O 11 JS-6 22
44 55 66 77 United States District Court 88 Central District of California 99 1100 1111 BRIGHAM FIELD et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-09563-ODW-(JCx)
1122 Plaintiffs, ORDER REMANDING CASE TO
1133 v. STATE COURT
1144 GENOVA CAPITAL, INC. et al.,
1155 Defendants.
1177 1188 I. INTRODUCTION 1199 On October 19, 2020, Plaintiffs Colette Pelissier and Brigham Field filed a 2200 Complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Ventura (“State Court 2211 Action”). (Notice of Removal (“Removal”) ¶¶ 1, 10, Ex. 1 (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1.) 2222 Plaintiffs contend Defendants Genova Capital, Inc. and California TD Specialists’ 2233 (“Defendants”) efforts to foreclose on their beach-front Malibu home are improper. 2244 (Compl. ¶¶ 23–40.) In the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert three claims for (1) relief 2255 pursuant to California Civil Code section 2924.17; (2) declaratory relief; and 2266 (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Id.) On October 19, 2020, 2277 Defendants removed the State Court Action to federal court, asserting federal question 2288 jurisdiction. (Removal ¶ 6.) 1 From a review of the Notice of Removal and the state court records provided, it 2 is evident that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case. 3 Accordingly, the Court sua sponte REMANDS1 this action to the California Superior 4 Court for the County of Ventura for the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as set forth 5 below.2 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 “The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and ‘a suit commenced in 8 a state court must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of 9 Congress.’” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (quoting 10 Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 280 (1918)). Generally, where Congress 11 has acted to create a right of removal, those statutes are strictly construed against 12 removal jurisdiction. Id.; Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 667 13 (9th Cir. 2012); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 14 Unless otherwise expressly provided by Congress, a defendant may remove 15 “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 16 States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Dennis v. Hart, 724 F.3d 17 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 2013). The removing defendant bears the burden of establishing 18 federal jurisdiction. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 19 2006); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566–67. “Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order 20 properly to remove [an] action pursuant to that provision, [the removing defendant] 21 must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction lies in the federal courts.” 22 Syngenta Crop Prot., 537 U.S. at 33. Failure to do so requires that the case be 23 remanded, as “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and . . . the district 24 court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.” Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n v. 25 1 In light of the Court’s determination that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, the 26 Court vacates the Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Emergency Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 16.) 27 2 After carefully considering the Notice of Removal, the Court deems the matter appropriate for sua 28 sponte decision. United Invs. Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). 1 Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). “If at any time before final 2 judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case 3 shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). It is “elementary that the subject matter 4 jurisdiction of the district court is not a waivable matter and may be raised at anytime 5 by one of the parties, by motion or in the responsive pleadings, or sua sponte by the 6 trial or reviewing court.” Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n.2 7 (9th Cir. 1988). 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 Although Defendants purported to remove based on federal question 10 jurisdiction, they fail to identify any basis for such subject matter jurisdiction. 11 To begin, the Complaint does not include any claim “arising under the Constitution, 12 laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 13 Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts claims for (1) relief pursuant to California Civil 14 Code section 2924.17; (2) declaratory relief; and (3) breach of the covenant of good 15 faith and fair dealing. (Compl. ¶¶ 23–40.) Although none of Plaintiffs’ claims 16 affirmatively allege a violation of federal law, Defendants contend that because 17 allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint appear to accuse Defendants of violating federal 18 statutes, Plaintiffs’ claims necessarily “require resolution of questions of federal law.” 19 (Removal ¶ 3.) 20 The Court disagrees. “[A] case will not be removable if the complaint does not 21 affirmatively allege a federal claim.” Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 2 22 (2003). “[T]he mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not 23 automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction.” Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. 24 Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. 25 v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986)). Rather, a state law claim is subject to federal 26 jurisdiction when a federal issue is necessarily raised if it is “basic,” “necessary,” 27 “pivotal,” “direct,” or “essential” to the claim. Id. at 1045–46; see also Easton v. 28 Crossland Mortg. Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he mere reference of 1 a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of 2 action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law claim and no 3 preemption exists.”). 4 Here, Plaintiffs have not affirmatively alleged any federal law claims (see 5 generally Complaint), and Defendants have not demonstrated any purported federal 6 law issues are necessary or essential Plaintiffs’ claims. See Lippitt, 478 U.S. at 808. 7 Plaintiffs have asserted only claims arising under state law and for declaratory relief. 8 (See Compl. ¶¶ 23–40.) Plaintiffs’ first state law claim is brought under California 9 Civil Code section 2924.17, a state statute that requires certain documents filed by the 10 mortgage servicer be accurate and complete. (Compl.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
O 11 JS-6 22
44 55 66 77 United States District Court 88 Central District of California 99 1100 1111 BRIGHAM FIELD et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-09563-ODW-(JCx)
