Thompson, Justice.
We granted an interlocutory appeal in this case to determine whether OCGA § 16-8-60 (b), which criminalizes the possession and distribution of sounds or images without a label bearing the name and address of the transferor of the sounds or images, is either (1) unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, or (2) preempted by federal copyright law. The short answer to these questions is “no.”
Defendant, who was found in possession of 52 individually wrapped compact discs that allegedly bear unauthorized reproductions of recorded material, was indicted for violating OCGA § 16-8-60 (b), which provides, in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any person... to sell; distribute; circulate; offer for sale, distribution or circulation; or possess for the purposes of sale, distribution or circulation any phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, videotape, film, or other article on which sounds or visual images have been transferred unless such phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, videotape, film or other article bears the actual name and address of the transferor of the sounds or visual images in a prominent place on its outside face or package.
Defendant attacked the statute and moved to dismiss the indictment on constitutional and federal preemption grounds. In granting defendant’s application for interlocutory appellate review, we posed these questions: (1) Did the trial court err in its determination that OCGA § 16-8-60 is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad? (2) Did the trial court err in its determination that OCGA § 16-8-60 is not preempted by federal copyright law?
[330]*3301. Unconstitutionally vague. Defendant asserts that the phrase “transferor of the sounds or visual images,” found in OCGA § 16-8-60 (b), is inherently vague and renders the statute unconstitutional. We disagree. As this court observed in Mixon v. State, 226 Ga. 869, 870 (178 SE2d 189) (1970):
“The uncertainty in a statute which will amount to a denial of due process of law is not the difficulty of ascertaining whether close cases fall within or without the prohibition of the statute, but whether the standard established by the statute is so uncertain that it cannot be determined with reasonable definiteness that any particular act is disapproved; and a criminal statute is sufficiently definite if its terms furnish a test based on knowable criteria which men of common intelligence who come in contact with the statute may use with reasonable safety in determining its command.” 16 AmJur2d 954, § 552.
Reading the statute as a whole, as we are bound to do, see Lindsey v. State, 277 Ga. 772, 773 (596 SE2d 140) (2004) (in testing constitutionality, statute is examined in its entire context), we find it to be sufficiently definite to satisfy due process standards. It is true, as defendant points out, that the statute does not itself define the term “transferor.” However, we are confident that, as used in the statute, the term is clear and straightforward.
A “transferor” is one who conveys title or property to another. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). In the context of the statute, a “transferor of the sounds” is the individual who conveyed the sounds by transferring them to the article in question. Thus, the statute plainly prohibits the sale, or possession for the purposes of sale, of an article that does not prominently display the name and address of the individual (or entity) who transferred the sounds to the article. [331]*331Lindsey v. State, supra. The statute meets that due process requirement. See also State v. Gale Distributors, 349 S2d 150 (Fla. 1977); People v. Zakarian, 460 NE2d 422 (121 Ill. App. 3d 968) (1984).
[330]*330The
prohibition against excessive vagueness does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater precision. Many statutes will have some inherent vagueness for “[i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” . . . All the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden.
[331]*3312. Unconstitutionally overbroad. Defendant contends the statute is overbroad because, although it may properly prohibit criminal conduct, it simultaneously chills constitutionally protected speech. In this regard, defendant argues that the statute is a content specific regulation on pure speech; that, therefore, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny; and that the statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve its goal because it compels an artist or transferor to disclose information he may wish to keep private. Defendant’s contention cannot be sustained because the statute does not impinge upon pure speech. At most, the statute regulates a combination of commercial conduct and speech. Compare McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U. S. 334 (115 SC 1511, 131 LE2d 426) (1995) (anti-anonymity provision of political campaign literature was an unconstitutional limitation on pure speech) with Anderson v. Nidorf, 26 F3d 100 (9th Cir. 1994) (California statute which criminalizes the selling of recordings without a label did not regulate pure speech).
Under the test enunciated in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376 (88 SC 1673, 20 LE2d 672) (1968), the government may regulate conduct that may have both speech and “nonspeech” elements if the regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedom is no greater than necessary to further the governmental interest.
State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 671 (398 SE2d 547) (1990). OCGA § 16-8-60 (b) meets the O’Brien test. It aims to protect the public and entertainment industry from piracy and bootlegging, a legitimate governmental interest unrelated to free speech concerns. To the extent that it can be said that it curtails an artist’s or transferor’s desire to remain anonymous,1 its deterrent effect on legitimate expression is minimal. Compare Cunningham v. State, 260 Ga. 827 (400 SE2d 916) (1991) (statute banning motor vehicle decal containing profane words substantially affects protected speech) with State v. Miller, supra (anti-mask law does not affect a substantial amount of innocent behavior). The statute is not, therefore, overbroad.
[332]*3323. Federal preemption.
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Thompson, Justice.
We granted an interlocutory appeal in this case to determine whether OCGA § 16-8-60 (b), which criminalizes the possession and distribution of sounds or images without a label bearing the name and address of the transferor of the sounds or images, is either (1) unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, or (2) preempted by federal copyright law. The short answer to these questions is “no.”
Defendant, who was found in possession of 52 individually wrapped compact discs that allegedly bear unauthorized reproductions of recorded material, was indicted for violating OCGA § 16-8-60 (b), which provides, in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any person... to sell; distribute; circulate; offer for sale, distribution or circulation; or possess for the purposes of sale, distribution or circulation any phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, videotape, film, or other article on which sounds or visual images have been transferred unless such phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, videotape, film or other article bears the actual name and address of the transferor of the sounds or visual images in a prominent place on its outside face or package.
