Brock v. CVS Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 20, 2022
Docket7:22-cv-04014
StatusUnknown

This text of Brock v. CVS Corporation (Brock v. CVS Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brock v. CVS Corporation, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

Fusde br □□ | DOCUMEN □ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT p LEC BPLONTS Ai □□ SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK poe TERRELL K. BROCK, Poa S19 | VW Plaintiff, -against- 22-CV-4014 (VB) CVS CORPORATION; MANAGER LEO; CITY ORDER OF SERVICE OF WHITE PLAINS; WHITE PLAINS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendants. VINCENT L. BRICCETTI, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at the Orleans Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that in April 2020, he was falsely arrested on two occasions, and that in both instances the charges were dismissed. By order dated May 17, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).' STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,”

! Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). DISCUSSION A. Claims against the WPDPS Plaintiff’s claims against the WPDPS must be dismissed because city agencies or departments do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law. See Omnipoint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F. Supp. 2d 539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In New York, agencies of a municipality are not suable entities.”); Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Under New York law, departments which are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and cannot sue or be sued.””); see also N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 2 (“The term ‘municipal corporation,’ as used in this chapter, includes only a county, town, city and village.”). B. Claims against John or J ane Doe WPDPS police officers In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against the WPDPS police officers who arrested him, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against those police officers, and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this action to replace the WPDPS with WPDPS John or Jane Doe police officers. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses the Doe officers may wish to assert. Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the district court in identifying a defendant. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). In the complaint, Plaintiff supplies sufficient information to permit the City of White Plains Law Department to identify the John or Doe WPDPS police officers who arrested Plaintiff in the CVS store on Mamaroneck Avenue on April 13, 2020, and at an unknown location on April 3, 2020. It is therefore ordered that the City of White Plains Law Department, which is the attorney for and agent of the WPDPS, must

ascertain the identity and badge number of each John or Jane Doe police officer whom Plaintiff seeks to sue here and the address where each defendant may be served. The City of White Plains Law Department must provide this information to Plaintiff and the Court within sixty days of the date of this order. Within thirty days of receiving this information, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint naming the John or Jane Doe defendants. The amended complaint will replace, not supplement, the original complaint. An amended complaint form that Plaintiff should complete is attached to this order. Once Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint, the Court will screen the amended complaint and, if necessary, issue an order directing the Clerk of Court to complete the USM-285 forms with the addresses for the named John or Jane Doe Defendants and deliver all documents necessary to effect service to the U.S. Marshals Service. C. Order of service Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, Plaintiff is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process .. . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP)). Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that summonses and the complaint be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served summonses and the complaint until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that summonses be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date summonses are issued. If the complaint is not served within that time, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for service); see also Murray v.

Pataki, 378 F. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (“As long as the [plaintiff proceeding IFP] provides the information necessary to identify the defendant, the Marshals’ failure to effect service automatically constitutes ‘good cause’ for an extension of time within the meaning of Rule 4(m).”). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants CVS Corporation, “Manager Leo,” and the City of White Plains through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (““USM-285 form”) for each of these defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses and deliver to the Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon these defendants.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Murray v. Pataki
378 F. App'x 50 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange
658 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D. New York, 2009)
Hall v. City of White Plains
185 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D. New York, 2002)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
Brock v. CVS Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brock-v-cvs-corporation-nysd-2022.