[Cite as Broadview Hts. v. Vukotic, 2025-Ohio-5855.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CITY OF BROADVIEW HEIGHTS, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114923 v. :
PETAR VUKOTIC, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 31, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Parma Municipal Court Case No. 24TRD13811
Appearances:
Dean DiPiero, City of Broadview Heights Assistant Prosecutor, for appellee.
Petar Vukotic, pro se.
LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:
Petar Vukotic (“Vukotic”) appeals his convictions for improper lane
usage and distracted driving. After a thorough review of the law and the facts, we
affirm. I. Facts and Procedural History
A. Before Trial
On October 14, 2024, the City of Broadview Heights charged Vukotic
with Count 1, improper lane usage, and Count 2, texting while driving, in violation
of Broadview Heights Mun.Code 432.08 and 432.43, respectively. Vukotic pled not
guilty to both counts.
The court scheduled a pretrial hearing for November 18, 2024.
Vukotic filed a motion to continue the hearing. The court granted this motion,
continuing the hearing until December 16, 2024.
Vukotic filed a “Discovery Motion Request” on November 4, 2024.
Vukotic filed a motion to dismiss on December 16, 2024. Attached to
the motion were several documents that the City had provided him in response to
his request for discovery. Also attached were documents regarding the purported
impact of this case on his employment. The court denied the motion to dismiss on
the record during the December 16, 2024 pretrial hearing.
Vukotic filed another motion to dismiss on January 6, 2025. That
same day, the case proceeded to a bench trial. Before trial, on the record, the court
denied Vukotic further discovery and denied his second motion to dismiss. During
trial, the City elicited the following testimony.
B. Trial Testimony
Officer Nick Kashi (“Ofc. Kashi”) testified that he was a patrolman for
the Broadview Heights Police Department and was on duty on October 14, 2024. That day, he observed a car (“the Chevy”) exit a post office parking lot and drive to a
gas station. He estimated that these locations were a quarter of a mile apart. Driving
behind the Chevy, Ofc. Kashi saw that the car’s tires were “crossing over the solid
line into the . . . lane towards the left” for “almost the whole way” between the post
office and gas station.
Ofc. Kashi followed the Chevy and “got over one lane” to its right. He
saw that the Chevy’s driver “had his head down” and “was on his phone, texting or
doing whatever he was doing.” Ofc. Kashi drove into the gas station parking lot and
exited his car. He approached the Chevy and spoke to its driver, whom he identified
in the courtroom as Vukotic. According to Ofc. Kashi, Vukotic “apologiz[ed] that he
was on his phone looking up . . . why the post office was closed that day,” which was
a federal holiday. Ofc. Kashi then issued Vukotic a citation.
On cross-examination, Ofc. Kashi stated that he believed the Chevy
belonged to Vukotic. He could not remember why he indicated in the citation that
Vukotic nearly caused a collision.
C. Verdict, Sentencing, and this Appeal
The court found Vukotic guilty of both Counts 1 and 2. The court
sentenced Vukotic immediately, imposing a $50 fine for each count, for a total fine
of $100.
Vukotic appealed, raising the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court’s failure to grant the Appellant’s first motion to dismiss. The trial court erred by siding with the prosecution’s inaccurate legal argument and denied the Appellant’s first motion to dismiss solely based on a false legal premise, i.e. that civil procedure rules never apply to criminal cases.
2. The trial court erred by granting a time extension to the prosecution at pre-trial without a stated articulable excuse, good cause or excusable neglect as according to the requirements of Crim.P.R. 16 and Crim.P.R. 45. A continuance was granted even though the prosecution had no intention of complying with the discovery request because it was operating under the false legal premise that civil procedure rules can never apply to criminal cases.
3. The trial court did not issue any appropriate orders or sanctions prescribed by procedural rules to enforce discovery. During pre-trial the discovery deadlines were ignored and during the trial the court outright refused to issue any sanctions for untimely and incomplete discovery.
4. The trial court’s failure to adhere to the principle of stare decisis and binding case law precedent deprived the Appellant of due process. Regardless of how many legal precedents were cited by the Appellant, the trial court’s overall attitude was that legal precedent did not apply to the Parma Municipal Court in any form or fashion.
5. At trial, the court conceded that discovery was incomplete yet took no measures to enforce disclosure or issues sanctions or court orders.
6. The trial court ignored the fact that the prosecution failed to produce all discovery within the fourteen day deadline as according to Civ.P.R. 6 Div.(C)(1). Discovery deadlines were entirely disregarded by the trial court and the prosecution.
7. The trial court incorrectly denied the Appellant’s second motion to dismiss by misinterpreting what evidence qualifies as valid discovery. Civil procedure rules were completely ignored and disregarded as irrelevant.