1122 Plaintiffs, ORDER REMANDING CASE TO
1133 v. STATE COURT
1144 GENOVA CAPITAL, INC. et al.,
1155 Defendants.
1177 1188 I. INTRODUCTION 1199 On October 19, 2020, Plaintiffs Colette Pelissier and Brigham Field filed a 2200 Complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Ventura (“State Court 2211 Action”). (Notice of Removal (“Removal”) ¶¶ 1, 10, Ex. 1 (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1.) 2222 Plaintiffs contend Defendants Genova Capital, Inc. and California TD Specialists’ 2233 (“Defendants”) efforts to foreclose on their beach-front Malibu home are improper. 2244 (Compl. ¶¶ 23–40.) In the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert three claims for (1) relief 2255 pursuant to California Civil Code section 2924.17; (2) declaratory relief; and 2266 (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Id.) On October 19, 2020, 2277 Defendants removed the State Court Action to federal court, asserting federal question 2288 jurisdiction. (Removal ¶ 6.) 1 From a review of the Notice of Removal and the state court records provided, it 2 is evident that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case. 3 Accordingly, the Court sua sponte REMANDS1 this action to the California Superior 4 Court for the County of Ventura for the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as set forth 5 below.2 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 “The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and ‘a suit commenced in 8 a state court must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of 9 Congress.’” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (quoting 10 Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 280 (1918)). Generally, where Congress 11 has acted to create a right of removal, those statutes are strictly construed against 12 removal jurisdiction. Id.; Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 667 13 (9th Cir. 2012); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 14 Unless otherwise expressly provided by Congress, a defendant may remove 15 “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 16 States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Dennis v. Hart, 724 F.3d 17 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 2013). The removing defendant bears the burden of establishing 18 federal jurisdiction. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 19 2006); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566–67. “Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order 20 properly to remove [an] action pursuant to that provision, [the removing defendant] 21 must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction lies in the federal courts.” 22 Syngenta Crop Prot., 537 U.S. at 33. Failure to do so requires that the case be 23 remanded, as “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and . . . the district 24 court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.” Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n v. 25 1 In light of the Court’s determination that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, the 26 Court vacates the Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Emergency Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 16.) 27 2 After carefully considering the Notice of Removal, the Court deems the matter appropriate for sua 28 sponte decision. United Invs. Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). 1 Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). “If at any time before final 2 judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case 3 shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). It is “elementary that the subject matter 4 jurisdiction of the district court is not a waivable matter and may be raised at anytime 5 by one of the parties, by motion or in the responsive pleadings, or sua sponte by the 6 trial or reviewing court.” Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n.2 7 (9th Cir. 1988). 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 Although Defendants purported to remove based on federal question 10 jurisdiction, they fail to identify any basis for such subject matter jurisdiction. 11 To begin, the Complaint does not include any claim “arising under the Constitution, 12 laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 13 Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts claims for (1) relief pursuant to California Civil 14 Code section 2924.17; (2) declaratory relief; and (3) breach of the covenant of good 15 faith and fair dealing. (Compl. ¶¶ 23–40.) Although none of Plaintiffs’ claims 16 affirmatively allege a violation of federal law, Defendants contend that because 17 allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint appear to accuse Defendants of violating federal 18 statutes, Plaintiffs’ claims necessarily “require resolution of questions of federal law.” 19 (Removal ¶ 3.) 20 The Court disagrees. “[A] case will not be removable if the complaint does not 21 affirmatively allege a federal claim.” Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 2 22 (2003). “[T]he mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not 23 automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction.” Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. 24 Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. 25 v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986)). Rather, a state law claim is subject to federal 26 jurisdiction when a federal issue is necessarily raised if it is “basic,” “necessary,” 27 “pivotal,” “direct,” or “essential” to the claim. Id. at 1045–46; see also Easton v. 28 Crossland Mortg. Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he mere reference of 1 a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of 2 action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law claim and no 3 preemption exists.”). 4 Here, Plaintiffs have not affirmatively alleged any federal law claims (see 5 generally Complaint), and Defendants have not demonstrated any purported federal 6 law issues are necessary or essential Plaintiffs’ claims. See Lippitt, 478 U.S. at 808. 7 Plaintiffs have asserted only claims arising under state law and for declaratory relief. 8 (See Compl. ¶¶ 23–40.) Plaintiffs’ first state law claim is brought under California 9 Civil Code section 2924.17, a state statute that requires certain documents filed by the 10 mortgage servicer be accurate and complete. (Compl. ¶¶ 23–28.) 11 Plaintiffs’ second claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 12 dealing (Complaint ¶¶ 37–40), is also a state law claim. See Rosenfeld v. JPMorgan 13 Chase Bank, N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 952, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Under California law, 14 every contract ‘imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 15 performance and its enforcement.’” (quoting McClain v. Octagon Plaza, LLC, 159 16 Cal. App. 4th 784, 796 (2008))); see also Judicial Council of California Civil Jury 17 Instruction 325. 18 Moreover, no federal question is presented by Plaintiffs’ final claim, which 19 seeks a declaration that Defendants are not legally entitled to foreclose on their 20 property. (Compl. ¶¶ 29–36); see Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 21 Rsrv., 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (“To obtain declaratory relief in federal 22 court, there must be an independent basis for jurisdiction.”); see also Bravo v. Argent 23 Mortg. Co., LLC, No. CV 09-02691 SJO (JCx), 2009 WL 1322572, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 24 May 8, 2009) (“[F]ederal question jurisdiction exists only if the claim for declaratory 25 relief ‘arises under’ federal law.”) Here, Plaintiffs allege only that Defendants’ 26 attempt to foreclose on their property is wrongful because it is based on the same 27 promissory note as a previous foreclosure, and that certain irregularities in the parties’ 28 1 || relationship render the attempted foreclosure illegal. (Compl. {| 29-36.) No federal 2 || question 1s presented by these allegations. 3 Therefore, Defendants have not met their burden to establish that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds of federal question 5 || jurisdiction. 6 IV. CONCLUSION 7 For the foregoing reasons, the Court REMANDS the action to the Superior 8 || Court of the State of California, County of Ventura, 800 South Victoria Avenue, Ventura, CA 93009, Case No. 56-2020-00546243-CU-OR-VTA. The Clerk of the 10 | Court shall close this case. 11 12 IT ISSO ORDERED. 13 14 October 23, 2020 . 15 a 16 tee |
7 OTIS D. GHT, I ig UNITED STATES’DISTRICT JUDGE
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28