Brittany Nicole Duffy v. FCA US, LLC

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: November 18, 2025
• Docket: 5:24-cv-07540
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 BRITTANY NICOLE DUFFY, Case No. 24-cv-07540-BLF

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. REMAND AND DENYING AS MOOT MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 10 FCA US, LLC, PLEADINGS 11 Defendant. [Re: ECF Nos. 21, 22]

12 13 Before the Court are Plaintiff Brittany Nicole Duffy’s (“Plaintiff” or “Duffy”) Motion to 14 Remand, ECF No. 21 (“Mot.”), and Defendant FCA US, LCC’s (“Defendant” or “FCA”) Motion 15 for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 22. Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion 16 to Remand, ECF No. 24 (“Opp.”), and Plaintiff filed a Reply Brief in support of her motion, ECF 17 No. 26 (“Reply”). Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the 18 Pleadings, ECF No. 27, and Defendant filed a Reply Brief in support of its motion, ECF No. 29. 19 The Court previously determined that these motions were suitable for resolution without oral 20 argument and vacated the hearing date. ECF No. 33; see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons that 21 follow, the Court GRANTS Duffy’s Motion to Remand and DENIES AS MOOT FCA’s Motion 22 for Judgment on the Pleadings. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 This dispute arises out of Duffy’s purchase of a 2021 Jeep Cherokee (the “Jeep”). 25 Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 6, ECF No. 1-1. Upon purchase, Duffy entered a warranty contract with 26 FCA. Id. Duffy alleges that the Jeep is “worthless and/or de minimis,” id. ¶ 13, due to various 27 “[d]efects and nonconformities to warranty,” including transmission, engine, and electrical 1 Duffy initiated this action by filing a complaint in the County of Santa Clara on 2 September 24, 2024. The Complaint asserts causes of action for violations of California’s Song- 3 Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly Act”), breach of the implied warranty of 4 merchantability pursuant to sections 1791.1, 1794, and 1795.5 of the California Civil Code, and 5 fraudulent inducement. Id. ¶¶ 38–65. Duffy seeks damages, restitution, diminution in value, a 6 civil penalty in the amount of two times actual damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees and 7 costs, and other relief that the Court deems proper. Id. at Prayer for Relief. On October 30, 2024, 8 FCA removed to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. 9 II. MOTION TO REMAND 10 A. Legal Standard 11 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 12 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). They may adjudicate only those cases that the Constitution and 13 Congress authorize them to adjudicate, such as those involving diversity of citizenship or a federal 14 question, or those to which the United States is a party. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 15 500, 513 (2006). 16 The removal statute “is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of 17 establishing federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute.” Limon-Gonzalez v. Kia 18 Motors Am., Inc., No. 20-cv-4381-PA, 2020 WL 3790838, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2020) (quoting 19 California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004)). “Federal 20 jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” 21 Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). When removal is based on diversity, the 22 defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds 23 $75,000. Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 2018). The Court may 24 look to the complaint, notice of removal, “as well as summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to 25 the amount in controversy.” Id. The Court uses “judicial experience and common sense” to 26 evaluate whether the removing party has shown that it is more likely than not that the amount in 27 controversy exceeds $75,000. Oh v. Navient Sols., LLC, No. 25-cv-6415-PA, 2025 WL 2495536, 1 (11th Cir. 2010)). 2 Duffy argues that remanding this case would “further[] the ‘strongly pro-consumer’ 3 protection statutes passed by the California State legislature.” Mot. at 2. FCA argues that this 4 contention “distorts the relevant legal standard for remand by improperly elevating a policy 5 argument over controlling jurisdictional law.” Opp. at 2. The Court does not read Duffy’s 6 argument as a statement of the legal standard. However, the Court agrees with FCA that whether 7 remanding this case would have a pro-consumer result is not a factor in the jurisdictional analysis. 8 As a consequence, the Court will not consider that policy issue. 9 B. Discussion 10 Because Duffy does not dispute that complete diversity between the Parties exists, the 11 Court considers that requirement satisfied. See Ehrman v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 932 F.3d 1223, 12 1228 (9th Cir. 2019). However, Duffy argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on 13 the ground that FCA has not sufficiently shown that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 14 because its damages estimate is speculative and unsupported by evidence. Mot. at 4–9. FCA 15 argues that its Notice of Removal sufficiently demonstrates that the sum of Plaintiffs’ actual 16 damages, statutory penalties, attorney fees, and punitive damages exceeds $75,000. Opp. at 5–11. 