8. The prosecution’s failure to disclose before trial that the Broadview Heights Police Department does not have dashboard cameras installed in their vehicles severely prejudiced the Appellant’s case preparation.
9. The trial court failed to compel complete discovery disclosures in a timely manner and thus violated the Appellant’s statutory rights. 10. The trial court failed to issue any sanctions for repeated violations and non-compliance of discovery and thus violated the Appellant’s rights and denied the Appellant a fair trial.
11. The trial court’s reliance on a misinterpretation of procedural law and prejudicial conduct rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.
12. The trial court denied the Appellant’s second motion to dismiss without sound legal justification.
13. Despite Appellant’s duly noted objections to the proceedings and the witness testimony, the trial court allowed the officer to testify and the trial to proceed.
14. The trial court’s outright refusal to preclude the officer’s witness testimony in direct defiance of Criminal Procedural Rule 16(K) was a violation of procedure and due process. No witness testimony summary was provided to the Appellant that coincided with what the officer testified to during the trial.
15. The trial court erred by finding the Appellant guilty on both counts. Although Appellant’s objections to the proceedings were duly noted by the trial court, all laws cited, motions and exhibits filed and every argument made by the Appellant was dismissed as irrelevant.
II. Law and Analysis
For ease of analysis, we address Vukotic’s assignments of error
together and out of order.
A. Assignments of Error Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11 — The Trial Court did not err in its Handling of Vukotic’s Discovery Requests
Vukotic asserts that the court erred when it failed to compel the City
to provide documents in response to his discovery requests.1 We disagree.
1 Assignments of error Nos. 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10 explicitly address discovery issues.
Vukotic’s arguments supporting assignments of error Nos. 4 and 11 also implicate the trial court’s treatment of his discovery requests. Crim.R. 16(B) addresses the prosecution’s obligation to provide
information upon a criminal defendant’s request for discovery. Crim.R. 16(B)(1)-(7)
list various types of documents that a prosecuting attorney is required to provide or
make available to the defense. The purpose of these disclosures is “‘to provide the
parties in a criminal case with the information necessary for a full and fair
adjudication of the facts, to protect the integrity of the justice system, the rights of
defendants, and the well-being of witnesses, victims, and society at large.’” S. Euclid
v. Fayne, 2015-Ohio-1378, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting Crim.R. 16(A). The documents
that Vukotic seeks, discussed in more detail below, implicate only the requirement
that the City provide “[a]ny evidence favorable to the defendant and material to guilt
or punishment.” Crim.R. 16(B)(5).
Further, we note that Crim.R. 16(B)(5) incorporates language from
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which established that “suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” (Emphasis
added.)2 Brady at 87. Applying this language, we have found that the prosecution
was not required to disclose information that was “publicly available,” including that
which could be obtained through an internet-based search. State v. McGuire, 2018-
Ohio-1390, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.). Courts require defendants “to substantiate claims that
the evidence in question was favorable and material.” Id. at ¶ 28.
2 Crim.R. 16(B) imposes on the prosecution additional discovery requirements that
go beyond the holding in Brady but that do not apply to this case. Before trial, on the record, the court addressed each of Vukotic’s
discovery requests. The City represented that ten of Vukotic’s discovery requests
sought information that did not exist. On these requests, we find no error in the
court’s decision not to grant Vukotic’s motion to compel. See State v. Linden, 2017-
Ohio-4439, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.) (“Crim.R. 16(B) does not impose a duty upon the state
to produce evidence that does not exist.”). Vukotic conceded that the City
adequately answered an additional three of his requests. In all, the City
acknowledged that two of Vukotic’s discovery requests concerned existing
information that it had not provided — records of Ofc. Kashi’s training and prior
traffic citations that Ofc. Kashi had issued. After a hearing on these two requests,
the trial court denied Vukotic’s motion to compel.
We review the court’s ruling on Vukotic’s discovery motions for an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Counts, 2022-Ohio-3666, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). An abuse
of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way,
in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Abdullah v.
Johnson, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. An abuse of discretion “‘implies that the court’s
attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’” W.A.F.P., Inc. v. Sky Fuel
Inc., 2024-Ohio-3297, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), quoting Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio
St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
We find that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
compel the City to provide Ofc. Kashi’s training records. Nothing before us
substantiates Vukotic’s claim that the information in these records would be material to this case or favorable to the defense, under Crim.R. 16(B)(5). Vukotic
introduced no evidence and did not cross-examine Ofc. Kashi on his training. He
raised no arguments about what information Ofc. Kashi’s training records may
contain. And as in McGuire, Ofc. Kashi’s training records can be found using an
internet-search engine.3
We also find nothing in the record that substantiates Vukotic’s claim
that the information contained in Ofc. Kashi’s other citations is material to this case
or favorable to the defense. Nothing before us indicates that these citations would
provide insight as to Vukotic’s alleged conduct, rather than the conduct of other
drivers. Again, Vukotic did not introduce evidence, cross-examine Ofc. Kashi
regarding prior traffic citations, or explain what information these citations may
include that would be pertinent to his defense in this case.
