Bright Health Management, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance and Cantilo & Bennett, L.L.P., Special Deputy Receiver of Bright Healthcare Insurance Company of Texas
Opinion
ACCEPTED
15-25-00092-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
7/14/2025 2:54 PM
NO. 15-25-00092-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN FOR THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT AUSTIN, TEXAS 15th COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/14/2025 2:54:55 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
IN RE BRIGHT HEALTH MANAGEMENT, INC., Appellant,
v.
BRIGHT HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On Appeal from the
455th Judicial District Court, Travis County, Texas Cause No. D-1-GN-23-008361 The Honorable Catherine Mauzy, Presiding
BRIGHT HEALTH MANAGEMENT, INC.’S REPLY TO THE COURT’S ORDER REGARDING APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Carlos R. Soltero
csoltero@maynardnexsen.com State Bar No. 00791702
Brytne D. Kitchin
bkitchin@maynardnexsen.com State Bar No. 24079973
Lisa Alcantar
lalcantar@maynardnexsen.com State Bar No. 24069284
MAYNARD NEXSEN
2500 Bee Caves Road
Bldg. 1, Suite 150
Austin, Texas 78746
Counsel for Appellant/Relator
TO THE HONORABLE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellant Bright Health Management, Inc. (“BHM”) responds to this Court’s July 3, 2025 notice of potential dismissal for want of jurisdiction (“Notice”) as follows:
1. When faced with uncertainty regarding the appropriate vehicle for interim relief, a party may file both an appeal and a petition for writ of mandamus.
Parties whose rights are impacted by trial court decisions in contexts where it is unclear whether their appellate remedy is through an appeal or an original proceeding seeking a petition for writ of mandamus may seek both types of relief in the alternative. See, e.g., CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 446 (Tex. 2011). In Perez, CMH Homes filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the appointment of an arbitrator, “requesting in the alternative that its appeal be treated as a mandamus petition.” Id. The appellate court determined it was without jurisdiction, but the supreme court disagreed, concluding that the appeal could “properly be treated as a petition for writ of mandamus” and remanding the case for consideration of the merits. Id.
When there is uncertainty and a party files only a petition for writ of mandamus, the party risks waiving all appellate rights if mandamus
is not the appropriate remedy under the circumstances. See, e.g., In re State ex rel. De Leon, 89 S.W.3d 195, 196–97 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, orig. proceeding) (denying petition for mandamus relief because the State had an adequate remedy at law in the form of a statutory appeal that it failed to timely exercise).
Here, given the uncertainty regarding the appropriate remedy under the unique circumstances of an order compelling a non-party to produce documents in an insurance party receivership, BHM filed both this appeal and a petition for writ of mandamus. See In re Bright Health Management, Inc., No. 15-25-00092-CV. Both proceedings challenge the District Court’s May 6, 2025 Order making rulings pertaining to the Special Deputy Receiver’s (“SDR”) June 28, 2024 Motion to Enforce Permanent Injunction Against BHM (the “Motion to Enforce”)1 and BHM’s corresponding Cross-Motion for Entry of Order Governing Electronically Stored Information (the “ESI Cross-Motion”). 2
1 3 CR 339–425. 2 3 CR 426–459.
2. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal because the challenged Order functions as a temporary injunction and, additionally or in the alternative, as a modified order appointing receiver, and thus is an appealable interlocutory order.3
The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code expressly authorizes an appeal “from an interlocutory order of a district court” that “grants or refuses a temporary injunction.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(4). The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted this to include “jurisdiction over [an] interlocutory appeal from a prejudgment enforcement order that functions as a temporary injunction.” Harley Channelview Prop., LLC v. Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, 690 S.W.3d 32, 41– 42 (Tex. 2024). Consistent with Harley Marine and Section 51.014(a)(4) of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, whether this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal “depends on whether the trial court’s order can properly be characterized as a temporary injunction.” Harley Marine, 690 S.W.3d at 37.
3 To the extent the Notice is questioning specifically whether the Fifteenth Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal, BHM asserts that it does as this appeal is brought against the SDR in its capacity as the agent of the Texas Department of Insurance (“TDI”), which is an “agency in the executive branch of the state government.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(d)(9)(A); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.220(d)(1). See also TEX. INS. CODE § 443.154(a) (explaining that any special deputy appointed by TDI acts for TDI, “serves at the pleasure of” TDI, and may exercise only those powers granted to TDI under the Insurer Receivership Act (TEX. INS. CODE, Ch. 443)).
In Harley Marine, the trial court ordered one of the parties “to immediately convey property to the other to enforce the court’s partial summary judgment ruling.” Id. at 35. The aggrieved party filed an interlocutory appeal, which the court of appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Id. The supreme court disagreed that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction, holding that the trial court’s order directing that a party’s property be immediately conveyed “based on an interim ruling that a claim has merit is a temporary injunction, from which a party may appeal.” Id. In so holding, the supreme court noted that the order (1) required performance by the enjoined party; (2) was made effective and operated during the pendency of the suit; and (3) compelled a party’s performance based on the trial court’s “determination that the opposing party’s claim ha[d] merit.” Id. at 40.
Here, as in Harley Marine, the challenged order (1) requires BHM to perform by conveying its property (and property that belongs to other third parties)—e-mails that include privileged and confidential information not belonging to the insurer in receivership and to which the SDR has no legal or contractual entitlement—to the SDR; (2) is effective immediately and operates during the pendency of proceedings that may
continue at the trial court level; and (3) compels BHM’s performance based on the District Court’s determination that the SDR’s claim of entitlement to those e-mails has merit. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of BHM’s appeal under Section 51.014(a)(4) of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code and Harley Marine. See Gruss v. Gallagher, 680 S.W.3d 642, 653–55 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (holding that trial court’s ruling ordering “the current books and records of the Company” be made immediately available to a party constituted “a new temporary injunction” subject to interlocutory appeal under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(4)).
As further support for this Court’s jurisdiction, Section 51.014(a)(1)
of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code provides a statutory right for an appeal “from an interlocutory order of a district court” that “appoints a receiver or trustee.” While BHM is not directly appealing the District Court’s order appointing the SDR, the “character and function” of the District Court’s May 6, 2025 Order that is challenged in this appeal is a modified order appointing receiver as it expands the scope of the SDR’s receivership powers to include entitlement to the property of third
parties irrespective of that property’s relevance to the receivership. See Harley Marine, 609 S.W.3d at 39 (“[I]t is the ‘character and function of an order’ that define its classification, not ‘matters of form.’”) (quoting Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam)). Thus, this Court also has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Section 51.014(a)(1) of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code. See Gruss, 680 S.W.3d at 653–55.
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Bright Health Management, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance and Cantilo & Bennett, L.L.P., Special Deputy Receiver of Bright Healthcare Insurance Company of Texas (Bright Health Management, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance and Cantilo & Bennett, L.L.P., Special Deputy Receiver of Bright Healthcare Insurance Company of Texas) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.