17 1. Ambiguity in the Complaint 18 As a threshold matter, the disagreement over the amount in controversy arises in part from 19 the ambiguity in the Complaint regarding damages. Duffy alleges damages “in an amount that is 20 not less than $35,001.00.” Compl. ¶ 33. Duffy argues the word “damages” refers to “total 21 damages,” which include, inter alia, actual damages, civil penalties, and attorneys’ fees. Mot. 22 at 5. But the Complaint is silent on this point. FCA argues that the $35,001.00 value is a floor, 23 not a cap. Opp. at 6–7. The Court finds that the Complaint is ambiguous. The Court must resolve 24 “any doubt about the right of removal . . . in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, 25 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the Court finds that this ambiguous allegation 26 is insufficient by itself to show that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 by a 27 preponderance of the evidence. See id.; see also Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 441 F. Supp. 3d 2. Actual Damages 1 Under the Song-Beverly Act, actual damages are “equal to the actual price paid or payable 2 by the buyer,” less the reduction in value “directly attributable to use by the buyer.” Cal. Civ. 3 Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)–(C); see also Perkins v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 22-cv-03540- 4 CRB, 2022 WL 9529451, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2022). In its notice of removal, FCA assumes 5 the Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (“MSRP”) is a “reasonable estimate of actual 6 damages.” See Notice of Removal ¶ 28. Duffy argues that FCA’s evidence is speculative and 7 insufficient to support the claim that actual damages are $39,280. Mot. at 5–6. FCA argues its 8 amount-in-controversy calculation is sufficiently “factually supported by judicially noticeable 9 facts and reasonable estimates.” Opp. at 5. 10 FCA’s Notice of Removal is conspicuously devoid of any allegation or evidence as to the 11 Jeep’s actual purchase price. Instead, FCA attached a declaration that includes the Manufacturer’s 12 Suggested Retail Price (“MSRP”) for the 2021 Jeep Cherokee Limited 4X4 ($35,550 not including 13 options, $39,280 with options plus destination charge). See Declaration of James A. Sheridan in 14 Support of Defendant FCA US, LLC’s Notice of Removal of Entire Case (“Sheridan Decl.”) ¶ 7, 15 ECF No. 1-3. The declaration assumes the MSRP is a “reasonable estimate” of actual damages. 16 Id. ¶ 8. 17 Duffy refers the Court to Steeg v. Ford Motor Company, No. 19-cv-05833-LHK, 2020 WL 18 2121508 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2020). Mot. at 6. In that similar case brought against a car 19 manufacturer, the plaintiff sought to remand the case. Steeg, 2020 WL 2121508, at *1. In support 20 of removal, the manufacturer offered a “piece of ‘evidence’ to estimate the actual damages: the 21 suggested retail price for the Vehicle.” Id. at *4. The court noted that “in nearly identical cases,” 22 other courts had concluded that “merely providing the retail price of the vehicle at issue . . . leaves 23 ‘considerable doubt as to the amount in controversy.’” Id. (quoting Chajon v. Ford Motor Co., 24 No. 18-cv-10533-RGK, 2019 WL 994019, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2019)). Resolving the 25 ambiguity in favor of remand, the court found that the suggested price of the vehicle did not 26 establish actual damages by a preponderance of the evidence. 27 Like the defendant in Steeg, FCA has not submitted evidence of the actual contract price of 1 the vehicle. The Court finds Steeg persuasive and concludes that the MSRP does not offer reliable 2 evidence as to actual damages. See also Newsome v. FCA USA LLC, No. 20-cv-01189-JLT-BAK, 3 2022 WL 408631, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2022) (finding that because there was no evidence of 4 “the original purchase price of the vehicle to give at least some guidance or context,” the 5 defendant had “not met its burden to show [that] actual damages” equaled the amount alleged in 6 the complaint or otherwise exceeded $75,000). The Court concludes that FCA has not shown any 7 amount of actual damages by a preponderance of the evidence.1 8 3. Civil Penalties 9 Duffy also seeks civil penalties. Compl. at Prayer for Relief ¶ e. FCA argues that 10 potential civil recovery in this case would include “up to $78,560”—two times the MSRP. Mot. 11 at 5; Notice of Removal ¶ 28. Duffy argues that FCA has submitted no evidence that she will 12 receive the maximum amount of civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act, let alone any 13 penalties at all. Mot. at 7–9. 14 The Song-Beverly Act permits civil penalties of up to twice the amount of actual damages. 15 Brady v. Mercedes-Benz USA, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2002). “If the amount of 16 actual damages is speculative, however, an attempt to determine the civil penalty is equally 17 uncertain.” Chavez v. FCA US LLC, No. 19-cv-06003-ODW, 2020 WL 468909, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 18 Jan. 27, 2020). Because FCA did not establish the amount of actual damages by a preponderance 19 of the evidence, the amount of civil penalties is also uncertain. FCA has accordingly failed to 20 satisfy the burden of proof required to include civil penalties in the jurisdictional amount. See 21 Newsome, 2022 WL 408631, at *5. 22 4. Attorneys’ Fees 23 FCA also relies on Duffy’s claim for “reasonable attorneys’ fees” to satisfy the amount in 24 controversy. See Compl. at Prayer for Relief ¶ h. FCA argues its attorneys’ fees estimate “is 25 based on reasonable projections consistent with similar cases.” Opp. at 8. Duffy argues that FCA 26

