Brigid Blume, V. Hans Lambert

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

BRIGID BLUME, No. 87709-7-I

Respondent,

DIVISION ONE

v.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

HANS LAMBERT,

Appellant.

DÍAZ, J. — A court issued a one-year domestic violence protection order (DVPO)

against Hans Lambert. Lambert now contends the court abused its discretion when it found he had committed acts of coercion or abuse against his then spouse, Brigid Blume, and their children. Finding no error, we affirm, awarding fees to neither party.

I. BACKGROUND

In October 2024, Lambert filed a petition for a protection order against Blume.

Lambert and Blume have two children together, S.L. and H.L. Blume opposed Lambert’s petition and requested the court realign the request, i.e., “restrain [] Lambert and protect [herself],” among other things.

The court denied Lambert’s petition due to insufficient evidence and found “a basis to realign the parties and enter a temporary order protecting [Blume] to allow [Blume] time to file her own petition in accordance with RCW 7.105.210.” In December 2024, the court

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granted a full DVPO protecting Blume, S.L., and H.L. Lambert timely appeals the court’s order. And Blume seeks her attorney fees on appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. DVPO Hans contends that substantial evidence does not support the court’s entry of the DVPO against him because “there was no evidence of coercion or abuse.” We disagree.

“Whether to grant or deny a domestic violence protection order is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Rodriguez v. Zavala, 188 Wn.2d 586, 590-91, 398 P.3d 1071 (2017). The decision will not be disturbed unless it was manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. In re Marriage of Freeman, 169 Wn.2d 664, 671, 239 P.3d 557 (2010).

Where, as here, the court has weighed the evidence, our role is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the findings of fact and whether those findings support its conclusions of law. In re Marriage of Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 714, 986 P.2d 144 (1999). Substantial evidence is a quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a reasonable person that the premise is true. Wenatchee Sportsmen Ass’n v. Chelan County, 141 Wn.2d 169, 176, 4 P.3d 123 (2000).

RCW 7.105.225(1)(a) establishes that a court “shall issue a protection order if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . the petitioner has been subjected to domestic violence by the respondent.” The definition of domestic violence under chapter 7.105 RCW includes “coercive control . . . of one intimate partner by another intimate partner,” or “[p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of physical harm, bodily injury, or assault . . . of one family or household member by another family or

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household member.” RCW 7.105.010(10)(a)-(b). “‘Coercive control’ means a pattern of behavior that is used to cause another to suffer physical, emotional, or psychological harm, and in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.” RCW 7.105.010(4)(a). “Examples of coercive control include[] but are not limited to . . . [u]sing technology to threaten, humiliate, harass, stalk, intimidate, exert undue influence over, or abuse the other party.” RCW 7.105.010(4)(a)(i)(B).

At the hearing for realignment, the court orally found that Lambert recorded Blume without her consent, which “[did] seem to be a pattern of behavior that has occurred.” The court also found that Lambert slapped S.L. Overall, the court held that, “given what is before the Court, including the coercive control, the slapping [of] the party’s child in the face in July of 2023, and some of the other incidents that [Blume] raised . . . [it] [did] find that there’s enough to grant the request to realign the parties.” When entering a permanent order, the court mirrored the above ruling. The court concluded in its written DVPO that Hans committed domestic violence by physically harming and exercising coercive control over Blume, H.L., and S.L.

Blume provided substantial evidence concerning Lambert physically harming and inflicting fear of physical harm on her and the children. First, as part of her sworn petition, Blume described an incident in which Lambert slapped S.L. Each of the parties submitted pictures documenting the resulting mark from Lambert slapping S.L., and Lambert admitted that he slapped S.L. Second, in the same petition, Blume also discussed, among other things, an incident in March 2023 where Lambert threatened her with physical violence during a disagreement.

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As to Lambert’s exercise of coercive control over Blume, Blume recounted across her declarations that Lambert would often record her, sometimes in front of the children, without her permission. She declared that

this is something he [does] about 1-2 times per month to goad me whenever I tried to talk about anything he didn’t want to discuss. I believe he does this to humiliate me, disrupt my train of thought, and ultimately communicate that he thinks I’m ridiculous and my concerns aren’t worthy of his time.

Lambert disagreed as to why he was recording her, but he did not dispute that he recorded her on previous occasions without her permission. Blume also described an incident in March 2024 where he threatened to shut off her phone during an argument. Accordingly, substantial evidence—a quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a reasonable person—that Lambert had committed acts of domestic violence via physical harm and coercive control supported the trial court’s findings. Wenatchee Sportsmen Ass’n, 141 Wn.2d at 176.

In response, Lambert contends that Blume’s attorney “made false accusations”

which insinuated Lambert hit each of the children more than once each. Within his declarations and at the hearing for realignment, Lambert asserted that he had only hit each of the children once. However, Blume asserted the parties had an ongoing dispute around the use of corporal punishment, and she declared that there were at least a few instances in which Lambert hit H.L. We defer to the trier of fact on questions of credibility, conflicting testimony, and persuasiveness of the evidence. In re Domestic Violence Prot. Ord. for Timaeus, 34 Wn. App. 2d 670, 679, 574 P.3d 127 (2025). Thus, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion when it considered this conflicting information, apparently credited Blume’s testimony, and determined there was sufficient evidence to

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establish Lambert had committed domestic violence by causing physical harm to their children.

Finally, Lambert also requests that this court “ask [] Blume why she failed to report the slap” immediately and instead “waited 2.5 years” and “exaggerated” the facts of the incident. Again, we cannot and do not judge credibility. In re Marriage of Burrill, 113 Wn. App. 863, 868, 56 P.3d 993 (2002) (reasoning that “[s]o long as substantial evidence supports the finding, it does not matter that other evidence may contradict it” as “credibility determinations are left to the trier of fact and are not subject to review.”). 1 Thus, Lambert’s appeal fails.

B. Attorney Fees For her part, Blume requests attorney fees on appeal. Under RAP 18.1(b), a party “must devote a section of its opening brief to the request for the fees or expenses,” which includes argument and citation to authority to advise this court of the appropriate grounds for an award of attorney fees and costs. Austin v. U.S. Bank of Wash., 73 Wn. App. 293, 313, 869 P.2d 404 (1994). These requirements are mandatory. Phillips Bldg. Co. v. An, 81 Wn. App. 696, 705, 915 P.2d 1146 (1996). The rule requires more than a “bald request for attorney fees on appeal.” Thweatt v. Hommel, 67 Wn. App. 135, 148, 834 P.2d 1058 (1992).

Blume’s request is comprised of two identical sentences constituting such a bald request “for costs of responding to this appeal.” It fails to include argument and citation

1 In his briefing, Lambert also raises claims neither pleaded nor argued to the trial court,

for example, how the parties addressed the slap when it happened. Parties generally cannot raise new issues for the first time on appeal. Sourakli v. Kyriakos, Inc., 144 Wn. App. 501, 509, 182 P.3d 985 (2008). We thus decline to consider this portion of the argument under RAP 2.5(a).

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to authority advising this court of the grounds for an award of attorney fees and costs. Thus, we deny the request.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm.

WE CONCUR: