that “‘[h]istory shows a legislative intent . . . to treat persons entitled to

chapter 411 benefits and workers’ compensation benefits alike’ and ‘the systems

[chapters 411 and 85] are not identical but it is apparent they serve the same

purposes.’” Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Goebel v. City of

Cedar Rapids, 267 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Iowa 1978)).

Because the Cornish-Moon standard came from the workers’ compensation

realm, Carter asserts the supreme court’s decision in Tripp—which revamped the 8

legal causation standard under chapter 85 for mental injuries “traceable to a

readily identifiable work event,” 977 N.W.2d at 470—also applies to accidental

disability benefits under chapter 411. We disagree.

The issue before the court in Tripp was “whether Iowa’s workers’

compensation statute places on emergency responders a different, higher bar to

be eligible for benefits for trauma-induced mental injuries suffered on the job than

workers in other roles with identical injuries.”1 977 N.W.2d at 460. In concluding

it did not, the court explained:

Focusing on the employee’s own job in determining an “unexpected strain” places workers routinely tasked with addressing traumatic incidents, such as emergency dispatchers, paramedics, police officers, and firefighters, in a disfavored position as compared with other workers. They would bear a burden to prove hyper- unexpected causes and hyper-unusual strains—some extraordinary species of traumatic event, above and beyond the perilous events that they regularly confront—to qualify for benefits that those in less hazardous professions receive by meeting a far lower bar.

Id. at 466. Since nothing in the workers’ compensation statute required that result,

the court concluded that “[f]or mental injuries ‘based on a manifest happening of

a sudden traumatic nature from an unexpected cause or unusual strain’ legal

causation is established without regard to the regular duties of the particular

employee or other employees in similar positions.” Id. at 467 (citing Brown v. Quik

Trip Corp., 641 N.W.2d 725, 728–29 (Iowa 2002)).

Carter argues that because the “Tripp Court specifically referenced police

officers in holding that there is nothing that requires police officers to meet a higher

burden,” its standard must also apply to chapter 411 accidental disability benefits

1 The emergency responder in Tripp was a 911 dispatcher who answered a call

from the mother of a dead infant. 977 N.W.2d at 461. 9

for police officers. In further support of this argument, she notes the court in Tripp

stated the Cornish-Moon cases “offer[ed] little of substance” to its analysis. Id. at

468. But, as Tripp explained, “the words of the workers’ compensation statute”

were the polestar for its analysis. Id. at 467. And the court was careful to limit its

holding to workers’ compensation benefits: “Our workers’ compensation statute

doesn’t impose a higher burden on workers with jobs that involve frequent brushes

with traumatic events than workers in other occupations. Workers’ compensation,

it bears repeating, is a statutory creation, with eligibility for benefits determined by

what the statute provides.” Id. at 470.

For these reasons, we agree with the district court that while Tripp may have

“call[ed] into question the continuing viability of the Cornish-Moon legal causation

test going forward, at least for now, that legal standard remains the governing law

in a chapter 411 disability case in Iowa.”2 See id. at 482 (Waterman, J.,

dissenting) (stating the “majority effectively overrules Moon, where we had

2 We note that effective July 1, 2024, section 411.6(5) was amended to add a new

paragraph: To establish that a mental incapacity occurred as the natural and proximate result of an injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by the actual performance of duty or arising out of and in the course of the employment, or while acting, pursuant to order, outside of the city by which the member is regularly employed, the member must demonstrate that the mental incapacity is traceable to a readily identifiable work event constituting a manifest happening of a sudden traumatic nature from an unexpected cause or unusual strain in the workplace. Whether an incident is traumatic, unexpected, or unusual is determined by comparing the incident, and not the effect on the member, to the experiences of other police officers or fire fighters in Iowa. A member must be able to trace their mental injury to a specific event or events in the workplace to be eligible for accidental disability benefits. Iowa Code § 411.6(5)(0d) (Supp. 2024). 10

confirmed that the compensability of a first responder’s mental injury triggered by

one or two specific incidents is determined under Dunlavey by reference to the

claimant’s occupation as a police officer”). Because the court in Tripp did not

expressly overrule the Cornish-Moon legal causation standard for accidental

disability benefits under chapter 411 for mental injuries, we conclude the board

did not act illegally in applying that standard to Carter’s claim. See State v. Miller,

841 N.W.2d 583, 584 n.1 (Iowa 2014) (“Generally, it is the role of the supreme

court to decide if case precedent should no longer be followed.”).

