Brittany Park Apartments v. Harrison Charter Township

443 N.W.2d 161, 432 Mich. 798
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 24, 1989
DocketDocket Nos. 82162, 82163, (Calendar No. 5)
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 443 N.W.2d 161 (Brittany Park Apartments v. Harrison Charter Township) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brittany Park Apartments v. Harrison Charter Township, 443 N.W.2d 161, 432 Mich. 798 (Mich. 1989).

Opinion

Brickley, J.

The dispute in this case requires us to examine the constitutionality of Harrison Township Ordinance No. 100 which establishes inter alia the rate structure for the municipality’s water and sewage system. Leave to appeal was granted limited to:

(1) whether defendant’s rate structure charging a base rate per residential unit denies plaintiff apartment complexes equal protection of law; and
(2) whether defendant’s rate ordinance which limits no charges for periods of vacancy to units served by separate meters denies plaintiffs equal protection of law.[ 1 ] [430 Mich 891 (1988).]

*801 We hold that the ordinance is reasonable and rationally related to the objectives of the township. Accordingly, the ordinance is constitutional and plaintiffs were not denied equal protection of the law.

In 1968, the Charter Township of Harrison assumed the ownership and operation of the township’s water and sewage system originally operated by the City of Mt. Clemens. At the same time, it adopted the rate structure followed under the city ownership enacting Township Ordinance No. 100. The categories of billable users under the ordinance include: (1) residential users, (2) commercial users, (3) industrial users, and (4) public authority. The ordinance defines a single-family dwelling unit for billing practices as

any structure or part thereof containing within its separate confines all necessary facilities for the use thereof as a dwelling place for human habitation, and including, but not necessarily limited to, a single family home, a dwelling unit within a multiple unit housing structure, and a mobile home (trailer coach). [Harrison Township Ordinance No. 100, § 2.6(5)(A).]

Plaintiffs are owners and operators of multiunit housing structures located in Harrison Township. According to the definitions plaintiffs are included within the residential customer billing category.

Pursuant to the ordinance, all single-family dwelling units are charged a quarterly minimum *802 rate for water and sewage consumption. Water consumed in excess of this minimum usage is billed at a declining block rate. 2 When an apartment owner chooses not to individually meter each apartment unit, making it impossible to separately bill each unit, it is charged the minimum fee, multiplied by the number of units, but is allowed to combine all of the water usage in excess of the aggregate minimum fee as though the apartment building was one unit.

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of defendant’s practice of charging a multiminimum rate because, it is claimed, it results in a differential in the billing rates of residential customers. Brittany Park argues that the disparate treatment among the class of residential users is the result of the establishment of two subclasses within the residential category. The first class is that of multiunit housing structures that have only one meter, but are charged an aggregate minimum rate. The second subclass is that of a detached single-family dwelling which is charged only one minimum rate. Plaintiffs assert that the removal of the multiple-minimum charge for each unit would *803 eliminate the disparity in the billing between multiple- and single-unit dwellings.

Further, Metro Towers argued that the rate structure violates its equal protection rights because there was no provision within the ordinance to account for the vacancy of a unit within an apartment complex. The differential treatment results from the fact that a detached single-family dwelling can terminate its service by having its meter shut off, while multihousing structures not individually metered are not afforded such an alternative.

The Court of Appeals accepted the arguments submitted by plaintiffs and reversed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant. The Court of Appeals found that although the ordinance has a legitimate purpose, in practice the rate structure is not fair or uniform when an examination of the rates showed that apartment owners were paying more for the same service than other members within the class of residential customers. The Court concluded that the disparity in the costs of services between apartment owners and single-dwelling units coupled with the fact that the township incurred no additional expenses in providing water and sewage service to such customers, did not support the legitimate goal of the ordinance. The Court of Appeals stated that "[i]f plaintiffs are in the same classification as single family homes, the rates should be equal.” 3 We find that the Court of Appeals based its rationale and conclusion on erroneous assumptions about both the classification and the treatment of those within it.

The township is the sole source of water within *804 the community and it is undisputed that the municipality has a right to charge for the services it provides to the community. Further it has the right to rationally impose classifications upon its users so long as all persons within the class are treated alike. Rouge Parkway Associates v City of Wayne, 423 Mich 411; 377 NW2d 748 (1985). The standard of review of the classification under an equal protection challenge is that the ordinance is presumed constitutional. The burden is upon the party challenging the legislation to show that the classification established is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See, generally, Cook Coffee Co v Village of Flushing, 267 Mich 131; 255 NW 177 (1934), and Detroit v Highland Park, 326 Mich 78; 39 NW2d 325 (1949). Under the rational basis test there must be a showing that the ordinance is discriminatory and arbitrary, and that its classifications are without reasonable justification.

There is no dispute over the applicable test to be applied in this case. It is derived from this Court’s decision in Alexander v Detroit, 392 Mich 30; 219 NW2d 41 (1974), wherein we enumerated a two-part test to be applied in an equal protection challenge to a legislative enactment. The questions to be considered are:

(1) Are the enactment’s classifications based on natural distinguishing characteristics and do they bear a reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation?
(2) Are all persons of the same class included and affected alike or are immunities or privileges extended to an arbitrary or unreasonable class while denied to others of like kind? [Id. at 35-36. Citations omitted.]

Reaffirmed in Rouge Parkway Associates v City of Wayne, supra.

Uniformity among users is the ultimate goal *805 strived for by the ordinance. 4

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Bluebook (online)
443 N.W.2d 161, 432 Mich. 798, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brittany-park-apartments-v-harrison-charter-township-mich-1989.