Brogdon v. Hallman

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Brogdon v. Hallman

167 S.E.2d 673, 119 Ga. App. 464, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 1140

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedMarch 13, 1969

Docket43862

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 167 S.E.2d 673 (Brogdon v. Hallman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brogdon v. Hallman, 167 S.E.2d 673, 119 Ga. App. 464, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 1140 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969).

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Opinions

Deen, Judge.

1. Where one by a course of dealing with an innocent (uninformed) third party indicates that another is [465]*465acting as his agent and has been clothed with certain authority, and this course of dealing induces the third party to deal with the supposed agent, the principal is estopped to deny that the purported agent is in fact such or is not in fact acting within the scope of the authority granted. Equitable Credit Corp. v. Johnson, 86 Ga. App. 844 (72 SE2d 816); Cable Co. v. Walker, 127 Ga. 65 (56 SE 108); Glover v. Summerour, 165 Ga. 513 (141 SE 211); Germain Co. v. Bank of Camden County, 14 Ga. App. 88 (80 SE 302).

2. There is a prima facie presumption of fact that household effects used by a husband and wife jointly are the property of the husband. Black v. State, 41 Ga. App. 349 (2) (152 SE 922). There is also a presumption that a state of affairs once shown to exist continues to exist until the contrary appears. Coleman & Burden Co. v. Rice, 105 Ga. 163 (31 SE 424). Where, therefore, although title to a pleasure boat is in fact in the wife’s name, it appears from undisputed evidence that the parties went together to use the boat and purchase supplies for it at the defendant’s marina, the husband appearing to be in charge of the boat and paying the charges thereon, and where the husband returned later and again left the boat at the marina, incurring additional storage charges, the defendant had a right to assume either that the boat belonged to the husband or that, if it in fact belonged to the wife, the husband had authority to use it in the manner in which it was being used. “Where a wife permits her husband to manage and control her property or allows him so to deal with it as to induce others to believe that it is his property or that he is acting as her authorized agent, such facts are sufficient to establish the agency in favor of persons who deal with him in such belief, where she knows that her husband is so managing and controlling her property and makes no objection thereto.” Aronoff v. Woodard, 47 Ga. App. 725 (5) (171 SE 404). The undisputed evidence here shows that after the parties had jointly used the boat at the marina they separated and the husband returned it to the defendant’s premises; that the wife, knowing these facts, took no steps to inform him that it was her property or that her husband was not authorized to incur charges against it, and that he did in fact have her authorization to take the boat out and use it for his pleasure. Accordingly, where the defendant sought by retaining the boat to enforce his lien to [466]*466the extent of unpaid storage charges, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in his favor for this amount in the action of the plaintiff wife to recover the boat in trover without the charges thereon first being paid. This case is distinguished from Wilkinson v. Townsend, 96 Ga. App. 179 (99 SE2d 539) and Stephens v. Millirons Garage, 109 Ga. App. 832 (137 SE2d 563), where the owner’s property was taken to a garage without the owner’s knowledge or assent by a person without either actual or apparent authority to act for him.

Argued September 9, 1968 Decided March 13, 1969— Rehearing denied April 3, 1969 Dor emus & Karsman, William Green, for appellant. Oliver, Maner & Gray, Thomas S. Gray, Jr., for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

Bell, P. J., Jordan, P. J., Hall and Quillian, JJ., concur. Felton, C. J., Eberhardt, Pannell and Whitman, JJ., dissent.

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Deen, Judge.

1. Where one by a course of dealing with an innocent (uninformed) third party indicates that another is [465]*465acting as his agent and has been clothed with certain authority, and this course of dealing induces the third party to deal with the supposed agent, the principal is estopped to deny that the purported agent is in fact such or is not in fact acting within the scope of the authority granted. Equitable Credit Corp. v. Johnson, 86 Ga. App. 844 (72 SE2d 816); Cable Co. v. Walker, 127 Ga. 65 (56 SE 108); Glover v. Summerour, 165 Ga. 513 (141 SE 211); Germain Co. v. Bank of Camden County, 14 Ga. App. 88 (80 SE 302).

2. There is a prima facie presumption of fact that household effects used by a husband and wife jointly are the property of the husband. Black v. State, 41 Ga. App. 349 (2) (152 SE 922). There is also a presumption that a state of affairs once shown to exist continues to exist until the contrary appears. Coleman & Burden Co. v. Rice, 105 Ga. 163 (31 SE 424). Where, therefore, although title to a pleasure boat is in fact in the wife’s name, it appears from undisputed evidence that the parties went together to use the boat and purchase supplies for it at the defendant’s marina, the husband appearing to be in charge of the boat and paying the charges thereon, and where the husband returned later and again left the boat at the marina, incurring additional storage charges, the defendant had a right to assume either that the boat belonged to the husband or that, if it in fact belonged to the wife, the husband had authority to use it in the manner in which it was being used. “Where a wife permits her husband to manage and control her property or allows him so to deal with it as to induce others to believe that it is his property or that he is acting as her authorized agent, such facts are sufficient to establish the agency in favor of persons who deal with him in such belief, where she knows that her husband is so managing and controlling her property and makes no objection thereto.” Aronoff v. Woodard, 47 Ga. App. 725 (5) (171 SE 404). The undisputed evidence here shows that after the parties had jointly used the boat at the marina they separated and the husband returned it to the defendant’s premises; that the wife, knowing these facts, took no steps to inform him that it was her property or that her husband was not authorized to incur charges against it, and that he did in fact have her authorization to take the boat out and use it for his pleasure. Accordingly, where the defendant sought by retaining the boat to enforce his lien to [466]*466the extent of unpaid storage charges, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in his favor for this amount in the action of the plaintiff wife to recover the boat in trover without the charges thereon first being paid. This case is distinguished from Wilkinson v. Townsend, 96 Ga. App. 179 (99 SE2d 539) and Stephens v. Millirons Garage, 109 Ga. App. 832 (137 SE2d 563), where the owner’s property was taken to a garage without the owner’s knowledge or assent by a person without either actual or apparent authority to act for him.

Argued September 9, 1968 Decided March 13, 1969— Rehearing denied April 3, 1969 Dor emus & Karsman, William Green, for appellant. Oliver, Maner & Gray, Thomas S. Gray, Jr., for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

Bell, P. J., Jordan, P. J., Hall and Quillian, JJ., concur. Felton, C. J., Eberhardt, Pannell and Whitman, JJ., dissent.

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Bluebook (online)

167 S.E.2d 673, 119 Ga. App. 464, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 1140, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brogdon-v-hallman-gactapp-1969.

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