B. Substantial Evidence

This brings us to the determinative question on appeal—whether the

board’s decision denying Carter accidental disability benefits under the Cornish-

Moon standard was supported by substantial evidence?3 We find no error of law

in the district court’s conclusion that it was.

In denying Carter’s claim, the board considered a non-exclusive five-factor

test to determine whether the incident involved “workplace stress ‘of greater

magnitude than the day-to-day mental stresses experienced by other workers

employed in the same or similar jobs, regardless of their employer.’” Moon, 548

N.W.2d at 568 (citation omitted). Those factors included:

(1) whether the incident(s) is something for which the member received training; (2) whether, with respect to the incident(s), the member’s department or supervisor followed or deviated from standard protocols in the profession; (3) the member’s degree of familiarity with a victim prior to the incident; (4) the culpability or

3 Although the board also applied the Tripp standard in denying Carter’s claim for

accidental disability benefits, we need not address Carter’s argument that its decision under that standard was not supported by substantial evidence since we have concluded that the board correctly applied the Cornish-Moon standard. 11

innocence of the victim(s); and (5) whether the incident occurred in close proximity to other more stressful incidents.

Under those factors, the board found:

There was no testimony that Applicant’s department or supervisors failed to follow standard protocols in connection with the Incident. While no evidence was presented as to whether Applicant had received training for situations similar to the Incident, Applicant testified that it was common for her to assist with difficult situations, and she and the other officers were aware the suspect had a history of carrying weapons and assaulting officers when they arrived at the call on December 14. The Incident involved a potential for severe injury to an individual who was a colleague and friend to Applicant. . . . The Committee recognizes that fact. However, in light of the fact that Applicant and officers often face dangerous suspects and entered this situation aware that the suspect was likely armed, the Committee assesses that the Incident was not above and beyond the day to day stress experienced by other police officers.

Carter challenges these findings with other evidence in the record, including

that “each of the seasoned officers involved testified they had never been involved

in a similar incident so traumatic” and that while the officers may have been

prepared for a physical confrontation with Plain, they were not prepared for what

actually occurred—“an attack by vehicle . . . with the intent to kill or injure one of

the police officers.” See Cornish, 572 N.W.2d at 925 (“[T]he more extraordinary

the incident the greater the stress”).

While this evidence could support a finding that the stress of the incident

went beyond the day-to-day stress of other police officers, our review is narrow.

See Kirkman v. Disability Appeals Comm., Mun. Fire and Police Ret. Sys of Iowa,

No. 01-1963, 2002 WL 31757508, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2002) (affirming

the board’s denial of accidental disability benefits despite conflicting evidence

about the unusually traumatic nature of the incident); accord Cornish, 572 N.W.2d

at 925–26; Moon, 548 N.W.2d at 569–70. As the court in Cornish explained, 12

Evidence is not insubstantial merely because it would have supported contrary inferences; nor is evidence insubstantial because of a possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from it. In determining whether evidence is substantial to support a decision, the ultimate question is not whether the evidence supports a different finding, but whether the evidence supports the finding actually made.

572 N.W.2d at 926 (internal citation omitted). Because Carter had the burden of

proof on her claim, which she failed to meet before the board, she can prevail on

appeal only if she “was entitled to such benefits as a matter of law.” Moon, 548

N.W.2d at 569. We agree with the district court that, given “the sad reality of police

work,” Carter did not meet this standard for the reasons the board stated. See,

e.g., Chiafos v. Mun. Fire & Police Ret. Sys., 591 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 1999)

(stating significant physical traumas are “not unusual in the often violent

experience of police officers”). Buttressing the board’s decision is evidence that

the officers knew Plain disliked law enforcement; Plain was still “very upset” when

he drove away, only to call back minutes later screaming at the reporting party;

and the entire event was short—with Hammitt jumping out of his squad car and

joining the other officers within sixty seconds after the crash.

Yet Carter urges that we should reach a different result because there was

no conflicting evidence in the record about the unexpectedly traumatic nature of

the event since the “City was present at the hearing but declined to participate and

offered no witness[es] or exhibits.” As stated above, however, the question is not

whether the evidence is unrebutted but whether the evidence—rebutted or not—

“supports the finding actually made.” See Cornish, 572 N.W.2d at 926. The board,

which includes police officers, “is more than qualified to weigh the evidence and

determine what are and what are not unusually stressful incidents for police 13

officers” because “of its members’ own work experience.” Id.; accord Kirkman,

2002 WL 31757508, at *3.

For these reasons, we conclude the district court correctly determined that

substantial evidence supported the board’s denial of accidental disability benefits

for Carter’s mental injury.

AFFIRMED.