27 1 Because FCA has not made a showing of actual damages, the Court need not consider 1 has not carried its evidentiary burden to demonstrate likely attorneys’ fees. Reply at 4–5. 2 Future attorneys’ fees awards may be included in determining the amount in controversy. 3 Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., 899 F.3d 785, 794 (9th Cir. 2018). The defendant “retains 4 the burden” of demonstrating the amount of future attorneys’ fees by a preponderance of the 5 evidence. Id. at 788. Future fees may be excluded where they are too speculative. See id. at 795. 6 The Notice of Removal asserts that “[c]laims for attorney fees in these types of cases 7 regularly approach or exceed $50,000.” Notice of Removal ¶ 26. In its Opposition, FCA states 8 that its estimate of attorneys’ fees is $25,000. Opp. at 8. FCA does not explain the discrepancy of 9 $25,000 between the two estimates. 10 As evidence to support its estimate of $50,000, FCA points to Mr. Sheridan’s declaration, 11 which states, “[i]n my experience with such cases against FCA, it is common for plaintiffs’ 12 counsel to file motions seeking attorney fees and costs in excess of $50,000. . . .” Sheridan Decl. 13 ¶ 9. The Court finds that this statement is not sufficient evidence of likely future attorneys’ fees in 14 this case. Indeed, it does not identify why counsel in this case is likely to file a motion seeking 15 attorneys’ fees of more than $50,000. See Schneider, 441 F. Supp. 3d at 914 (finding that a 16 declaration stating that “it is not uncommon, and in fact quite regular, for attorneys’ fees and cost 17 awards . . . to exceed $50,000” amounted to “nothing more than mere conjecture”). 18 As further evidence of the likely amount of attorneys’ fees, Mr. Sheridan attaches to his 19 declaration a motion from a plaintiff’s attorney in a lawsuit against “another automobile 20 manufacturer” seeking $58,471.07 worth of attorney’s fees and costs. Sheridan Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 1. 21 In Schneider v. Ford Motor Company, defendants likewise pointed to fees recently claimed by 22 plaintiff’s counsel in another lemon law case. 441 F. Supp. 3d at 914. The Schneider court noted 23 that defendants failed to “compare or contrast the litigation strategies or the litigation timelines of 24 the two cases.” Id. Because the defendants did not provide “specific evidence” with respect to the 25 likely amount of attorneys’ fees, the court found that the fees from other cases could not be used to 26 satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. Id. Here, as Duffy points out, FCA does not 27 explain how the facts and circumstances of the attached case are comparable to those in this case. 1 attorneys’ fees by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 In sum, the Court concludes that because FCA has not provided “specific evidence 3 showing that the attorneys’ fees in this case are ‘more likely than not’ to exceed [$25,000], 4 attorneys’ fees cannot be used to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.” Schneider, 5 441 F. Supp. 3d at 914; Mpock v. FCA US LLC, No. 21-cv-00330, 2021 WL 5356472, at *13 6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025), R&R adopted, 2021 WL 5966833 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2021) (holding 7 that because FCA did not “provide any factual details underlying the claims, litigation strategies, 8 or the litigation timelines of any of the cases cited” it was not possible to determine whether those 9 cases were “analogous” or “a persuasive indicator regarding the amount of attorney’s fees plaintiff 10 might recover”). 11 5. Punitive Damages 12 Duffy seeks punitive damages in connection with the claim for fraudulent inducement. 