In sum, Vukotic has not demonstrated that the City deprived him of
the information necessary for a full and fair adjudication of the facts, in accord with
the purpose of Crim.R. 16. See Fayne, 2015-Ohio-1378, at ¶ 9. We cannot say that
further information as to Ofc. Kashi’s qualifications and service was required to
evaluate his simple, naked-eye observations that Vukotic failed to keep his car in a
single lane and was using his phone while driving.
We lastly find no merit in Vukotic’s argument that the City’s
disclosures were untimely and that he was prejudiced thereby. Vukotic maintains
3 The Ohio Peace Officer Training Academy publishes current and former peace
officer training records online. that the court should have applied discovery timelines in the Rules of Civil
Procedure. We acknowledge that, in certain circumstances, Crim.R. 57(B) requires
courts to “look to the rules of civil procedure . . . if no rule of criminal procedure
exists.” The court did not err in not doing so here. Again, Crim.R. 16 addresses
discovery in criminal cases, and Vukotic has raised no issue that the rule fails to
contemplate. Further, it appears from Vukotic’s motions to dismiss that the City’s
production in response to Vukotic’s discovery requests amounted to five pages,
provided the week before trial. Given the simple nature of this case, we cannot say
that the timing of this disclosure left Vukotic inadequate time to prepare or
otherwise prejudiced his defense.
The court did not err by not ordering the City to provide Vukotic
additional information in discovery. Accordingly, assignments of error Nos. 3, 4, 5,
6, 8, 9, 10, and 11 are overruled.
B. Assignments of Error Nos. 1, 7, and 12 — The Trial Court did not err in Denying Vukotic’s Motions to Dismiss
Vukotic asserts that the court erred in denying both of his motions to
dismiss, which were based on his claim that the City withheld information in
response to his discovery requests. “[A] trial court may dismiss an indictment with
prejudice as an appropriate sanction for the State’s failure to comply with a
discovery request.” State v. Simmons, 2008-Ohio-682, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). However,
as discussed above, Vukotic has not demonstrated that the City failed to comply with
his discovery requests.
Accordingly, assignments of error Nos. 1, 7, and 12 are overruled. C. Assignment of Error No. 2 — Vukotic has not Identified an Erroneously Granted Continuance
Vukotic asserts that the court erred in granting the City a
continuance, at a time and in a manner that he does not specify. The lower court
docket does not reflect that the court continued this case at the City’s request. In
fact, it appears that Vukotic sought the only continuance of this case, which the court
granted, rescheduling his pretrial hearing from November 18, 2024, to December
16, 2024.
To the extent that Vukotic contests the court’s decision to set his trial
for January 6, 2025, we find no error. A trial court has the discretion to schedule
and continue hearings. Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2010-Ohio-2347, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.). In
so doing, “[t]he trial court must balance its own interests of maintaining its docket
with the potential prejudice to the parties.” Id. We find no merit in Vukotic’s
suggestion that the court should have tried this case on December 16, 2024,
immediately after the pretrial hearing. Doing so would have prejudiced the City,
because the record does not indicate that its only witness — Ofc. Kashi — was present
in court that day. Further, during the pretrial hearing, Vukotic did not object to his
trial date.
Accordingly, assignment of error No. 2 is overruled.
D. Assignments of Error Nos. 13 and 14 — The Trial Court did not err in Permitting Ofc. Kashi to Testify
Vukotic asserts that the court should have excluded Ofc. Kashi’s
testimony because of the City’s purported failure to provide discovery. Also, Vukotic asserts that Ofc. Kashi’s testimony should have been excluded because, citing
Crim.R. 16(K), the City did not provide a report summarizing it.
We acknowledge that “[a] court may sanction a party for failing to
comply with a discovery order by excluding evidence.” State ex. Rel. Dewine v.
ARCO Recycling, Inc., 2022-Ohio-1758, ¶ 54 (8th Dist.). Again, however, Vukotic
has not identified any failure to provide discovery that would support precluding
Ofc. Kashi from testifying.
