Bright Health Management, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance and Cantilo & Bennett, L.L.P., Special Deputy Receiver of Bright Healthcare Insurance Company of Texas
Opinion
ACCEPTED
15-25-00092-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
7/17/2025 10:48 AM
NO. 15-25-00092-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE ______________________________________________ CLERK FILED IN
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
7/17/2025 10:48:13 AM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
BRIGHT HEALTH MANAGEMENT, INC.
Appellant,
V.
CANTILO & BENNETT, LLP, SPECIAL DEPUTY RECEIVER FOR BRIGHT HEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY OF TEXAS Appellee
SDR REPLY REGARDING APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Appellee Cantilo & Bennett, LLP, Special Deputy Receiver for Bright Healthcare Insurance Company of Texas (the “SDR”) files this reply to the response of Appellant Bright Health Management (“BHM”) regarding appellate jurisdiction.
INTRODUCTION
BHM filed this interlocutory appeal and a parallel mandamus action in this Court, both actions seeking review of an order requiring it to turn over certain books and records of Bright Healthcare Insurance Company of Texas (“Bright Healthcare”) to the SDR. 4CR1705 (the “Order”). This Court denied the mandamus petition on the merits. The Court also questioned whether there is appellate jurisdiction over this parallel appeal. Appellate jurisdiction turns on whether the Order is either: (1) an order appointing a receiver or granting a temporary injunction such that interlocutory
appeal is permitted, or (2) a final judgment. Because it is neither, the Court lacks appellate jurisdiction and should dismiss this appeal.1 ARGUMENT
A. There is no basis for interlocutory appellate jurisdiction.
1. The Order does not function as a temporary injunction.
BHM argues that the Order functions as a temporary injunction, so there is interlocutory appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §51.014(a)(4). Response.4. In support, BHM relies on Harley Channelview Properties, LLC v. Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, which held that the courts have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over a “prejudgment enforcement order that functions as a temporary injunction.” 690 S.W.3d 32, 41 (Tex. 2024). In that case, a trial court granted summary judgment for specific enforcement of a contract and ordered turnover of the subject property as part of the interlocutory grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court reasoned, quite rightly, that such an order operated as a temporary injunction and was thus appealable on an interlocutory basis pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(4).
1 The SDR does not dispute that the Fifteenth Court is the appropriate court to review the Order because it is a matter “arising out of or related to a civil case . . . brought by or against the state or a board, commission, department, office, or other agency in the executive branch of the state government.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.220(d)(1). The SDR disputes BHM’s contention that the SDR is an “agent of the Texas Department of Insurance.” Response.4 n.3. See Tex. Ins. Code § 443.154(a) (providing that the liquidator may contract with a special deputy receiver, and: “Any person with whom the liquidator contracts is not considered to be an agent of the state and any contract under this subsection is not a contract with the state.”).
The Order is quite different, and it does not function as a temporary injunction.
Instead, the Order simply enforces the permanent junction rendered long ago in the November 2023 Receivership Order, which had already ordered BHM to turn over the Bright Healthcare books and records to the SDR. 2CR316-27 (the “Receivership Order”). The Receivership Order granted a permanent injunction directed to a number of parties affiliated with Bright Healthcare, including BHM by name. 2CR321. Under the permanent injunction, BHM was enjoined from “[d]oing anything to prevent the Liquidator or the Liquidator’s designees from gaining access to, acquiring, examining, or investigating any of Defendant’s property or any other property, books, documents, records, or other materials concerning Defendant’s business, under whatever name they may be found.” 2CR323. BHM was also ordered to “make available and disclose to the Liquidator or the Liquidator’s designees the nature, amount, and location of Defendant’s property, and promptly surrender all such property to the Liquidator or the Liquidator’s designees.” Id. (emphasis added).
BHM did not appeal the Receivership Order or the permanent injunction included in it. But nor did it comply with the permanent injunction. Many months after the Receivership Order was rendered, the SDR filed a motion to enforce the permanent injunction included in the Receivership Order because BHM had not fulfilled its obligation to turn over Bright Healthcare’s books and records. The Order
thus does nothing more than enforce the permanent injunction. The Special Master Report quotes at length from the permanent injunction requiring BHM to turn over the Bright Healthcare books and records. 3CR621-23. BHM does not identify anything in the Order that goes beyond the scope of the Receivership Order or grants greater relief than the permanent injunction. The Order’s provisions simply “maintain or carry forward the prior injunction.” Gruss v. Gallagher, 680 S.W.3d 642, 654 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.).
Because the Order cannot be characterized as a new temporary injunction, there is no basis for interlocutory appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(4).
2. The Order does not modify the appointment of a receiver.
BHM argues that there is interlocutory appellate jurisdiction because the Order is a “modified order appointing receiver as it expands the scope of the SDR’s receivership powers to include entitlement to the property of third parties irrespective of that property’s relevance to the receivership.” Response.6; id. §51.014(a)(1) (providing for interlocutory appeal of an order that “appoints a receiver or trustee”). That contention is baseless.
The Receivership Order: (1) appointed the Commissioner of the TDI as Liquidator of Bright Healthcare pursuant to Tex. Ins. Code §443.151; (2) granted the Liquidator title to “all of [Bright Healthcare’s] property,” and ordered that the
Liquidator “is authorized to take control and possession of Defendant’s property, wherever located, and remove all such property from Defendant’s premises;” and (3) authorized appointment of the SDR to perform the Liquidator’s functions regarding Bright Healthcare. 2CR316-27. The Order does not grant any modified or additional authority to the SDR; it simply enforces the broad authority that was already granted in the Receivership Order.
The Receivership Order appointed a receiver and granted the permanent injunction, but BHM never appealed the Receivership Order. It is too late to appeal the Receivership Order now because it was signed more than 18 months ago. See Gossett Jones Homes, Inc. v. Bluebonnet Lane Cityhomes Condo. Ass'n, Inc., No. 03-24-00261-CV, 2024 WL 4375799, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 3, 2024, no pet.) (while there is interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over order denying motion to compel arbitration, there is not interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over subsequent order denying a motion to reconsider the original order).
If BHM disputed the Receivership Order’s permanent injunction requiring it to turn over Bright Healthcare’s books and records, it should have perfected an appeal from that order and sought the protection it seeks through this action. It did not. This Court lacks interlocutory appellate jurisdiction from the Order, and it should dismiss this appeal.
B. The Order is not a final judgment.
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Bright Health Management, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance and Cantilo & Bennett, L.L.P., Special Deputy Receiver of Bright Healthcare Insurance Company of Texas (Bright Health Management, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance and Cantilo & Bennett, L.L.P., Special Deputy Receiver of Bright Healthcare Insurance Company of Texas) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.