Briggs v. Upjohn Co.

Michigan Court of Appeals

Briggs v. Upjohn Co.

503 N.W.2d 695, 200 Mich. App. 62

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedJune 7, 1993

DocketDocket 136340

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 503 N.W.2d 695 (Briggs v. Upjohn Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Briggs v. Upjohn Co., 503 N.W.2d 695, 200 Mich. App. 62 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).

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Opinions

Taylor, J.

In this products liability case, defendant appeals by leave granted the Muskegon Circuit Court order vacating an earlier protective order that prevented the dissemination of documents obtained through discovery. We reverse.

In their suit against defendant, plaintiffs alleged that plaintiff John Briggs’ ingestion of Halcion, manufactured and sold by defendant Upjohn, was a factor leading him to attempt suicide. Although this attempt was unsuccessful, he contended that he was seriously maimed as a result of the attempt.¹ Defendant moved for a protective order of confidentiality covering the documents plaintiffs requested from defendant during discovery. The parties ultimately agreed that, among other things, plaintiffs would be allowed full access to the documents without the necessity of individual review of each document by the court; in return, plaintiffs agreed that they would not divulge the contents of the documents, except as necessary for purposes of the lawsuit. Although counsel for plaintiffs were entitled to use discovered documents in their own related cases, it was agreed [64]*64that, when the case was over, plaintiffs would return the documents to Upjohn. A comprehensive protective order containing the terms of the agreement was entered. The order provided that its terms could be modified by the trial court during discovery upon a showing of "need and good cause.”

This arrangement worked well: over 400,000 documents were produced, of which approximately 25,000 were photocopied. Mediation was eventually conducted and resulted in an evaluation of $75,000 for plaintiffs. This evaluation was accepted by all. However, very soon afterward, plaintiffs moved to vacate the protective order with regard to all of the approximately 25,000 documents that were copied, and, after a hearing regarding the motion, the trial court granted the motion to vacate. In contravention of the terms of the protective order pertaining to the subsequent release of the documents, the trial court reviewed fewer than one percent of the documents that were ordered released. In short, the trial court took action under the aegis of the provision of the order allowing modification upon a showing of "need and good cause” as if that provision gave it carte blanche for canceling the terms of the agreement of the parties that supported the order.

Defendant’s first claim on appeal is that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek vacation of the protective order once the mediation evaluation was accepted and the case concluded. In view of the fact that the protective order purports to control the parties in perpetuity with respect to these discovery documents, we will assume, for the sake of argument, that plaintiffs had standing to attack the protective order. However, we agree with defendant’s second argument, i.e., that plaintiffs should be estopped from renouncing the protective [65]*65order after stipulating to its terms, receiving its benefits, and thereby inducing defendant to produce confidential documents in reliance upon the protective order’s provisions concerning confidentiality and the return of documents. We note that even if abolition, as opposed to modification of the protective order, was within the trial court’s authority, in light of the parties’ agreement, the trial court abused its discretion² here because no documentary review of the great majority of the documents, as required by the pertinent provisions of the protective order, was ever done by the trial court before its ruling and plaintiffs acted in bad faith in moving to vacate the protective order. To allow plaintiffs to prevail with regard to such a motion is to undermine the parties’ efforts to agree on umbrella protective orders in complex cases and to destroy discovery as we know it. Zenith Radio Corp v Matsushita Electric Industrial Co, Ltd, 529 F Supp 866, 889, 894 (ED Pa, 1981). See also Hoye v Westfield Ins Co, 194 Mich App 696, 705; 487 NW2d 838 (1992).

Reversed.

Fitzgerald, J., concurred.

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Taylor, J.

In this products liability case, defendant appeals by leave granted the Muskegon Circuit Court order vacating an earlier protective order that prevented the dissemination of documents obtained through discovery. We reverse.

In their suit against defendant, plaintiffs alleged that plaintiff John Briggs’ ingestion of Halcion, manufactured and sold by defendant Upjohn, was a factor leading him to attempt suicide. Although this attempt was unsuccessful, he contended that he was seriously maimed as a result of the attempt.¹ Defendant moved for a protective order of confidentiality covering the documents plaintiffs requested from defendant during discovery. The parties ultimately agreed that, among other things, plaintiffs would be allowed full access to the documents without the necessity of individual review of each document by the court; in return, plaintiffs agreed that they would not divulge the contents of the documents, except as necessary for purposes of the lawsuit. Although counsel for plaintiffs were entitled to use discovered documents in their own related cases, it was agreed [64]*64that, when the case was over, plaintiffs would return the documents to Upjohn. A comprehensive protective order containing the terms of the agreement was entered. The order provided that its terms could be modified by the trial court during discovery upon a showing of "need and good cause.”

This arrangement worked well: over 400,000 documents were produced, of which approximately 25,000 were photocopied. Mediation was eventually conducted and resulted in an evaluation of $75,000 for plaintiffs. This evaluation was accepted by all. However, very soon afterward, plaintiffs moved to vacate the protective order with regard to all of the approximately 25,000 documents that were copied, and, after a hearing regarding the motion, the trial court granted the motion to vacate. In contravention of the terms of the protective order pertaining to the subsequent release of the documents, the trial court reviewed fewer than one percent of the documents that were ordered released. In short, the trial court took action under the aegis of the provision of the order allowing modification upon a showing of "need and good cause” as if that provision gave it carte blanche for canceling the terms of the agreement of the parties that supported the order.

Defendant’s first claim on appeal is that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek vacation of the protective order once the mediation evaluation was accepted and the case concluded. In view of the fact that the protective order purports to control the parties in perpetuity with respect to these discovery documents, we will assume, for the sake of argument, that plaintiffs had standing to attack the protective order. However, we agree with defendant’s second argument, i.e., that plaintiffs should be estopped from renouncing the protective [65]*65order after stipulating to its terms, receiving its benefits, and thereby inducing defendant to produce confidential documents in reliance upon the protective order’s provisions concerning confidentiality and the return of documents. We note that even if abolition, as opposed to modification of the protective order, was within the trial court’s authority, in light of the parties’ agreement, the trial court abused its discretion² here because no documentary review of the great majority of the documents, as required by the pertinent provisions of the protective order, was ever done by the trial court before its ruling and plaintiffs acted in bad faith in moving to vacate the protective order. To allow plaintiffs to prevail with regard to such a motion is to undermine the parties’ efforts to agree on umbrella protective orders in complex cases and to destroy discovery as we know it. Zenith Radio Corp v Matsushita Electric Industrial Co, Ltd, 529 F Supp 866, 889, 894 (ED Pa, 1981). See also Hoye v Westfield Ins Co, 194 Mich App 696, 705; 487 NW2d 838 (1992).

Reversed.

Fitzgerald, J., concurred.

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503 N.W.2d 695, 200 Mich. App. 62, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/briggs-v-upjohn-co-michctapp-1993.

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