The City was not required to provide a report concerning Ofc. Kashi’s
testimony because he did not testify as an expert. Crim.R. 16(K) states that “[a]n
expert witness for either side shall prepare a written report summarizing the expert
witness’s testimony, findings, analysis, conclusions, or opinion, and shall include a
summary of the expert’s qualifications.” In relevant part, Ohio Evid.R. 702 states
that “a witness may testify as an expert” if “[t]he witness’ testimony is based on
reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized information and the expert’s
opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of
the case.” Compare with Evid.R. 602, stating that “subject to the provisions of Rule
702,” a “witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient
to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”
Ofc. Kashi testified about his firsthand observations of Vukotic’s driving and phone
use. He did not offer an expert opinion. For the reasons above, the court did not err by allowing the City to
introduce Ofc. Kashi’s testimony, which did not require an expert report.
Accordingly, assignments of error Nos. 13 and 14 are overruled.
E. Assignment of Error No. 15 — Defendant’s Conviction was Supported by Sufficient Evidence and not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence
Vukotic asserts that the trial court “erred by finding [him] guilty on
both counts.” Whether Vukotic intended this assignment of error to challenge the
sufficiency or the manifest weight of the evidence is not clear. So, although the terms
“sufficiency and “weight” of the evidence are “quantitatively and qualitatively
different,” we address these related issues together, while applying distinct
standards of review. See State v. Perry, 2018-Ohio-487, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing State
v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
“A claim of insufficient evidence raises the question whether the
evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law.” State v.
Parker, 2022-Ohio-1237, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins at 386. The relevant
inquiry in a sufficiency challenge is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime existed beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
When making a sufficiency determination, an appellate court does
not review whether the prosecution’s evidence is to be believed but whether, if believed, the evidence admitted at trial supports the conviction. State v. Starks,
2009-Ohio-3375, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins at 386. Under a sufficiency
challenge, witness credibility is immaterial.
The City introduced sufficient evidence to support Vukotic’s
conviction for improper lane usage. Broadview Heights Mun.Code 432.08(A)
states, in relevant part, that “[a] vehicle shall be driven, as nearly as is practicable,
entirely within a single lane or line of traffic . . . .” Ofc. Kashi testified that the tires
of Vukotic’s Chevy were “crossing over the solid line into the . . . lane towards the
left” for “almost the whole way” between the post office and gas station. From this
testimony, a rational factfinder could determine that Vukotic did not drive his
vehicle within a single lane, as section 432.08(A) requires.
The City also introduced sufficient evidence to support Vukotic’s
conviction for distracted driving. Broadview Heights Mun.Code 432.43 provides
that “[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle on any street, highway, or property
open to the public for vehicular traffic while using, holding, or physically supporting
with any part of the person’s body an electronic wireless communications device.”
Ofc. Kashi testified that he saw Vukotic driving with “his head down” and that he
“was on his phone.” When Ofc. Kashi spoke to Vukotic in the gas station parking
lot, Vukotic “apologiz[ed] that he was on his phone looking up . . . why the post office
was closed that day.” A rational factfinder could determine, based on this testimony,
that Vukotic was, at a minimum, using an electronic wireless-communications
device while operating a motor vehicle, as section 432.43 prohibits. 2. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
In contrast to sufficiency, a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence
challenge “addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief,” i.e., “whose evidence
is more persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s?” State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-
2202, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386-387. When considering an
appellant’s claim that a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the
Ohio Supreme Court recently explained that “[the] court looks at the entire record
and ‘“weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of
witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”’” State v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-
2804, ¶ 30, quoting Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d
172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
At trial, the jury is in the “best position to view the witnesses and
observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections that are critical observations
in determining the credibility of a witness and his or her testimony.” State v.
Sheline, 2019-Ohio-528, ¶ 100 (8th Dist.). Reversal on manifest-weight grounds is
reserved for the “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting Martin at 175.
Vukotic’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Vukotic called no witnesses and declined to testify. As such, nothing in
the record indicates that his car’s lane-assist technology prevented it from occupying multiple lanes, as he argued on appeal. For the same reason, no evidence supports
his claim that his phone was mounted to the Chevy’s dashboard.
Further, we cannot say that the factfinder lost its way in believing the
testimony of the sole witness in this case. During cross-examination, Vukotic did
not question Ofc. Kashi about his observations that the Chevy had occupied multiple
lanes or that he used his phone while driving. We are not persuaded by Vukotic’s
argument that Ofc. Kashi’s testimony should be entirely discredited because he
could not remember why he noted in his citation that Vukotic had nearly caused a
collision. That claim is ancillary to the elements of each offense for which Vukotic
was convicted.
Accordingly, assignment of error No. 15 is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Parma
Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________ LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCUR
(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of Appeals.)