Brinson v. Brinson

Supreme Court of Georgia

Brinson v. Brinson

40 S.E.2d 535, 201 Ga. 540, 1946 Ga. LEXIS 272

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedNovember 14, 1946

Docket15622.

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 40 S.E.2d 535 (Brinson v. Brinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brinson v. Brinson, 40 S.E.2d 535, 201 Ga. 540, 1946 Ga. LEXIS 272 (Ga. 1946).

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Opinion

Candler, Justice.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) Cruel treatment as a ground for divorce is the wilful infliction of pain, bodily or mental, upon the complaining party, such as reasonably justifies an apprehension of danger to life, limb, or health. Ring v. Ring, 118 Ga. 183 (44 S. E. 861, 62 L. R. A. 878); Wood v. Wood, 179 Ga. 635 (176 S. E. 483); Holcombe v. Holcombe, 197 Ga. 105 (27 S. E. 2d, 687). “Mental anguish, wounded feelings, constantly aggravated by repeated insults and neglect, are as bad *542 as actual bruises of the person; and that which produces the one is not more cruel than that which causes the other.” Glass v. Wynn, 76 Ga. 319 (3) 322; Twilley v. Twilley, 195 Ga. 291 (24 S. E. 2d, 41). Here, the evidence introduced by the wife, showing the unconventional association of her husband with a named woman of questionable character, his refusal to furnish his family with the ordinary necessities of life, and his personal misconduct in and around their home, was amply sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the husband had been guilty of such cruel treatment as would entitle the wife to a total divorce.

“Condonation has been defined to be the forgiveness, either express or implied, by a husband of his wife, or by a wife of her husband, for a breach of marital duty, with an implied condition that the offense shall not be repeated.” Davis v. Davis, 134 Ga. 804 (68 S. E. 594, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.), 73, 20 Ann. Cas. 20). “Condonation is not so readily presumed against the wife, as the husband. Knowledge of the guilt of the husband, and forgiveness by the wife, are not legally to be presumed, but must be clearly and distinctly proved, in order to bar her action.” Odom, v. Odom, 36 Ga. 286 (5), 318; Lowry v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 349 (8, a) (153 S. E. 11, 70 A. L. R. 488); Duncan v. Duncan, 184 Ga. 602 (192 S. E. 215). Hnder the foregoing principles, the evidence authorized a verdict for the wife on the issue of condonation.

The evidence being sufficient to support the verdict in favor of the wife on both counts, and having the approval of the trial judge, the judgment overruling the motion for new trial, which was based solely on the usual general grounds, will not be disturbed.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

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Candler, Justice.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) Cruel treatment as a ground for divorce is the wilful infliction of pain, bodily or mental, upon the complaining party, such as reasonably justifies an apprehension of danger to life, limb, or health. Ring v. Ring, 118 Ga. 183 (44 S. E. 861, 62 L. R. A. 878); Wood v. Wood, 179 Ga. 635 (176 S. E. 483); Holcombe v. Holcombe, 197 Ga. 105 (27 S. E. 2d, 687). “Mental anguish, wounded feelings, constantly aggravated by repeated insults and neglect, are as bad *542 as actual bruises of the person; and that which produces the one is not more cruel than that which causes the other.” Glass v. Wynn, 76 Ga. 319 (3) 322; Twilley v. Twilley, 195 Ga. 291 (24 S. E. 2d, 41). Here, the evidence introduced by the wife, showing the unconventional association of her husband with a named woman of questionable character, his refusal to furnish his family with the ordinary necessities of life, and his personal misconduct in and around their home, was amply sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the husband had been guilty of such cruel treatment as would entitle the wife to a total divorce.

“Condonation has been defined to be the forgiveness, either express or implied, by a husband of his wife, or by a wife of her husband, for a breach of marital duty, with an implied condition that the offense shall not be repeated.” Davis v. Davis, 134 Ga. 804 (68 S. E. 594, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.), 73, 20 Ann. Cas. 20). “Condonation is not so readily presumed against the wife, as the husband. Knowledge of the guilt of the husband, and forgiveness by the wife, are not legally to be presumed, but must be clearly and distinctly proved, in order to bar her action.” Odom, v. Odom, 36 Ga. 286 (5), 318; Lowry v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 349 (8, a) (153 S. E. 11, 70 A. L. R. 488); Duncan v. Duncan, 184 Ga. 602 (192 S. E. 215). Hnder the foregoing principles, the evidence authorized a verdict for the wife on the issue of condonation.

The evidence being sufficient to support the verdict in favor of the wife on both counts, and having the approval of the trial judge, the judgment overruling the motion for new trial, which was based solely on the usual general grounds, will not be disturbed.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

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40 S.E.2d 535, 201 Ga. 540, 1946 Ga. LEXIS 272, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brinson-v-brinson-ga-1946.

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