13 Compl. at Prayer for Relief ¶ f. FCA argues that punitive damages add to the amount in 14 controversy in this case. Opp. at 8–9. FCA further contends that because punitive damages of 15 four to eight times the amount of compensatory damages have been permitted by other courts, it is 16 plausible that there will be such an award in this case. Id. Duffy argues her demand for punitive 17 damages does not establish the amount in controversy and FCA has not provided any evidence 18 establishing a reasonable estimate thereof. Reply at 1. 19 Punitive damages may be recovered “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence 20 that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). 21 However, that a plaintiff seeks punitive damages does not itself establish the amount in 22 controversy. See Conrad Assocs. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1196, 1201 23 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“Defendant’s burden cannot be met simply by pointing out that the complaint 24 seeks punitive damages and that any damages awarded under such a claim could total a large sum 25 of money, particularly in light of the high burden that must be met in order for a plaintiff even to 26 be eligible for receipt of discretionary punitive damages.”). 27 FCA correctly asserts that punitive damages are often calculated as a multiplier of the 1 a preponderance of the evidence, any calculation of punitive damages would be equally 2 speculative. See Guzetta v. Ford Motor Co., No. 21-cv-09151-MEMF, 2022 WL 1044173, at *7 3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2022) (“[W]here actual damages are uncertain, any calculation of punitive 4 damages would be speculative.”); Nash v. FCA US LLC, No. 21-cv-02092-MEMF, 2022 WL 5 2304030, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2022) (same). 6 Even if actual damages were not speculative, the punitive damages calculation in this case 7 would still be too uncertain. FCA cites two cases in support of its argument that “other cases 8 brought against car manufacturers” have yielded “punitive damages ranging from four to eight 9 times the amount of compensatory damages.” Opp. at 9. Other than noting that the cases were 10 brought against car manufacturers, FCA does not explain how those cases are comparable to this 11 case such that those verdicts would bear on the likely amount of punitive damages here. 12 *** 13 In sum, the Court finds that FCA has only established by a preponderance of the evidence 14 that the amount in controversy is $35,000.01—the amount alleged in the complaint. Even 15 attributing an additional $25,000 for attorneys’ fees, the amount in controversy would still only 16 total $60,000.01. Because this value does not exceed the $75,000 amount-in-controversy 17 requirement, FCA has failed to meet its burden to show that the Court has subject matter 18 jurisdiction. The Court will accordingly remand this case. 19 III. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 20 Because the Court is remanding the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the 21 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is moot. Defendant may refile that motion in state court.

22 23 24 25 26 27 IV. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 2 (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 21, is GRANTED. 3 (2) Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 22, is DENIED 4 WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT. 5 6 Dated: November 18, 2025

8 Leh Oxasb N FREEMAN 9 United States District Judge 10 11 a 12

15 16 & = 17

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