Defendant attacked the statute and moved to dismiss the indictment on constitutional and federal preemption grounds. In granting defendant’s application for interlocutory appellate review, we posed these questions: (1) Did the trial court err in its determination that OCGA § 16-8-60 is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad? (2) Did the trial court err in its determination that OCGA § 16-8-60 is not preempted by federal copyright law?
[330]*3301. Unconstitutionally vague. Defendant asserts that the phrase “transferor of the sounds or visual images,” found in OCGA § 16-8-60 (b), is inherently vague and renders the statute unconstitutional. We disagree. As this court observed in Mixon v. State, 226 Ga. 869, 870 (178 SE2d 189) (1970):
“The uncertainty in a statute which will amount to a denial of due process of law is not the difficulty of ascertaining whether close cases fall within or without the prohibition of the statute, but whether the standard established by the statute is so uncertain that it cannot be determined with reasonable definiteness that any particular act is disapproved; and a criminal statute is sufficiently definite if its terms furnish a test based on knowable criteria which men of common intelligence who come in contact with the statute may use with reasonable safety in determining its command.” 16 AmJur2d 954, § 552.
Reading the statute as a whole, as we are bound to do, see Lindsey v. State, 277 Ga. 772, 773 (596 SE2d 140) (2004) (in testing constitutionality, statute is examined in its entire context), we find it to be sufficiently definite to satisfy due process standards. It is true, as defendant points out, that the statute does not itself define the term “transferor.” However, we are confident that, as used in the statute, the term is clear and straightforward.
A “transferor” is one who conveys title or property to another. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). In the context of the statute, a “transferor of the sounds” is the individual who conveyed the sounds by transferring them to the article in question. Thus, the statute plainly prohibits the sale, or possession for the purposes of sale, of an article that does not prominently display the name and address of the individual (or entity) who transferred the sounds to the article. [331]*331Lindsey v. State, supra. The statute meets that due process requirement. See also State v. Gale Distributors, 349 S2d 150 (Fla. 1977); People v. Zakarian, 460 NE2d 422 (121 Ill. App. 3d 968) (1984).
[330]*330The
prohibition against excessive vagueness does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater precision. Many statutes will have some inherent vagueness for “[i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” . . . All the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden.
[331]*3312. Unconstitutionally overbroad. Defendant contends the statute is overbroad because, although it may properly prohibit criminal conduct, it simultaneously chills constitutionally protected speech. In this regard, defendant argues that the statute is a content specific regulation on pure speech; that, therefore, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny; and that the statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve its goal because it compels an artist or transferor to disclose information he may wish to keep private. Defendant’s contention cannot be sustained because the statute does not impinge upon pure speech. At most, the statute regulates a combination of commercial conduct and speech. Compare McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U. S. 334 (115 SC 1511, 131 LE2d 426) (1995) (anti-anonymity provision of political campaign literature was an unconstitutional limitation on pure speech) with Anderson v. Nidorf, 26 F3d 100 (9th Cir. 1994) (California statute which criminalizes the selling of recordings without a label did not regulate pure speech).
Under the test enunciated in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376 (88 SC 1673, 20 LE2d 672) (1968), the government may regulate conduct that may have both speech and “nonspeech” elements if the regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedom is no greater than necessary to further the governmental interest.
State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 671 (398 SE2d 547) (1990). OCGA § 16-8-60 (b) meets the O’Brien test. It aims to protect the public and entertainment industry from piracy and bootlegging, a legitimate governmental interest unrelated to free speech concerns. To the extent that it can be said that it curtails an artist’s or transferor’s desire to remain anonymous,1 its deterrent effect on legitimate expression is minimal. Compare Cunningham v. State, 260 Ga. 827 (400 SE2d 916) (1991) (statute banning motor vehicle decal containing profane words substantially affects protected speech) with State v. Miller, supra (anti-mask law does not affect a substantial amount of innocent behavior). The statute is not, therefore, overbroad.
[332]*3323. Federal preemption. State law rights that are the equivalent of those protected under the federal copyright law are preempted. 17 USCA§ 301. To determine whether a state law is the equivalent of the federal copyright law, the courts often apply what has become known as Nimmer’s2 “extra-element” test:
[A] right which is “equivalent to copyright” is one which is infringed by the mere act of reproduction, performance, distribution or display. ... If under state law the act of reproduction, performance, distribution or display,... will in itself infringe the state created right, then such right is preempted. But if other elements are required, in addition to or instead of, the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or display, in order to constitute a state created cause of action, then the right does not lie “within the general scope of copyright,” and there is no preemption.
Collezione Europa U. S. A. v. Hillsdale House, 243 FSupp.2d 444, 449 (M.D. N.C. 2003).
The statute in question, OCGA § 16-8-60 (b), criminalizes the sale, or the possession for purposes of sale, of recordings which do not carry a label identifying the “transferor” of the sounds, regardless of their copyright status. The statute does not criminalize unauthorized copyrighted works. The federal copyright law, on the other hand, protects the exclusive right of the copyright owner to reproduce, perform, distribute or display the copyrighted work. See 17 USCA § 106. Thus, the Georgia statute contains an extra element — i.e., labeling — which qualitatively distinguishes it from federal copyright law and saves it from preemption. See Anderson v. Nidorf, supra (California statute prohibiting sale of recordings without disclosing manufacturer and author was not preempted by federal copyright law).
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, P. J., and Carley, J., who concur specially, and Sears, C. J., and Melton, J., who dissent.